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Crisis can happen any time and any where. Whether the crisis comes in or out, it depends on 
the effectiveness of the crisis communication strategy. Communication strategy becomes a very 
important key for crisis recovery.  Based on the several researches, it was found that the 
strategy is selected on the basis of constructed reality about the crisis situation and other things 
related to the crisis. Based on my point of view, to select the strategy does not only refer to the 
situation of crisis but also any other factors. Refering to the system theory a strategy is selected 
on the basis of the structural characters of the organization and social system. On the other 
hand, based on the structuration theory, the strategy not only can be created in line with the 
character of the structure but also creates the structure. It means that the actor is active to 
create new action and new structure.    
 
This dissertation explained the crisis communication strategy applied by the Presidents in 
responding to the multidimensional crisis that happened during 1998 – 2004 and the contextual 
factors in the strategy choice. Focus of this dissertation is the crisis communication strategy 
chosen by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia and the 
choices. The strategy is identified by exploring, analyzing and interpreting the content or text of 
the written speeches of the President. Interpretive approach and discourse analysis was applied. 
The context is also identified by analyzing and interpreting the text of news editorial from two 
Indonesian national newspapers. The structuration theory and a little part of system theory, for 
comparing purpose, are used as a basis of interpretation to link or to connect the text to the 
context.  
 
The dissertation shows that the President tended to apply the defensive strategy. It is the 
strategy to defense ourselves in responding to the “publics accusation” by avoiding that we do a 
wrong or mistake, or contribute to the mistake. The dissertation also shows that this  strategy 
can be connected by (1) the Public Relations practices which are more technical, mechanistic 
and applies one way relationship model, (2) the organizational structure which is structured, 
formal, and centralistic, and  (3) the personal characters and attributes of the President which 
are more introvert and mindless.   
 
In conclusion, the selected strategy or the action is influenced by the structural factors, both in 
an organization level and a larger system. The context of the choice is the structure. It was 
produced by the previous dominant people in the past. It constrains and also enables the 
current and next presidents in responding to the crisis. Unfortunately, in the case of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, actor failed to break the chain of the interplay between a structure and an 
agency. Structure and the structure reproducing are more dominant. Based on the finding, I 
would like to say that it is not enough to understand the crisis situation to select the best 
strategy to respond to the crisis. It needs understanding the rules, resources and the structure in 
an environment and also the interplay between the structure and the strategy.    
 
Keywords:  crisis communication, strategy, defensive, accommodative, structure, agency.
  





Crisis can happen any time and any where. Organization and individual can face a crisis. 
If it happens, an organization and an individual stand on a critical or crucial time.  Staying alive 
or collapse of an organization or individual depends on the way they manage the crisis. 
Applying a wrong way in crisis management will lead them to get collapse. Therefore, the way 
of crisis management, called strategy, would be planned carefully. Communication is inherent in 
crisis management. As stated by Benoit (Coombs 2001:321) communication is a part of the 
success of a crisis management effort. What an organization or a person says and does is critical 
for the success. Hence, it is important to think both crisis management strategy and crisis 
communication strategy. The two strategies can not be separated. A right communication 
strategy choice can be meant an effective crisis management strategy.      
Crisis communication is one of the public relations fields. There are several researches 
about it. Almost is in context of business and corporation and the crisis related to business or 
profit organization. Based on the past researches, it has been found that there are some factors 
that influence the leader to apply certain strategy. It means that the strategy is selected by 
considering the several factors, which I identify as factors related to the crisis. I thought to find 
out of the contextual factors, it needs to use structuration theory. It offers the thesis that the 
organizational action, as well as the strategy of crisis communication, can be created not only 
because of the structure or system, as explained on system theory, but also of the individual’s 
own free will. So, leader and his action can be seen not as a part of the structure, but as an 
agent who is capable to act by his own free will, creativity, and to create innovation.  
By utilizing some concepts and propositions in those researches, the dissertation is 
purposed to analyze crisis communication strategy applied by public or political leaders in 
context of public or political organization. Multidimensional crisis that has happened in 
Indonesia comes to be a research case. This dissertation is intended to explain the strategy of 
crisis communication which is applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of 
Republic of Indonesia and the contextual factors could be connected to the strategy choice. 
The explanation is started by Chapter One that describes (1) the research background, derived 
into the explanation of crisis situation in Indonesia and its impact on the presidents’ image. In 
this part is also explained factors might be the reasons of the failure of the government and 
  
                                                                                        2  
president to overcome the crisis faster. Those factors are their low sense of crisis and bad 
relations with the press and publics; (2) theoretical problem explains the important concepts of 
crisis communication strategy and the factors related to the strategy choice; and (3) research 
problem. It is followed by (4) the methodology; (5) research delimitation; and also (6) the 
description of the dissertation structure.  
             
1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
1.1.1. Indonesia during the crisis   
It is not deniable that Indonesia has ever experienced crisis. Almost all of the Indonesian 
Presidents admitted that Indonesia was in crisis and in a very crucial and critical time for 
Indonesian survival. Different from other Asian countries, Indonesian government was 
assessed not quite successful in dealing with the crisis. Crisis was not resolved in a short time, 
but contrarily, crisis developed to be worse and very serious. Single crisis that was just a 
monetary crisis was becoming to be multidimensional crisis. It indicated that the Indonesia 
governments, and also the Presidents, have failed in dealing with that crisis. The incapability of 
this country to come out from crisis quickly has not only destroyed the image of Indonesia, but 
also image of Indonesian governments and the Presidents.   
It is not easy to construct an image, so is to maintain and regain the already-destroyed-
image. This is what Indonesia is dealing with currently. Incidences happened in successions, 
whose effect was on the establishment of an adverse nation image on its own point of view, 
moreover on that of other nations. Below are some economical, political, and social events 
occurred during 1998 - 2004 which have demolished the image of Indonesia. The successive 
events have taken place during the reign of four Presidents, these were Haji Muhammad 
Soeharto (HM Soeharto), Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (BJ Habibie), Kiai Haji Abdurrahman 
Wahid (KH Abdurrahman Wahid/ Gus Dur) and Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
It is difficult to identify the real causes of Indonesian crisis that has been occurring since 
the middle of 1997. Economical problem that occurred in Philippine, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand was assumed as the triggered events for the Indonesian economical problem. Begun 
in 1997, Indonesia has experienced many incidences that deteriorated the national economy. A 
serial of incidences has been intertwined one to another with an unexpected huge incidence at 
its end that has brought destruction and loss with it.  Started on the middle of 1997, the value 
of Indonesian currency (Rupiah/ Rp) declined toward US Dollar. The value of one US dollar 
that is equal with Rp 2.500,00 in time before 1997 changed into Rp 16.700,00 on June 17, 1998. 
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The rupiah devaluation against US dollar was followed by instability of rupiah value. It causes 
the degree of inflation hit into seven times more in 1998. Many international, national, regional 
and local-scale companies in Indonesia were bankrupt. It brought the problems of 
unemployment. Worker termination has increased the number of unemployment and people 
who have poor economical condition. The number of unemployment increased, from 4.1 
million people in 1997 to 5.1 million people in 1998 (Julianery 2002: 39-42). This situation 
encouraged Indonesian people to enforce Soeharto to descend from his reign for he was 
considered to be unable to overcome the people’s economic problems. The requirement was 
then followed by huge chaotic actions in 13-15 May 1998 in such ways as arsons, massacre, 
vandalism, plundering and even Chinese women rape.  Media reported that there was a million 
of people dead, injured, raped and also billion rupiahs was lost (Kompas Cyber Media, 14 May 
2002). This tragedy followed the tragedy of Trisakti 12 May 1998 that there were four students 
dead1. The same incident occurred again in Semanggi on November 13th 19982. This incident 
caused 13 people were dead and 253 people got injured.  
Those incidents insisted on Soeharto, overwhelmed by the poor image shaped by the 
people, resigned in May 21, 1998. However, the economic crisis was still continuing. 
Incapability of the government and the unsupportive political situation in that time have 
affected on the Indonesian’s image on international publics. It is characterized by the decline of 
investors from overseas, the decreasing of tourism visitors, the threat of economic embargo 
from the international donors, the severance of contracts of international commercial 
collaborations either in private or public sectors, and the descend of share value in stock 
exchange. The decline of investment rate is started in 2001 that shown by the decreasing of 
accepted investment and the low of investment realization (Gianie 2002:94-97).  
In the other aspect, in 1998, Indonesia has experienced the worst of national security 
during 32 years of HM Soeharto’s reign. It is indicated by the travel warning or ban to 
Indonesia launched by several countries. The number of tourism visitors that was 5.185.243 
people in 1997, decreased into 4.606.416 people in 1998 (Julianery 2002: 58).  The national 
tourism investment fell into 18.6%.  Indonesian tourism achievement is in worst position in the 
                                                 
1 Related to the incident, two personnel of Indonesian National Police (POLRI) namely, Agus Tri Heryanto 
and Pariyo were brought to the court. On August 12th 1998, Agus received ten months imprisonment and 
Pariyo received 4 months because they were stated guilty not obey the institutional instruction and overused 
their authority in handling Trisakti demonstration.  They were not stated as the actors of the students firing 
(Headquarter of Indonesian National Police 1999:253-264). This case is still on process till 2005 because 
assessed by some people that it was not clear yet. The real actors were not found.   
2 In this incident, the Minister of Security and Defense of the Republic of Indonesia admitted that there were 
175 military personnel behaved too defensive and ignored the procedure, shoot and hit the students.      
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last ten years (Kristianto 2002:166-168).  In the period of 1997-2001, as quoted from The 
World Competitiveness Year Book IMD 2002, Indonesia has experienced bad rating in the 
world competition, on the aspect of prospect and business climate.  In 1997, Indonesia was in 
the level “38”, in 1998 it went down into the level “40” and in 2001 Indonesia was in the 
position “49”. It means that in four years (1998-2001) Indonesia was in fifth lowest rating  in 
aspects of economic growth, political situation, business and infrastructure (Julianery 2002:68-
70). The data show that Indonesian’s image was clearly not conducive for gaining high 
achievement in the world competitive economy and business.         
The leadership of Soeharto was authorized onto BJ Habibie. Still with the same hope, 
the people required the economic improvement, by eradicating collusion, corruption and 
nepotism (CCN) that was indicated as a culture of Soeharto’s regime and thought as the 
resources of economic problems. During his rule, the echo of demand to judge Soeharto as the 
promulgator of collusion, corruption and nepotism and crisis roots were getting more intense. 
Even though Habibie took some breakthrough new policies, for example, press freedom, 
people still considered him as just the same figure as Soeharto, the part of New Order. During 
his term East Timor was exempted of Indonesia at August 30, 1999, which was the result of 
polling full of intimidating action, violence and human rights violation among East-Timoreste 
by Indonesian military. The separation of East Timor, one of the twenty seven provinces in 
Indonesia in that time, is believed as the biggest mistake and the main source of the fail of the 
BJ Habibie’s presidency (Sugiya, 2002:223).     
In 1999 an election was held, which bore the figure of Gus Dur or Abdurrahman 
Wahid as the fourth President, substituting for BJ Habibie. The image of Abdurrahman Wahid 
as a nationalist, democrat and humanist lead to the birth of trust among people that the new 
president would bring a new bright hope to the future of the nation. However, during his rule, 
the crisis did not cease yet. Social crisis, such as conflicts in various dimensions were conceived 
to be purged.  Frequency and intensity of crime, ethnic, religion and region conflict was 
increasing. The conflicts of -- such as religion or ethnicity – related chaos — have increased 
and taken place in many areas since 1997. Big ethnic unrests happened in 1999 in Kabupaten 
Sambas, West Kalimantan3, which was followed by the same unrest that happened in Poso, 
Central Sulawesi (1998-2002), in Maluku and North Maluku (January 1999- April 2002). This 
                                                 
3At least, there were 11 serious ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan since 1950 until 1999. Conflict occurred in 
Sambas (January-April 1999) involved ethnic Melayu – Dayak -- Madura. In this conflict 68.000 Madura 
people have been evacuated, and 200 people were dead. Thousand of buildings were burned, public facilities 
were damaged and also economy and business life were inhibited (Tridianto 2002:321-334).       
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kind of conflicts continually followed the conflicts that occurred before, namely conflict in 
Kupang (November 30-December 2, 1998), Ketapang and Kupang in 1998 and Karawang, 
West Java in 1999. On February until April 2001 horizontal conflict also happened in Sampit, 
Central Kalimantan4. Most of the mass riots above occurred in the era of KH Abdurrahaman 
Wahid’s administration, but some of them are continuing, until the Megawati’s administration. 
All the mass riots have caused hundred(s) people died and thousand(s) people were evacuated. 
Until April 5th 2002, recorded there were 1.247.449 Indonesian people lived as refugees in their 
own country (Sugiya 2002:335-337). Those conflicts and riots contributed the difficulties of this 
country to resolve the crisis. The repeating conflicts, such as occurred in Poso and Maluku, 
indicated that the efforts of the governments to make peace among people from different 
ethnics were not quite successful. Table 1 below shows the total important crimes that are 




Ethnic, Religion and Race Crimes5
2001-2003 
 
 Year Crime Total Crime Clearance Percentage 
2001 9 7 77.77% 
2002 11 8 72.72% 
2003 10 6 60% 






            Source: Indonesian National Police Today, Annual Report 1 July 2004 
  
 
In the aspect of crime, such as robbery and plundering, raged over in every places of Indonesia, 
not only in frequency but also in intensity. More than 80 cases of robbery occurred during 
1998-2002. Mass reactions to those robberies were manifested in various forms. Even, in some 
cases, the mass’ reaction is killing the victim (Suwardiman 2002:346-366).   
Beyond of the economic and social crisis, political crisis has taken place. It is indicated 
by the increasing number of political conflicts in the level of unit (actor, group) and the level of 
                                                 
4 In Sampit, the tragedy involved two ethnics, Dayak and Madura. Based on National Committee of Human 
Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM-Ind), the tragedy caused 352 people died and not less than 25 thousands 
Madura people evacuated. (Triardianto, 2002:321-334).  
5 Types of crime were various. Only few of those crimes are categorized by Indonesian National Police as 
ethnic, religion and race crimes. The National Police of Republic of Indonesia has a certain criteria for 
categorizing the type of crimes.    
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system, internal or external, from local, regional to the national level. Chaniago (2001:137-148) 
stated that the sources of political crisis in Indonesia were the uncontrolled and ambitious 
power gaining in the level of political elites. Under Gus Dur’s administration, conflicts between 
executive and legislative were put to the front. There were five cases in which Gus Dur and the 
parliament have different opinion about the issues, as follow; (1) the retirement of the head of 
Indonesian Police, (2) the effort to retire the President of Indonesian Bank, (3) the replacement 
of the three cabinet ministers, (4) the proposal of the candidate of head Indonesian Supreme 
Court, and (5) the revocation of Tap MPRS no XXV/MPRS/1966,6 (Santoso and Meming 
2002:205-207). This legislative-executive conflict was predicted as one important factor of his 
failure to hold the power until the end of the presidential period.7     
 One of good “political will” of Gus Dur was his efforts to diminish the number of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism acts. The first step of those efforts was bringing HM 
Soeharto, the second president, to the trial in the case of corruption. But, it was not successful, 
neither did ones on other corrupt culprits. The trial in the same case on Tommy, Soeharto’s 
youngest child, also failed, including the police failure to pursue his flight8. These failures were 
followed by the unsuccessful efforts of government and Indonesian attorney to bring many 
other corruptors into the court.  Several commissions established by Gus Dur were also not 
successful to overcome the multidimensional crisis. Ironically, Gus Dur lost his position as 
president by parliament’s impeachment because of corruption issue. About the number of 
corruption acts, it was difficult for Indonesia to decrease them. This situation was very bad for 
the image of Indonesia on international publics. From time to time, Indonesia always in bad 
rating in the list of very corrupted countries.    
                                                 
6  TAP MPRS no XXV/1966 explains about the prohibition of spreading of Marxism, Communism and 
Leninism.    
7 Gus Dur has lost his position as president since he got impeachment from the Indonesian Parliament in case 
of corruption and budget deviation of Bulog and financial aid from Brunei. The case was popular by the label 
“Brunei and Buloggate”. Bulog is the government institution which deals with the logistic management. Gus 
Dur was accused doing corruption and using the financial aid from Sultan Brunei for his personal purposes. 
He, finally, had to account for the case in the front of Indonesian Parliament, but his accountability was not 
accepted by the parliament. In the political discourse, the failure of Gus Dur to account for the budget was 
because of political interests than the corruption crime itself.    
8 Tommy, the youngest child of HM Suharto was brought to the court in the ruislag between PT Goro Bathara 
Sakti and Bulog. In the court, Tommy was stated not guilty. This decision was assessed by publics as the worst 
time for law enforcement in the era of BJ Habibie’s administration (Suryaningtyas, 2002:212-214). However, 
in later time, Tommy received imprisonment for his other cases, but, before he did his punishment, he escaped. 
The Indonesian national Police and the Indonesian attorney personnel have failed in pursuing him, even 
though after a period of time, the police successfully arrested him.       
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Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)9 and Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) as the 
highest Indonesian parliament held a session and inaugurated Megawati as the fifth president of 
Republic of Indonesia. The session was claimed to be very democratic. People thought that it 
could be an appropriate beginning for a crisis solution. On the other hand, there were problems 
not responded immediately by Megawati and her cabinet. The demand of radical Islamic groups 
to break up the relationship of Indonesia-USA, concerning with the terrorism action on the 
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was very intense (Danudjaja 2001:98). The 
circumstance was followed by issue of sweeping movement over white people in Indonesia. In 
Solo, 29 October 2001, sweeping had been done by hundreds of Laskar Jundullah, Kokam, 
Brigade Hisbullah and Laskar Hisbullah Sunan Bonang. Sweeping has been done in every hotel 
(Danudjaja, 2001:97-98).  It caused many white foreign people leave or canceled their visit to 
Indonesia. Next, other countries attached the label for Indonesia as the network of terrorists.  
Bomb terror occurred for many times and in many places. There are 58 cases of bombing, and 
12 unexploded bombs were found in between 1997-2002 (Suwardiman and Kristanto 2002:307-
313). Until 2005 in the later government’s administration era bomb terrors were still continuing.     
  In the meantime, the other events related to government were still ongoing. Human 
right violation done by state apparatuses in the cases of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku10;  
demonstration by publics to demand the change of the president and  the government’s 
policies; and the retirement and replacement of some cabinet minister are three of big political 
events during 1998-2002.  More than 200 times publics’ demonstration has occurred during 
1997-2002.  Almost of all were brought about by higher education’s students. Generally, they 
demanded to government to resolve crisis and to change the presidents and some of cabinet 
members. They also expressed their disappointment and disagreement to the government’s 
policies, acts and statements (Erianto and Kristianto, 2002: 224-264). Some of those 
demonstrations were being brutal and anarchistic. It made the social and political situation 
became worse.   
                                                 
9 With the president, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) has legislative power. It means that DPR has the 
authority to approve the bill. All members of DPR are the part of the members of MPR.  MPR holds the 
highest people sovereignty. It has authority to draw up the constitution and state policy and appoint the 
president and the vice president.  
10 There were many cases of human right violations during Indonesia in crisis. Referrings to the document 
written by Research and Development Unit of KOMPAS, during 1997-1999, military personnel were 
suspected kidnapping several activists, firing several students in Trisakti and Semanggi tragedies, doing 
violence in Aceh (1996-1999) and also in East Timor (1999) and killing Theys Hiyo Eluay, Head of Papua 
people board presidium (2001). In some cases, the Indonesian court decided there were no human rights 
violations, or  categorized as very hard human right violations, such a case of the killing of four students of 
Trisakti. (Meming and Santoso 2002:303-306).    
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Table 2 
 Anarchism in Demonstration 
2001-2003 
 
 Year Crime Total Crime Clearance Percentage 
2001 22 18  81.81% 
2002 20 17  85% 
2003 31 21 64.74% 




            Source: Indonesian National Police Today, Annual Report 1 July 2004 
 
In another aspect, in this period of time, the changes of cabinet ministers have happened for 
many times in the short period of time; (1) in BJ Habibie’s administration there were three 
changes of cabinet, (2) in time of KH Abdurrahman Wahid, it has happened fifteen times 
(Sugiya, 2002:220-223). In general, the changes of cabinet ministers and the cabinets were done 
many times during 1998-2004. Only in a short time, the Presidential replacements have been 
done four times, the changes of the cabinets have been done six times, namely Kabinet 
Pembangunan VI (March 19th 1993-March 16th 1998), Kabinet Pembangunan VII (March 16th 
1998 – May 21st 1998), Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan (May 23rd 1998-October 29th 1999), 
Kabinet Persatuan Nasional (October 29th 1999 – August 10th 2000), Kabinet Persatuan 
Nasional II (August 26th 2000 – July 23rd 2001), Kabinet Gotong Royong (Agust 10th 2001) and 
Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu (October 24th 2004). This fast changing indicated that people did 
not find yet the leaders as their expectation. They need leader who is able to handle the crisis 
successfully.    
Based on the explanation above, we can see how hard the crisis situation has to be faced 
by Indonesia and Indonesian people. Kompas editorial, one of the biggest Indonesian national 
newspapers described the crisis situation in Indonesia, as below: 
 
“After the financial crisis happened on July 1997, in the same time, automatically our 
economy was totally damaged. Banks were closed down, conglomerates bankrupted, the 
unemployment was increasing, all of us were trapped again in the group of poor 
countries. This situation was worsened by the political crisis happened in the later time. 
After the resign of HM Soeharto from his presidency on May 1998, this country did not 
stop experiencing the political conflicts. […] The difficulties were still added by the 
several conflicts that happened in the several areas, from Aceh to Papua. We are like 
facing something worst. We are really in the tears hill.” (Kompas, December 29th 2001). 
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Crisis, multidimensional crisis in Indonesia, which has described by Kompas above seems a 
very sorrowful drama, but it was very real if referring to the aforementioned description. Some 
people thought that until 2005, after eight years crisis has began, Indonesia was still in crisis. 
They said that the face of Indonesia has to be made up. Many areas and aspects of Indonesian 
life kept going on the unexpected road, especially since the roots or sources of the problem of 
crisis were not resolved yet. Ongoing crisis and its damages indicate that Indonesia, especially 
the governments have failed to prevent crisis occurrence and to overcome the crisis.  Crisis 
which occurred in Indonesia was because of the low sense of crisis of the government and also 
all internal publics (Jacob Oetama, 2001:176). The national daily news, Media Indonesia, wrote 
on its editorial, “Government has lost of the sense of crisis. There is no fear to the fluctuation 
of rupiah values, there is no worrying about the decreased investment and real sectors that have 
not raised yet” (LP3ES, 2003:124). Sense of crisis is sensitivity of person or organization to the 
potential existence of crisis. The low of crisis sense was indicated by unwillingness and/ or 
incapability of the government to listen to, moreover to find, the developing issues, hopes and 
demands, opinions and criticism of the society, while in the discourse of the people, 
government can find the early signals of a potential issues to be a crisis. This negligence of crisis 
signals is often labeled as low sense of crisis. This failure in capturing crisis signals makes the 
crisis evolving bigger. The government’s powerlessness in overcoming the reports on issues 
around the crisis, primarily via the Internet, is considered as the biggest mistake of the 
government. The Internet that is globalizing, that can be access by anyone and free from 
anyone’s control, including the government, regardless its accuracy, has more or less impacts on 
the government’s image in the public’s view. After the fall of HM Soeharto, along with the 
press freedom that perceived by its actors as “allowing the reporting of anything”, makes the 
government and its PR practices that implement one-way communication pattern, fails to 
manage the public discourse. In other way, Kompas, national daily news, in its editorial, stated 
that there were several factors that made Indonesian governments have a low sense of crisis; (1) 
there is a deep discrepancy of economical condition. Some parts of political elites in the 
government and its publics did not really feel and experience the economical problem; (2) the 
Indonesian political elites are not usual to behave democratically. They generally live in the 
engineered atmosphere and dirigisme, difficult to accept different opinion and interests; (3) 
Indonesian leaders are not cohesive. They generally moved on their own way, and their own 
interests (Oetama, 2001:176-177). 
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 According to the Sudarsono’s exploration (2003), the Indonesian multidimensional 
crisis is systemic, so has to be resolved by systematical efforts based on system thinking. 
Governments who play the key role to resolve the crisis have to think the crisis as a system, 
that is a product of interconnected and interacted dynamically events or actions which occurred 
in the certain period of time. Unfortunately, almost all of the Indonesian Presidents have failed 
to think systematically in resolving the crisis. It is indicated by HM Soeharto, the second of 
Indonesian President in the end of his administration, has no capability to learn (disability to 
learn). “He is trapped by ‘the parable of boiled frog’,” wrote Sudarsono in his books.  
 
“Even though has realized that in the middle of the crisis situation, the President HM 
Soeharto was not identifying clearly sooner the structure and the system crisis behavior 
and also the resolution. Indonesian people are not carried to the comprehensive 
scenario…[…]. The solution of crisis is brought about by the President was describing in 
the very general main points and not giving the convinced direction.” (Sudarsono, 
2003:118) 
          
On the other way, BJ Habibie, the third president, referring to Sudarsono’s findings, has failed 
also to think systematically.  He, moreover, did not realize that crisis has occurred, even though, 
finally he realized that Indonesia has to be faced very hard crisis situation. BJ Habibie did two 
things in dealing with the crisis, (1) fixes that fail, and (2) shifting the burden. It means that BJ 
Habibie’s efforts to resolve the crisis leads to create new problem or make the problem 
becomes worse (Sudarsono 2003: 152). Gus Dur, the fourth president, have tried to identify the 
main sources of crisis and its resolution, but, referring to his speeches, Gus Dur was still 
difficult to identify these sources of crisis, the root of problem and the solutions. Gus Dur just 
said that there were so many hard tasks, not only for the government in overcoming the crisis, 
but also for establishing the national integration. One solution of Gus Dur, as done by the last 
two presidents, is shifting the burden. Governance restructuring is the manifestation of this 
shifting the burden (Sudarsono 2003:153-173). The fifth president, Megawati Soekarno Putri 
was also not explaining the variables of the causes of crisis, how they are affected to each other 
and the kind of crisis structure which can describe the anticipation toward the structure and 
crisis resolution (Sudarsono 2003: 197). The explanation above shows us that Indonesian 
governments did not only fail in issues management, but also in the whole of crisis 
management. The failure in crisis management made crisis going to be worse. It also means that 
the nation and also presidents’ image were going worse.   
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1.1.2. The Relationship between Governments and Publics. 
The relationship between an organization and its publics is dynamic.  The relationship can 
change or be different in the different time. In crisis, positive relationship between an 
organization and its publics is very helpful to recover the crisis. The relationship, whether 
positive or negative, can be seen by analyzing (1) the image of an organization on the publics, 
(2) an organization’s views about media, and (3) the position/the importance of public relations 
for an organization.    
The following description is about the relationship between the Indonesian governments, 
especially the Indonesian presidents, and the publics. This kind of relationship might color the 
process of crisis recovery.      
 
1.1.2.1. Image of the Presidents 
This prolonged crisis11 can be a predictor of inability of the government to resolve the 
multidimensional crisis. It made the government’s reputation was not good on publics. The 
repeated president successions with such a relatively short intervals and short ruling period, 
particularly after the downfall of Soeharto, was the symbol of Indonesian people’s quest for an 
appropriate president.  It also indicates that people were not sure that presidents, with her or 
his staffs, can control the crisis. It is a symbol of people’s hopelessness to build good image for 
this country.   
 The discourse of the government having no “Sense of Crisis” also symbolizes the 
government reputation and of this nation as well. The government itself, including the 
president, is considered to have failed in handling crisis communication, in order to save their 
personal or her/his regime and also of the country’s image. For examples, people criticized Gus 
Dur not proportional with his statements about the Indonesian’s internal problems that 
delivered in many international forums. He frequently made controversial statements, policies 
and acts. There were 20 controversial policies and statements made by Gus Dur during 1999-
2000 (Kompas, 2001: 36-37). His attitudes caused his reputation declined on Indonesian people 
(Satrio, 2002:210). “Media Indonesia”, Indonesian national daily newspaper, wrote in its 
editorial 20 April 2001 about Gus Dur’s statements in international public forum. Media 
Indonesia assessed Gus Dur was spreading terrors in the middle of crisis time. This assessment 
                                                 
11  Megawati, the former President of Republic Indonesia, in the certain forum (Tuesday, 4 Dec 2003), said 
that there were many people judged that Indonesia has still been in crisis, whereas actually Indonesia was 
getting out from the crisis and ready to enter to the better future (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 December 2003).  It 
means that based on President’s point of view, Indonesia has resolved the multi-dimensional crisis.  
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was launched based on Gus Dur’s statements that there would be a national rebellion by 
hundreds of Islam and Christian groups if DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Indonesian 
parliament) was pressuring him to resign as President. Gus Dur also said that there were a 
hundred thousands of his followers in Jakarta support the continuity of his presidency.12 Those 
statements, based on Media Indonesia, could be interpreted as provocative statements that 
potential to damage the image of president and his government (LP3ES, 2003:109). In the 
other editorial, Media Indonesia also said that Gus Dur was talking too much in front of the 
international publics (LP3ES:2003:122). Not only Gus Dur, Megawati  was also judged by 
public as the President that didn’t have enough capability to be an effective public relations for 
herself and her country, especially in  case of terrorism in Indonesia after World Trade Center 
Bombing , September 11, 2001 and Bali Bombing October 12, 2002 (Media Indonesia, 28 
October 2002). Her incapability to communicate to the publics made Megawati was labeled as 
“Mrs. Silent”13.    
 Undeniably, economical crisis, political crisis, social crisis were finally followed by crisis 
of public confidence on government. The reputation of the governments during the crisis has 
never been in good level. Table 3, 4 and 5 show the governments’ achievement in economy, 
politic and social aspects based on publics’ assessment. 
 
Table 3 
Publics’ assessment on  
B J Habibie’s performance   
(in percent) 
 
Respondents’ attitude Government’s Achievement 
Agree Not agree Don’t know 
Successfully establishing press freedom 69.0 27.2 3.8 
Successfully improving economic growth 24.6 72.9 2.5 
Successfully diminishing corruption, collusion, 
nepotism  
10.7 87.1 2.2 
Successfully establishing national security 17.7 80.4 1.9 
(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211) 
                                                 
12 This event happened when Gus Dur received memorandum action related to his scandal, Brunei and 
Buloggate. The two of accountability reports of Gus Dur were rejected by the Indonesian Parliament. Its 
consequence was Gus Dur had to reign from his position as president.   
13 That Megawati was criticized by publics that she is always silent, even in the crucial time, was denied by 
Kwik  Kian Gie, the president of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia’s  Board of Research and Development. Kwik 
explained that her silent is just publics’ impression that was born because of her leadership style. Kwik also 
said that Megawati always speaks in the certain events, such as  in annually official report forum, 16 August, 
the anniversary of PDIP. “She is not talking too much but most of all her speeches have a big value. Golden is 
silent but speak out on the right moment is diamond”, Kwik was closing by the statement. (Kompas Cyber 
Media, 30 July 2002).   
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Polling was conducted by Kompas14 in the end of B J Habibie’s administration, October 1999, 
showed that 70 percent of respondents assessed that he has been failed in improving the 
economic, national security and law enforcement. Habibie was assessed successful only in 
establishing press freedom. This assessment was not different too much from publics’ 
assessment on KH Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri   
 
Table 4 
Publics’ satisfaction of    




      
(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211) 
Respondents’ attitudes 
2000  2001 
Government’s Achievement 
January July January  July
Successfully improving economic growth 50.3 25.7 19.7 10.3
Successfully improving politic and national security 41.8 30.7 21.7 13.4
Successfully establishing social welfare 41.4 30.1 30.0 18.9
 
Table 4 demonstrated good reputation of KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), but only in the 
first three months of his administration. In this the early of his presidency, publics were very 
optimistic to the capability of Gus Dur to recover the economic crisis.  But, the enthusiasm of 
publics decreased after one year of his reign. By parliament, as a representation of publics, Gus 
Dur lost his power and authority as president.      
 
Table 5 
Publics’ satisfaction of the performance of  
Megawati Soekarnoputri   
(in percent) 
 
Respondents’ attitudes  
Government’s Achievement Oct 2001 Jan 2002 April 2002 
Successfully  improving economic growth 43.0 21.9 31.3 
Successfully  improving politic and national safety  52.4 43.1 40.1 
Successfully establishing social welfare 41.5 31.6 36.4 
(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211) 
                                                 
14 Kompas is a national daily newspaper. The polling was performed by the Department of Research and 
Development of Kompas. The respondents were people who have telephone lines, their age were at least 17 
years old. The respondents were selected by random systemic sampling method. The data collecting was done 
at 15-16 October 1999, January and July 2000, January, July and October 2001, and January and April 2002. 
Total respondents were 12.202 people in 13 big cities in Indonesia.    
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Publics’ satisfaction of Megawati Soekarnoputri was not different from those of KH 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Shown at table five, publics’ satisfaction was high only in early of her 
reign. Some demonstrations which demand Megawati and Hamzah Haz (vice president) to 
resign from his and her position claimed that this government has failed in improving the 
Indonesian prosperity. The public’s negative assessment to Megawati performance after one 
year of her presidency was shown by some statements that were collected by Kompas at 16-19 
July 2002 (Kompas Cyber Media, 22 July 2002), as below: 
 
“[…] After one year of Megawati’s presidency, I don’t see the important progress. […] 
National security problem is not resolved. [….]” (Wayan Putri, 46, tour leader). 
 
“I am very disappointed to Megawati […]. That is a proof that she did collusion, the 
same as Suharto did. How she can fight for promoting justice if she herself does not 
have wisdom to reflect her own experience […]. I don’t believe that Megawati will be 
able to communicate the truth..etc.” (Sari, 31, NGO in Jakarta) 
  
 “Not in a longer time, we will enter the global competition, but Megawati seems do not 
do anything yet. Until now, her policies are not clear enough. It seems there are many 
hidden interests that drive her. I am worried that annually official report forum next 
month will be the arena for Indonesian parties to fight for themselves. In the meantime, 
Megawati can not do anything.” (Joni, 31, private corporate staff  in Jakarta)   
 
“In the first time, I was very optimistic. I thought that Megawati would show us her best 
capabilities...But, this year we can see that Megawati is so weak.” (Amelia, 40, consultant 
in Surabaya). 
 
In the area of human rights enforcement, publics also judged that there was no 
significant improvement. The political transformation from authoritarian to democratic 
government coupled with personal commitment in high level government position did not 
necessarily bring about the improvement of human right practices. Juwana (2004:50-85) wrote 
in his article that during period of  1998-2003, the protection and promotion of the human 
rights in Indonesia remain far from being as expected. The down fall of Soeharto did not make 
Indonesia was free from human rights abuses. The government’s commitments, improvement 
in legal framework and the growing of the number of institutions have minimally contributed 
to the protection and promotion of human rights. In addition, recent negative public 
perception on excessive practice of human right deteriorated further this cause. Just for 
example, the excessive practice of human rights in recent times has been challenged by publics. 
Their dissatisfaction of human right issues have been often directed towards human rights 
activists. There have been incidents where human rights activists and their offices were attacked 
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by certain people and organizations. Another example, under the Habibie and Wahid 
administration, freedom of the press was exercised as if there were no boundaries and laws. 
However, recently there have been lawsuits coming from the public challenging the freedom of 
the press. Of course, from the perspectives of human rights activists and journalists the many 
cases against the press have been seen as threat to the freedom of the press. The same applies 
to the freedom of speech. Demonstration held in the business areas in big cities have been 
complained by the public due to the inconveniences they have caused. Long traffic jam, road 
closed and public transportation are operated are instances of these inconveniences. On the 
other cases, the demonstration were being uncontrolled, that caused many cases of violence, 
destruction of public facilities and private ownership, and also human victims.  This kind 
perception of publics to the human right practices done by governments has contributed to the 
unfavorable image of the presidents.  
Beyond the crisis, unfortunately the images of the four presidents of the Republic of 
Indonesia were not going better. The four Indonesian presidents have failed to build good 
image, including in the area of human rights promotion and enforcement. Bad image of the 
presidents, in one hand, could be caused by their failure in crisis handling, and in other hand it 
was a part of the crisis itself. But, it was also possible that the failure in crisis handling was 
caused by the presidents’ image.   
 
1.1.2.2. Media in the Presidents’ Point of View    
Additionally bad image of the president is also constructed by media. It can be produced by the 
interaction between media and presidents. How the presidents look at the media represent 
relationship between them. Bad relationship can produce ineffectiveness of crisis resolution. 
The relationship between president and media persons describes below.  
One characteristics of crisis is that the press coverage to the organization which in crisis 
is very high. It is because in crisis people have high intention to know whatever organization 
responses. In the other side, media have an important role to create public impression and 
opinion. The capability to create public opinion makes media have big contribution to crisis 
resolution. Media can be helpful for organization in crisis resolution, but also, they can make 
the crisis is getting worst. The good relation between organization and media which is 
established before the crisis will be very helpful for organization to build good cooperation in 
communicating the crisis, and in turn in creating positive image or positive public opinion. It is 
the reason why organization is very necessary to establish good relation and understanding with 
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media. Good relationship based on organization perspective is indicated by the willingness of 
the media to communicate the crisis accurately, balance and positively. And, based on media 
perspective is indicated by the willingness of organization to give needed information, 
transparent dialogues, honest and not intervene them in news creating. Unfortunately, in 
several cases of crisis in a few countries, media tended to worsen the crisis. The consequences 
of democracy and freedom of the press tended to give big opportunity to the press to publish 
information, including information which will worsen the situation of crisis.     
 In case of crisis experienced by the nation, the government must be able to cooperate 
with the press which have very important role in creating public discourse and public opinion. 
Unfortunately, referring to the Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian mass media 
did not give positive contribution to crisis resolution, as their expectation.  The Presidents saw 
that the image was exacerbated by Indonesian and even overseas press, which was considered, 
as only oriented on the exploration and exploitation of conflict and violence as the 
informational commodity.          
The statements that are similar were also mentioned by the presidents itself. In the end of 
his presidency, Gus Dur frequently complained to the media because many his statements are 
constructed in the wrong way by press (Danudjaja 2002: 142, Tamin, 2003: 25, Dhani, 2004:6-
7). Not only Gus Dur, Megawati also complained to media. She judged that Indonesian’s mass 
media frequently constructed imbalanced and complicated information about the government’s 
performance that makes the problem being worse (Tamin 2003:26, Dhani 2004:5-8). In the 
front of the members of PDIP, 21 January 2003, Megawati said as below: 
 
“The main task of the press is showing the justice and fairness. For you who have the 
tools, please show that you can act fairly. We know that in the reform era, we have to be 
fair. But, now, please look the news reportage, imbalance. Is it or not? Not only imbalance 
but it is also complicated.” (Kompas, 22 January 2003).   
 
Kwik Kian Gie in the press conference with the title “Litbang PDIP15 menjawab” that was held 
on 30 July 2002, also supported Megawati’s complain, that mass media often constructed the 
imbalance news about Megawati and her cabinet (Kompas Cyber Media, 30 July 2002). This 
statement was repeated in forum at December 4, 2003. Megawati said that the several critics to 
                                                 
15 PDIP is abbreviation of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the biggest one of the several political 
parties in Indonesia. Megawati is the president of PDIP. “Litbang” means “Penelitian dan Pengembangan” 
(Research and Development). It is one of many units in this party. “Litbang PDIP Menjawab” (Litbang PDIP 
Answering) is the title of this event.   
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her government are not objective. Many other parts of this country, based on her point of view, 
have been trying to speak ill of government (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 December 2003). Bad 
relation between Megawati and press was also seen when Megawati as a leader of PDIP 
“exiled” journalists from a certain event held by this political party on Tuesday, Dec 2, 2003 by 
reasoning this event was an internal party meeting and that was closed for press (Media 
Indonesia, Dec 3, 2003).  
 Moreover, both Gus Dur and Megawati were frequently acting emotionally when face 
to face with the journalists and suspecting that there were certain parties behind the press that 
want to hamper their governance. Using Gus Dur concepts, there was character assassination 
through the mass media (Dhani 2004: 6-7). The relationship can be called   distrustful and 
unsupportive relationship. It is not useful for the organization to bring them out from crisis.   
How the relationship between the Presidents and the media people during the reform 
era? Tables below describe the statements of four presidents of the Republic of Indonesia in 
relation with the press. Those statements can be looked as the form of the relationship between 
the presidents and the press.   
 
Table 6 




No   Date/Events  President’s statements 
1 15 January1998/ 
President’s house Jl. 
Cendana 
President reminded the press which began incite Indonesian 
people and made the situation getting worse, and 
constructed the many issues about him and made people 
were confused about the case of invasion of the stores.   
2 9 February 1998/ 
Indonesian National Press 
day in the State Palace  
President reminded the press to cultivate wisdom on 
Indonesian people in order to increasing the people’s media 
awareness.   
3  16 April 1998/Bina Graha President worried about the mass media news which was not 
giving the currently real situation to the Indonesian people. 
According to this, government would lead the press.     




                                                 
16 The statements were delivered by HM Soeharto under the situation in which many demonstrations 
demanded to the government to improve the economy condition and public prosperity. Publics saw that the 
President has failed to reform Indonesia, so they wanted to HM Suharto resign.     
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The three statements above were conveyed by HM Soeharto during the situation was very 
critical. It was the time of Indonesia entering the crisis situation. His statements show that the 
President blamed the press and feel dissatisfied with it.  The second president, HM Soeharto, 
asked to the National Press to make self recheck and self control in news reporting.  He wanted 
news reportage was not inspired by the overseas news reportage style. He wanted that the press 
were not exaggerated in constructing the news about economy and social gap, opinion conflict; 
and didn’t make disturbance and construct the news which were purposed only to the 
increasing of the rate of selling. He always reminded to the press about the main task of 
National Press that are educating and motivating people to participate in the national 
development. HM Soeharto also clearly said that the national press needed to be reconstructed 
and he wanted to control it directly.  According to the statements above, it is very clear that 
HM Soeharto saw that the media was not professional yet. In case of the critical situation the 
press did not do to make the situation better but in contrast, the press made the situation was 
worse.  
 However, during in his presidency before the time of crisis, it can be said that in 
Soeharto’s presidency, the relation of the President and the press was not equal. There was 
domination done by president to the press but the press felt comfortable with this dependency 
and using it to demand the government fulfill their economy life (Nainggolan, 2004:80).  It 
seems that the relationship between the government and the press was very “nice”, comfortable 
for the two parties. But, this kind relationship was not good in the perspective of the press 
freedom and democracy. 
Different from the prior Presidents, BJ Habibie, the later president showed the opposite 
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Table 7 
The Statements of BJ Habibie in Relation with the Press 
 
 
No Date/Event  President’s statements 
1 26 May 1998/ 
Bina Graha, meeting 
with the community 
leaders  
President gave commitment to revoke Permenpen (Peraturan  
Menteri Penerangan/ The Regulation by the Minister of Public 
Information)  No 1/1984 about SIUPP (Surat Ijin Usaha dan 
Penerbitan Pers/Legal Permit for Business and Press Publishing). 
President also opened the possibility to rehabilitate three printed 
media that have ever been closed down. 
2 6 June 1998/Meeting  
with editors and 
journalists at Wisma 
Negara, Jakarta  
President gave responses that press news have been good, but still 
needs to improve, especially in looking for the truth, not just 
sensation.   
3  10 October 1998/  The 
Congress of PWI at 20th  
at Semarang  
President reaffirmed that government did not want to intervene to 
the news reportage. Government did not lead, give direction or 
call to the desk editor.  
4 12 December 1998/ The 
Celebration of The 61st  
LKBN Antara  
Anniversary, Jakarta 
President asked to the press world to construct the information 
objectively, so, can be free from the certain group’s propaganda.   
Source: Juli Bestian Nainggolan, Thesis, 2004, “Pers dan Kekuasaan Presiden” , p. 84 
 
President BJ Habibie recognized very well about the existence of freedom of the press and tried 
to place the press as the institution which is free from the government intervention. It means 
that the media or press was not anymore under controlled by the government and other 
institution. Habibie saw that media must be independent and support the establishment of 
democracy in Indonesia.  
 The freedom of the press, by revoking the regulation about publishing permit, was 
continued by KH Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth President. Furthermore, in this time, the 
relationship between President and press was very closed and comfortable for journalists to 
gather information. Official mechanism and procedure for the media to access information 
from the government/ president were not so rigid and bureaucratic. Gus Dur said many times 
that the media or journalists were his best friends, as written below: 
 
“…Because I love journalists, journalism world, I criticize or can be said that I ask you to 
improve yourself, then outside…Because, however, I was a journalist in the past, even 
though as a freelance journalist…” (Nainggolan, 2004:87)  
 
In time of he criticized mass media, he always said that media was his best friend and he was a 
journalist in the past. Table 8 describes his statements.  
 
  
                                                                                        20  
Table 8 
The Statements of KH Abdurrahman Wahid 
in Relation with the Press 
 
Source: Juli Bestian Nainggolan, Thesis, 2004, “Pers dan Kekuasaan Presiden” , p. 87. 
No Date/Event  President’s statement 
1 17 February 2000 / 
The Day of the National 
Press, State Palace   
President criticized the journalists about the reportage of East 
Timor, dismissal of several cabinet ministers. He admitted that 
he was a journalist and wanted the journalists were becoming 
independent and no need to come and ask to the president.  
2 3 May 2000 /Meeting  with 
South East Asian press leader 
, Jakarta  
President hopes that the freedom of the press in Indonesia 
has to be maintained. He wanted the freedom of the press was 
done wisely. He also explained about the closing down of 
Information Department as a part of maturity building of 
society.       
3  14 October 2000 / Dialogue 
with the religious community  at 
Masjid Al Hidayah, Jakarta    
President said that he was preferringred to give absolutely 
freedom of the press in democracy development. If the press 
was intervened, it will make big impact on the next future.     
4 13 February 2001 / The State 
Palace at the event of the 
replacement of Head of TNI 
, Jakarta 
President intended not to distribute the information to 
Republika* because of their low performance in their works.    
                                                 * national daily news  
5 13 July 2001/ Mesjid At 
Taqwa, Cirebon 
President assessed the press reconstructed his statement about 
the arrest of The Head of Indonesian National Police, 
General Bimantoro, in the wrong way.    
 
 
In early of his presidency, this close relationship has impacts on the press which is not critical 
for Gus Dur. But, in the early three months of his administration, press begin to be critical to 
the Gus Dur’s policy, especially to the policy that has relation to the resign of several cabinet 
ministers, the economy and political condition which are not getting better, and his several 
inconsistent statements. These statements made the news are not conducive for his leadership. 
More over, in many occasions, he exactly criticized and blamed the journalists who frequently 
reconstructed his statement in the wrong way (Nainggolan 2004:84-87). 
 Not too much different from Gus Dur’s assessment, Megawati also has similar 
impression for the Indonesian Press. There was not close relationship between the president 
and the press. This is shown by her statements as written in table 9. Based on her statements on 
many events and occasions, Megawati as the fifth Indonesian President saw that the Indonesian 
press was less responsible for holding their educational function. Furthermore, the press must 
improve their professionalism, in order to give positive contribution to the Indonesian 
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Table 9 
The Statements of Megawati Soekarnoputri  
in relation with the Press 
Source: printed addresses of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth Indonesian President.  
No Date/Event  President’s statement 
1 Banjarmasin, February 8, 
2002/ the Day of Indonesian 
Press   
President hopes that the national press can play their role 
more than before to create a comfortable situation, enforce 
and facilitate the raising of the creative and constructive ideas. 
The national press should have an ability to develop and 
communicate knowledge, policy, strategy, plan, and program 
of Indonesian recovering in all dimensions.        
2  Denpasar, February 9, 2003/ 
The anniversary of Persatuan 
Wartawan Indonesia (PWI/ 
Association of Indonesian 
Journalists) 
President hopes that the national press as the strength of the 
Indonesian struggles could have capability to provide the 
accurate and balanced information, and always give the 
attention to the appropriate norms and also give good 
contribution to create and establish the national values.  
3 Palangkaraya, October 2, 
2003    
President said that in our society there were attitudes and 
behavior that tend to make fun of and blame ourselves, to 
create bad assessment for everything we have done and 
sometimes laugh at ourselves. In that occasion, President 
wanted to ask all Indonesian journalists to get attention for it. 
There was no any positive thing from doing like this.     
4 Jakarta, February 10, 2004/ 
National Convention of 
Indonesian Mass Media, in 
the Celebration of The Day of 
Indonesian National Press.   
 President claimed that Indonesian press has the highest 
degree of freedom in Asia, even   in all over the world. Of 
course, that freedom has to be followed by the responsibility, 
not only social and law, but also nationality and statesmanship 
responsibility. President asked to the Indonesian press to 
intensify the education function of mass media, equal with 
information and entertainment function.        
  
According to the four aforementioned tables, I can conclude that in general, in the early of the 
presidency, the presidents always tried to show that they would like to create good relation with 
the press, but, together with the time running, the relation between president and press tends to 
be worse. It is indicated by the uncomfortable feeling of the president about the performance 
of mass media. Most of all Presidents asked to media to improve their professionalism. 
Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati saw that media tended to ignore education function and 
emphasize more on the entertainment. In reporting the government performance, media was 
not accurate and imbalance. Even, these two presidents claimed that mass media press acted as 
someone else’s tool to make their power unstable. This assessment was delivered by them in 
the end of their presidency. On the other hand, mass media feel right for their information 
construction. When doing their job, journalists represent the publics’ interest, this is distributing 
information. “Whoever the person that stands for the publics’ interest should be aware that no 
part of his/her activities is hidden from publics’ interests.” (Media Indonesia, Dec 4, 2003). 
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Media said that all complaints were only representation of the defensive reaction of the 
government to the critics.  
 Those statements were supported by Danudjaja, Tabah and Tamin. Those people have 
close relationship with the presidents. Tamin17 (2003:51) said that freedom of the press was 
understood by Indonesian press as free for, not free from. Free for doing and informing 
everything. It seems that Indonesian press in this time was just focusing on free for swearing, 
but not on free from government intervention, sensation, profit and market orientation, 
inaccurateness, copyright violation. Tabah18 (2002:105), the Indonesian police officer, criticized 
that the Indonesian press regulation (UU Pokok Pers No 40 tahun 1999) which mentions the 
function of the press is just to inform. It can be interpreted that the press is only oriented to 
disseminate “news”, but ignoring the other functions, such as to influence, to entertain and to 
educate which should be implemented together by press. In the conflict situation, Indonesian 
press just concerned on giving news, but not on educating people. It means that the news was 
oriented only to inform but not to educate. It lead the press was not eradicating the conflict but 
contributing the conflict. In the cases of mass riot, Tabah (2002:65-70) also views that press 
tended to focus on violence acts that are done by apparatuses, and ignoring the fact that mass 
did anarchism. It shows that press construct imbalance information that can lead to the bad 
public opinion to the state apparatus. Tabah claims that the freedom of the press in Indonesia 
is most free in all countries in the world. This condition brings about the increasing of the 
number of press publications. Unfortunately, the freedom of the press is not followed by the 
improvement of the journalist’s professionalism. This condition leads to the press create and 
disseminate inaccurate, ambiguous, individual privacy violation, imbalance and not respectful 
information to the publics (Tabah in Rastra, 2004:32-36). Danudjaja19 (2001:137-148) said that 
in the time when gaining the politic power was more important than the others such a social 
welfare, the truth of morality, justice, and kindness, Indonesian mass media frequently 
manipulate information for their own interests. This statement supported the other statements 
that mass media was largely judged to have exhilarated the crisis.  
                                                 
17  Indrawadi Tamin was working for President Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2000-2003. He was a deputy of 
protocol, press and mass media at Indonesian State Secretary.  Before hold this position, he was a head of 
government public relations at Information Department, which was closed down by Gus Dur in 1999.  
18 Anton Tabah is an Indonesian Police Officer. He speaks frequently as a representative of the Indonesian 
National Police.  In 1999-2001, he was a private secretary of HM Soeharto, the second president of the 
Republic of Indonesia. When he gave his statement above (2002), he worked at Public Relations Division, The 
Headquarter of Indonesian National Police.  
19 Danudjaja was a journalist for KOMPAS, Indonesian national daily news. Until now he is the Vice Director 
of Editorial of the megasite Lippo Star. Some scholars criticized that his opinion tends to be side by side with 
Gus Dur’s point of view.     
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 Tabah, Tamin and Danujadja’s statements can be reflected as the voices of the “inner 
circle people” of the Presidents. They have the similar statements about the press and the 
relation between the press and the presidents or the governments. They tended to see the 
Indonesian press was not professional in constructing the news about government’s 
performance. Image media was not good on the presidents and the government.  
  Bad president’s images on publics and on media could become an indication of bad 
interaction between the presidents or the governments and the publics, including the media.  In 
turn, it will produce bad crisis overcome. How the organization positions its publics and media 
- dominates or gives equal participation in policy making processes - can affect on the result of 
this interaction. Organization which sees its publics and media are important and put it in equal 
level, can be realized by creating democratic organizational communication system and giving 
the equal opportunity to its publics to participate in the policy making, will produce positive 
outcome. To overcome the crisis positively, it needs to build and maintain good and supportive 
relationship between the government and the media, between the presidents and the media 
persons and also the publics.  
 
1.1.2.3. The importance of Public Relations for the Governments     
The relationship between the organization and its publics, can be seen not only by the 
relationship between the organization and the press, but also the relationship between 
organization and the general publics. How the organization posits the publics, dominates or 
gives equal participation in policy making processes, can be seen by how the policy of the 
organization about its public relations or organizational communication regulations. 
Organization which sees its publics are important will create the organizational communication 
system which is more democratic, giving the equal opportunity to its publics to participate in 
the policy making. It was manifested into the structure and the function of the public relation 
or communication system. How organization thinks about public relations can be an indicator 
for it.  
 For many practitioners, the terms public relations, communication or information 
management, organizational communication, business communication and public affairs are 
used interchangeably. In their point of views, the concept of public relations is usually 
understood as communication effort to gain economical profit and also just a part of more 
narrow functions of communication management. Even though, others, in contrast, see public 
relations as the broader term and apply communications term narrowly to techniques used to 
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produce information forms (Grunig 1992:4-5). For this research, in the context of government 
organization, using the term public relations is more appropriate than using the concept of 
communication management, especially in the cases of crisis and crisis management,  although, 
in my point of view public relations can be integrated part of the management of presidential 
communication functions. However, the essential meaning of those terms is not quite different 
that is organizational communication activities, including internal and external communication.  
 The two conditions, low sense of crisis and bad relationship between government, in 
this research, focus on the president, and the publics could be as a result of the structure and 
function of public relations in the government or presidency institution. In contrast, the 
structure and function of public relations can be created by the two conditions. In the first 
condition, the structure and function of the public relations especially in crisis communication 
has affected the low sense of crisis of the government or president and bad relationship 
between the president and mass media. In the second condition, low sense of crisis and bad 
relationship between the government and mass media has determined the structure and 
function of public relations. 
 In Indonesia, the government Public Relations (GPR), by the law, constitutes the ideal 
manifestation of the aforementioned PR’s roles and functions. Indonesian government PR is 
generated by HM Soeharto in order to promote two-way communication, to create open and 
candid dialog between the government and the publics, in order to increase the people’s 
confidence on the future of Indonesia. This was reflected very clearly in HM Soeharto’s speech, 
then as the President, in 1982 in the workshop of the PR of Local Government and 
Communication Elements of Indonesia: 
“Openness becomes the basic attitude of the Government and hence must also flow in 
our communication’s color and must be reflected in the Public-Relation’s attitudes. […] 
Public Relation’s jobs must be not only prepared well when we deal with major tasks. 
Public Relations jobs must be performed well from time to time. […] The informational 
and public-relation apparatus’s jobs are to build the community’s trust and to develop 
realistic optimism on the future and the development of social infra structure. [...] 
Therefore, give information that is good and correct, that is honest and transparent to 
the public, so that they can understand the common problems we deal with, so that they 
know which way we go through and so that they know what objectives we want to 
reach”. (Dit. Pembinaan Humas Deppen RI/Bakohumas Pusat, 1987:1-3). 
 
In the same meeting, the Vice President at that time, Adam Malik also stated: 
“[…] informational and public relations jobs need to be fast and not only works to 
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neutralize the issues developed within the community, but nonetheless must be able to 
create within the community the circumstances that make impossible or at least reduce 
the occurrence of those issues. […] Experience proves that the burgeoning of negative 
issues against the development, against the New Order Government is often because of 
the delayed information delivered to the community” (Dit. Pembinaan Humas Deppen 
RI/Bakohumas Pusat, 1987:4-5). 
 
Adam Malik’s statement implies that the Public Relations has to perform issues 
management in an effort to know the public discourses on the government’s development 
policy. This means that the Indonesian Government PR is expected to be responsive toward 
the public opinion. 
  The May 1998 riot was not the beginning of the crisis. It is a crisis that has already in 
acute phase. The May 1998 riot that followed by various major events actually was a form of 
dissatisfaction and discontent of the people. In fact, the government PR failed to detect the 
dissatisfaction and discontent signals. The PR’s failure may be because of the non-conducive 
PR position in the organization structure. PR’s function is only disseminating information from 
the President to the people, not seeking and listening information from public to the President. 
Indonesian GPR, from the central to the local levels, was set up (only) to hold main duties, 
those are (1) to convey the government’s policies, and (2) to persuade the public opinion, 
attitude and behavior in order to support every government’s decisions. PR served the interest 
of government and its leader, the president. The communication model applied is one-way 
communication, and press agentry oriented with its main duty to promote the president in the 
eyes of the people on an on-going basis. The role of PR supports the political system of 
authoritative Suharto with a centered government system. During 32 year of Soeharto’s reign, 
the system of public relations in Indonesia was developed merely as a tool of the president and 
his staff, which was referred in a term of “conveyor of  the messages from president to the 
people”, or “government funnel”. As a result of the functions and roles, the GPR became 
unresponsive to the changes taking place in Indonesia after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime. 
On one side, the GPR was not used to convey public voices to the government in order to 
increase the people’s participation in the political processes in the government. 
(Perbawaningsih, 2002). On the other side, Indonesia has claimed itself since 1998 as a state 
which is upholding the democracy. It means that it requires its PR to be a facilitator for the 
people to communicate with the government. Theoretically, in the system of democracy it 
should give opportunities to the people’s freedom in conveying and expressing their opinion. 
The opportunity for the media to convey public voices also indicates the people’s 
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empowerment. In such system, the model of public relations no longer exists in one-way 
communication, but it should have an equal two-way communication instead. Therefore, public 
relations should have a high awareness and capability to articulate the needs and interests of the 
public, in this case from the people to the state or government. Indonesia still lacks the 
awareness and capability even in the reformation. It is probably the large barrier for the 
actualization of the relationship of people and government in Indonesia. The condition of 
Indonesian people who still do not understand and go deeply into the meaning of democracy in 
an exact manner is regarded as another factor exacerbating the impotence of government 
public relations in handling the crisis.  In other words, I can say that the non-conducive 
position was exacerbated more by the situation at that time in which the people were not 
allowed to express their opinion freely. HM Soeharto’s hegemony then was very extensive 
against the people so that the people themselves felt no need to declare their dissatisfaction, 
disappointment, and even misery. Soeharto was able to implant mindset among the people that 
misery, dissatisfaction and disappointment were something natural as the service of people to 
the country, to the motherland. Thus some term appeared such as nation servants, heroes 
without medals, and national social solidarity.   
 How does the application of public relations, especially in communication with publics 
including journalists or mass media persons, of the four presidents’ administrations? 
Communication management in the New Order Era was highly under controlled by HM 
Soeharto, the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. He established the 
communication system and information channels, both within and outside of the president’s 
organizational structure. He had many secret informants, and also the creative staffs who 
helped him in creating his good image on publics (Dhani 2004). HM Soeharto preferred to use 
face to face communication with publics, than dialogue to journalists, in order to disseminate 
his thought and government’s policies to the publics, and then its dialogues were broadcasted 
by government television (Usman, 2004, Soemanto 2004). Even though the communication 
looked like two way communication, in fact, he applied one way communication, everything 
was controlled by him. Direct dialogue between HM Soeharto and the publics has been 
engineered as Soeharto’s style in order to make him satisfied (Dhani 2004:123). In BJ Habibie’s 
time, the absolute domination and power was disappeared. BJ Habibie who has western 
education preferred to establish free presidential communication with the low context culture20. 
                                                 
20  Usman did not explain the meaning of low context culture in his article. However, it can be defined as the 
open, outspoken and direct communication, transparent and using the simple words. What the people say is 
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He also applied human touch public relations (Usman, 2004). BJ Habibie gave the authority to 
speak as his spokespersons to several people, even though he had formal spokespersons. As his 
spokespersons, many of them for many times gave presidential information too early and too 
fast to the publics or press. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, one of his spokes persons, criticized the 
presidential communication management of BJ Habibie was “too much information and too 
many spokespersons”. In the situation of crisis, BJ Habibie did not have a settled 
communication management, moreover, in the certain case he failed to keep the formal 
communication and information out from publics’ intervention (Dhani 2004: 81-112). In the 
era of Gus Dur, the fourth president, the presidential communication management was very 
informal and spontaneous. In the early of his presidency, Gus Dur closed down Information 
Department in purpose to build the freedom of the press. He always established the direct and 
open dialogue with publics every Friday in the mosques. Unfortunately, the openness of this 
dialogue was misused by press. Gus Dur had also been trapped by his uncontrolled 
communication, within and outside of these countries. His statements became controversial. 
He cut off the role of state or president secretary but he promoted four presidential 
spokespersons (Usman 2004). Ratih Harjono, one of four Gus Dur’s spokesperson said, 
“Having four spokespersons, with one president who is very extrovert, is the weakness of Gus 
Dur. It made him lose his position”. People call this kind of communication situation as 
communication without management. Indrawadi Tamin, the Deputy of the press, media and 
protocol, President Secretary said, “There is no official guidance for the president’s secretary 
that can explain the task and strategy of presidential communication.” Miscommunication and 
unclear meaning of words and sentences which were shown on presidential communication 
was an indication that the official statements were not yet managed and packaged by an 
effective communication strategy (Dhani 2004:113-162). In the last administration, the fifth 
President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, presidential communication management had been 
changed for many times because of no settled national communication system. In the early of 
her presidency, Megawati applied open communication management, but it was changed in the 
rest of her presidency. The communication tended to be closed and very formal. She herself 
was more silent. She asked her ministers and her staffs as her informal spokespersons, for 
examples, the Minister of States Secretary, the Coordinator Minister, the Vice President, the 
                                                                                                                                                      
what the people think. It is not necessary to find the other meaning of the spoken word.  It was different from 
Javanese communication style which is more comfortable with the carefully worded and calculated for the 
purpose conversations.  Javanese people, and may be the Indonesian people in general preferring not to speak 
to the point. The meaning of the word has to find by the following questions.     
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functionary of political party, and also, the president’s husband. There was no formal 
spokesperson (Dhani 2004:200). In the official communication mechanism and procedure, in 
the era of Megawati, it was more rigid than Habibie and Gus Dur. In this time, not all of 
journalists had pass card to enter and access information about president or government. The 
rules for journalists were established and implemented tightly, including prohibition of the 
method of doorstop interview.21   
 Referring to the explanation above, it can be concluded that after HM Soeharto 
administration, there was no structured-presidential communication management. The pattern 
of communication and information in the presidential institution was based on the characters 
and communication style of the president. BJ Habibie and Gus Dur who have democratic way 
in leadership tended to apply very open and two way communication management, with all 
consequences. Megawati who was not be very talkative created her communication with publics 
was more closed, formal and one way.  All in all, there is no a presidential communication 
strategy which is effective for the crisis recovery.                       
 It can also be concluded that the PR’s structure and function in the government and 
presidential institution is different when the  president is different.  In the second president 
administration, in fact, the structure and function of government public relations was highly 
structured and formal. The communication between the organization and its publics tended to 
be one way communication. The function of PR staff is technician role which emphasized the 
tasks on the operational PR activities. In the third and fourth president administrations, one 
way communication was changed into two way communication models. The freedom of the 
press, open and free communication was applied, even though there was still not formal 
guidance and strategies for presidential communication yet. There was also no structure and 
system of presidential public relations. Megawati who was very popular with her silence led PR 
function was emphasized more on one way communication. All shows that the functioning and 
structuring of PR are very dependent on the individual characters of the presidents, their goals, 
current situations and also the structure of the organization. It can be said that on one hand, 
the personality of the actors, their recent interests, current environment’s situation and the 
organizational structure determine the structure and function of its public relations but on the 
                                                 
21 That the journalists did not have permission to interview the president by doorstop interview, it invited many 
critics and comments. For some people, doorstop interview was unethical, but in other way, the other people 
said that the prohibition is just the way constructed by Megawati followers to avoid direct interview by 
journalists to Megawati. As we know, Megawati assessed that publics have no communication competency, 
particularly in the formal setting.    
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other hand, the structure and the function of PR constrained the individual, organizational and 
social actions.  
 However, I saw that almost in all presidents’ administrations, public relations and 
organizational communication system and management were not established seriously. It 
indicated that the establishing of communication and relationship between organization and its 
publics was not to be an important concern for the government and the presidential institution. 
It can also be a representation of unequally president and public relationship. This relationship 
could influence the president in the process of the strategy selection. A wrong strategy can be 
affected to the unsuccessful crisis recovery.   
 
1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Look at the crisis happened in Indonesia and its impact on Indonesian life, image and 
reputation, it is reasonable when crisis and image are two concepts that can not be apart.   That 
Indonesian government has no highly crisis sense is one indicator that Indonesian government 
did not do crisis management. Ongoing crisis and difficult crisis resolution shows that 
Indonesian government has failed to handle crisis. The failure of crisis resolution, based on 
Indonesian experience, might be caused by the failure of the government and the president to 
resolve the basic problem of crisis in early of crisis stage. Furthermore, one important thing 
that also may give contribution to this ongoing crisis in this country is the government failure 
to communicate crisis. Crisis communication means how and what the organization 
communicate with its publics about crisis and in order to resolve the crisis. Theoretically, 
ineffective and improper communication by organization before, during and after crisis can 
create bad result in crisis resolution, not only crisis can develops to be worse, but also image, 
reputation and existence of organization can be lost.   
Crisis is the situation which is indicated by three specific things (1) event that contains 
threats to image, reputation and or existence; (2) decision makers have a very short time to 
respond; and (3) the event is unexpected, unpredictable (Seeger 1998).  The failure in crisis 
resolution can threat good image of management or organization. Actually, crisis can be 
anticipated and prevented by effective crisis management. Crisis management itself does not 
only mean management for crisis resolving, but every day life management of the organization. 
Crisis management becomes an inherent part of daily life of organizing of the organization. 
Crisis management therefore is one main task of the organization, especially of the sub unit of 
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organization that in charge to deal with the crisis. It is usually to be responsibility of public 
relations unit or department, or one of public relations’ functions.  
For many practitioners, the terms public relations, communication or information 
management, organizational communication, business communication and public affairs are 
used interchangeably. According to their point of views, the concept of public relations is 
usually understood as communication effort to gain economical profit and also just a part of 
more narrow functions of communication management. Even though, others, in contrast, see 
public relations as the broader term and apply communications term narrowly to techniques 
used to produce information forms (Grunig 1992:4-5). For this research, in the context of 
government organization, using the term public relations is more appropriate than using the 
concept of communication management, especially in the cases of crisis and crisis management, 
even though, based on my point of view public relations can be integrated part of the 
management of presidential communication functions. However, the essential meaning of 
public relations is not quite different from organizational communication activities, including 
internal and external communication. In addition public relations is not only responsible to 
communicate but also create and   establish mutual relationship between organization and its 
publics in order to build and maintain good organizational image. In crisis, referring to Coombs 
and Holladay’s (2001:321-340), the quality of relationship between organization and its publics 
and good organizational image can help the organization remains its reputation on crisis 
situation. It means that a good relationship between organization and its publics which has 
already existed22 can help organization to respond to the crisis better.    
Image is very important in context of crisis. Good image helps organization in crisis 
handling. In crisis, when the situation is full of uncertainty about organization, good 
organizational image leads its publics to build and maintain the trust to the organization. Good 
image contributes to build and establishes effective crisis communication. It means that 
organization has to, not only manage the crisis but also communicate the crisis effectively. To 
communicate about crisis, organization needs strategies, both strategy of communication with 
the media, and strategy to construct or reconstruct the organization image. Inequitable 
communication strategy could affect on worse crisis situation. Unfortunately there were several 
organizational leaders did not think that communication in crisis needs strategy. Furthermore, 
                                                 
22 Coombs and Holladay (2001) called it “relationship history”. Along with “crisis history”, it builds 
performance history. Based on their research, good existed relationship and good crisis handling in the past 
made the organization understand the crisis situation better.  Better understanding of the crisis, more effective 
organization’s crisis response is.    
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they did not think that communication was a very important part of crisis management and 
crisis resolution.                   
There are several researches about crisis communication strategies. In general, the 
researches explored about the strategy of the crisis communication of the profit organization in 
responding to the public claimed about its product failures. Fisher, (1995: 143) adopted John F 
Mahon’s research, wrote that there were alternative organizational responses to face negative 
issues or criticism from the other part, such a competitor. The alternatives responses are (1) 
resistance, organization take a counterattack directly to the issues or other opposite parts in 
order to self defense; (2) withdrawing from the controversies by doing capitulation or 
surrender; (3) terminating by ceasing the relationship; (4) cessation by dissolving the 
organization; or (5) bargaining, the efforts to compromise with the issues or opposite parties.  
Table 10 below is the some strategies of the organizations in responding crises.  
 
Table 10 
Strategies and Tactics of Crisis Responses 
 
 (Fisher, 1995:143) 
   
Beyond the development of process of negative issues, organization used different response 
strategies on each steps. In many cases, organization used not only single strategy but also multi 
strategies. It can be using combination of several different strategies or mixing several strategies 
into one main strategy. The case of response strategy used by Mercedes A Class23 is one 
example. Mercedes used combinations without such concerns in at least three situations. The 
first time was at the press conference where the company both denied the existence of the 
problem. Second, when it commented on the Auto Bild test and presented new test the A Class 
bad passed, the company both denied and excused. Third, when Mercedes halted the 
production and introduced an action plan, the company used an excuse at the same time as it 
                                                 
23 Mercedes Benz faced a major public relations problem when the newly launched A Class overturned during 
a test drive journalists in Sweden conducted. The reputation of Mercedes’ star was at stake as critics accused 
the German Company of producing an unsafe car. (Ihlen, 2002:185-206)      
Strategies Tactics Examples (Case) 
Resistance Persuade, propagandize,  deny 
Responsibility 
The Tobacco Industry 
Bargaining Offer inducement or threat Physician withholding services 
to force reduction in malpractice insurance premiums
Capitulation Concede, seek best solution, seek exoneration Johnson and Johnson, and the Tylenol scare 
Termination Cease relationship General Motors exit from South Africa 
Cessation Dissolve the organization Manville’s forced organization 
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apologized. These combinations were argumentatively incoherent and, as mentioned earlier, in 
ignoring several facts and issues, they also become materially incoherent (Ihlen 2002:202-203).  
According to Ihlen, the last strategy is most effective to restore the corporate image. However, 
he said that to combine several different strategies needs carefully consideration. The coherence 
among strategies is necessary. Ihlen also said that to respond to the crisis, organization needs to 
consider the public acceptance and the situation beyond the crisis. It is because the strategy 
needs to be changed when the publics did not accept the certain strategy or the strategy is 
contra productive for organization or publics or the situation developed in unexpected way. It 
means that there is interaction between the selected strategy and the development of crisis 
situations.  
Some other researchers also found that the strategies and tactics and techniques to 
restore the image or to respond to crisis are dependent on the other factors, such as (1) the 
accuracy of the critics, existence of scapegoat, and degree of organization mistake involved 
(Hearit, 1994,1995); (2) the organizational perception of  involvement degree of the 
organization to the existence of crisis (Marcus and Goodman 1991); (3) organization reputation 
in crisis handling (crisis history) (Coombs 2001:321-340, Newsom 2000:498) and the existed 
quality of relationship between organization and its publics (relationship history) (Coombs 
2001:321-340). These researches show that many factors contribute to the effectiveness of crisis 
resolution strategy. It is not only about how to react or response the crisis in the correct way 
but also about how the organization percepts the situation of crisis, the environment at that 
moment, the publics involved and other things.  
It means to select the strategy of crisis communication leader or organization must have 
not only a better knowledge of the factors related to the crisis situation, but also knowledge of 
the organizational factors and any other related factors. It is one of the things not mentioned 
and explored by past researchers. Another thing is about the type of research object. Mostly 
researchers in the past focused on profit institution. In this kind of institution, the context of 
crisis, therefore, is surely an economic context. It is important to explore crisis in a political 
context. Only a few researchers explored the crisis in the public sector/ area, especially in the 
setting of government or state. Some researches are emphasized on how the government or 
state communicates to the publics in a crisis situation by using political communication theories 
as the basis of analysis. Most of the researches used mass media content analysis and some 
explored the message of the political elite’s speeches in dealing with the crisis.  It is almost rare 
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that the research focused on the apology strategy of organization, especially of public 
organization in responding to the crisis.     
To find out about those missing knowledge, this research is conducted to explore how 
the government, as a public and political organization, deals with the political crisis, the strategy 
used to restore or reconstruct its image and the contextual factors might interact with the 
selected strategy, by answering the two biggest research question below: 
 
 1. What crisis communication strategy was applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, as the 
fifth President of Republic of Indonesia? 
2. What do the contextual factors interact with the crisis communication strategy 
choice? 
  
This research is considered as the new knowledge in the field of public relations studies 
or organizational communication, especially in the context of political crisis and governmental 
crisis communication. It is also important, based on the research, I might find out the new 
model or strategy of crisis communication which is very tight by the certain local political, 
social and economical environment. Finally, the result of this research can be benefit for the 
government at present and in the future to work along with publics, including mass media and 
government’s public relations spreading all over the provinces and the second-level local 
governments throughout Indonesia for the sake of crisis responses and crisis anticipation. 
Based on the structuration theory, it can be assumed that the ongoing crisis which could 
not be solved faster than expected is caused by (not only) the organizational policies, rules, 
structured and strategic practices and actions, (but also) the personal character, skill, and all 
attributes of the individuals which is not appropriate and fit for crisis resolution.  Structure, 
means rules and resources, could be the contextual factors in selecting of crisis communication 
strategy. By this structure, strategy is selected. Additionally, based on this theory, strategy is 
selected, not because of the structure, but because of people’ own personal interests or goals.  
It is important too to know deeper about the interplay between agency and structure 
when it is rest on the fact that during the crisis, Indonesia is living in the era of reformation. 
The efforts to change Indonesia can be seen by the change of authoritarian political system to 
democracy, followed by the changes of the presidential and governmental communication or 
public relations communication system. Theoretically, it is more and less influent on the 
communication strategy of the government to face the crisis. 
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 The analysis is put on the frame of public relations. Many concepts in the area of public 
relations are used in this research. As a case for this study is Indonesian government and the 
presidents’ strategy of crisis response. To understand the research questions, I need to answer 
first about: 
1. The message strategies of the Presidents in responding to the critics or issues from 
publics which against them and government’s performance in crisis resolution. 
2. The relationship between Presidents and media/ journalists 
3. The presidential communication mechanism. 
4. The crisis situation itself and political situation. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1. Research Methods 
This research is laid on the constructivism paradigm in which ontologically look at people are 
flexible and discursive. Flexibility means there is no fixed set of principles or processes that 
underlie human thought and behavior. Discursivity means people’s understanding of the world 
is based on what we say or talk about the world. Our understandings influence our choice. This 
paradigm also look at the social environment is socially constructed, ever changing and 
inherited from the past. Socially-constructed means that the environment  is consists of a 
variety of other understandings (of other people) which may or may not make sense to the 
people at a fundamental level, but everyone tries to make sense of their world as they move 
through it and they attempt in some way to grasp and operate within the ideas of others. Ever-
changing means that the environment is constantly reshaped by human action - the very terms 
of existence are subject to redefinition as people adjust their discourses in attempting to 
understand others better and in pursuit of agendas. Inheritance means people live within the 
context created by their predecessors – for instance, the last president’s action cannot be simply 
ignored by the current president’s action. The current action cannot simply make the world like 
it was, but it can and will be modified the understanding and waging of this. 
By using this paradigm, reality is a virtual reality which is formed by people’s meaning. 
The reality is not just a group of facts but meaning which is produced through the social 
interaction. Constructivism is always connected to the interpretive approach. This approach 
holds that social life is based on social interaction and socially constructed meaning system 
(Neuman, 1997: 67-73). This approach is related to theory of hermeneutic, a theory of meaning. 
It emphasizes a detailed of reading or examination of text. It could refer to a conversation, 
  
 35___________________                
written words or pictures. By using this theory, the true meaning is rarely simple or obvious on 
the surface. People need to reach the meaning of the text only through a detailed study, 
contemplating its many messages and seeking the connection among its parts. The assumption 
about meaning is supported by the theory of symbolic of interaction. This theory explains that 
a reality is socially constructed. Relationship are constantly formed, shaped and changed. 
Society is a network of relationships. Social reality is constructed by the society is in essence a 
matter of definition. It means a reality is a construction of people’s definitions (Perdue 
1986:164-167).    
Stuart Hall (Eriyanto 2003:29) concerned on two things in the process of reality 
constructing, that is language and politic of meaning and how the social practices create, 
control and determine meaning. So, reality is meaning which is produced by language and 
politic of meaning of dominant powers. Fairclough (Eriyanto 2003:285) says that language is a 
form of action in dialectical relation with social structure. Fairclough sees a language as power 
practice. In this research purpose, I analyze the text to identify the strategy of the president in 
responding to the crisis. So the methodology I use for this research is critical discourse analysis. 
Meanwhile, the critical discourse analysis methodology emphasizes on the comprehensive 
analysis, contextual and multilevel analysis. By using this methodology, analysis can be done 
holistically, not partially. It means that to know the social reality we need to analyze deeply 
about historical context, social, culture, economy and politic. In this method, Fairclough 
integrates discourse analysis, based on linguistic and social political thinking, and in general it is 
integrated to the social changes. The discourse has comprehensive analysis levels to the 
research object that is textual level, discourse practice and social cultural practice.  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) theoretically is characterized as “a dialectical view of 
the relationship between structure and agency, and of the relationship between discourse and 
other elements or ‘moments’ of social practices and social events.” By using simple words, it 
can be said that the meaning of the text can not be separated from the context. Context can be 
activities, social relations, object and instruments, time and place, social subjects with beliefs, 
knowledge, values, etc (Fairclough 2005: 76-94).       
For this research purpose, the critical discourse analysis is intended to explore the 
strategies of crisis communication of the presidents by identifying the meaning of the text –
written officially speeches -- of the president and the news about the president and the political 
situation through connecting the texts to the context. This context means the structure which 
can be defined as organizational events or practices, rules, guidance and the personal resources. 
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The context is divided into multiple layers. The first context, the closest layer to the textual 
speeches, is the organizational structure. In this layer, I have explored intra organizational 
communication structure of the government. It is represented by the practices of public 
relations within the organization and communication practices in the organization. The second 
layer is the social and political structure which exists outside of the organization. The media 
structure is one of the external structures. All layers are connected also by communication. 
According to the system theory by Parsons, the second layer context above is called as 
an environment and the first layer is system. There is always interaction between organization 
and its social political structure, system and environment. By Luhmann theory, the social and 
political structure can be a part of the system if they are connected by communication and have 
same meaning about the symbols of communication. The structuration theory states, strategy of 
crisis communication can be a product of interaction between structure and agency. Strategy as 
an action of the president is not only a “repeating” product of the structure – rules and 
resources, but also “new” product of the structure. The member of the organization is agency, 
agent who is able to create new rules and resources. Based on this proposition, how the 
president acts and reacts toward the crisis could be determined by the structure and created by 
his free personal interest and purpose. By this statement, to know the factors could play behind 
the action is firstly to know the rules of the government, and secondly to know the personal 
background of the president.   
For this purpose, I use the system theory, in order to compare with the usage of the 
structuration theory to analyze the same phenomenon. It means that there are two elements 
which interact to each other, (1) resources, and (2) rules. The two elements are identified as 
context, based on Fairclough’s statement, and, the textual speeches are the text. Through this 
text and context, I made a conclusion about the action and the interacted factors both in the 
structure and in the environment. The context is identified in three levels; these are the 
structure in the level of (1) individual, (2) organization, and (3) supra system. The text and 
context are analyzed by using Fairclough’s method divided in multi phase or stages as describe 
later.  
 
1.3.2. Textual Analysis and Procedures 
 As mentioned earlier, to understand the meaning of the text, needs to analyze the relation or 
interaction between text and context. Fairclough divides context in three levels, namely (1) 
micro level or the text itself, (2) messo level or practice discourse; and (3) macro level or social 
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cultural practices. Therefore, for this research analysis will be conducted in each level. In micro 
level, textual speeches of the presidents are analyzed to identify the message strategy in crisis 
and the meaning of it by using linguistic analysis; in level of meso, how the structure and all 
elements of the textual speeches is produced is the focus of analysis. It is done by analyzing text 
in mass media which is about the president. What the media said about the presidents can be 
seen as the relationship between presidential organization and its publics. And in macro level 
analyzes the social and political practices by analyzing the text of mass media which deliver 
news about social and political issues and situation in Indonesia. 
Operationally, there are three levels of analysis, these are (1) macro level, in which I 
describe a history situation as a second context; (2) messo analysis in which I described the 
characteristics of organization and its publics as a first context; and (3) micro analysis in which I 
analyzed the text. It is textual speeches. In the level of text, speeches is identified by the term 
thematic, schematic, semantic, syntactic, stylistic and rhetoric, more operationally, sentence, 
word, proposition, paraphrase, and so on. In messo level, the first context is analyzed, that is 
the structure of organization. It involves the rules and regulations production of the speech and 
public relations practices and rules. In macro level, bigger context is analyzed. That is the social 
politic practices, especially which occurred during the time of crisis. And the last procedure is 
the process of intertextualizing, process to analyze the interaction among the three discourses. 
The procedure of analysis is shown on model 1.  
 
Model 1 




• Social and political 
practices in society  
  
•  Rules and resources 
in organization 






•  The written text of 
speeches 
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1.3.3. Object of research, unit of analysis and unit of observation 
 
The object of research in the first level is communication crisis strategies are used by the 
Indonesian Presidents, namely HM Suharto (1998), BJ Habibie (1998-1999) and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri (2001-2004). The first two presidents’ strategies are analyzed in order to identify 
the structure or action in the past. The third one’s strategy is analyzed in purpose to identify the 
current action and structure. The communication crisis strategy means the strategy used by 
presidents to respond the crisis and how they communicate crisis to the publics. Some of them 
usually are used to reconstruct or restore personal, presidential and government’s image during 
and after the crisis. How the presidents and governments reconstruct their image is explored by 
analyzing President’s textual speeches delivered during 1998-2004. 
As unit of analysis is textual (written) speech of the President. It is emphasized on the 
speeches of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia, delivered 
between 2001-2004 contain the statements about crisis in general, terrorism and corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (CCN). Both issues are very connected with the presence of crisis in 
Indonesia. Megawati’s speeches are selected to be the case due to the reason that the time of 
her administration is a time of the freedom euphoria. People have freedom to express the 
thought, opinion, including critiques even to the political leaders. It leads Megawati received 
many critiques and in turn, many statements she delivered as the response. More critiques and 
more statements, mean easier to be analyzed and identified. There are more than 200 textual 
speeches analyzed. It is also because of the duration of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency is 
longest than the others.  
The object of research in the second and third layers is the structure in the level of 
individual, organization, and in the larger system. The structure is identified as context.  To 
explore the context, both in the second and third layer, organizational archives and documents 
related to the structure and the editorial of newspapers published during 2001-2004 come to be 
unit of analysis. Two daily national newspapers, Media Indonesia and Kompas, were selected by 
reason, (1) Kompas is generally accepted as neutral positions. It means that Kompas is not a 
partisan media; and other hand, (2) Media Indonesia tends to side with the certain Indonesian 
Political Party, (3) the two newspaper can give different and complement perspective in viewing 
crisis and the responses of the Presidents.       
 Even though discourse analysis is more used for analyzing the content of mass media, 
as a method for content (textual) analysis, this research is relevant also to be used to analyze the 
textual speeches of Megawati Soekarnoputri. The meaning of the text, and then, can be 
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analyzed as the message strategy of Megawati in crisis responses, and also as the representation 
of reality which is created by the existed social and political structure. 
Below, table 11 shows the unit of analysis of the first level (micro level). For analyzing 
the text, researcher adopts framing analysis method. Adoption means that framing analysis 
method is not totally used to analyze. There are few changes, to adjust the differences between 
the textual speeches and the textual news in mass media. 
 
Table 11 
Unit of analysis 
(Textual level)  
 
Frame 
Central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events, suggesting  
what is at issues  




(Interested, contrast, emphasized phrase in   
discourse. For example, slogan and jargon)  
Appeals to principles 
Basic premises, moral judgments 
Exemplar 
(Relating to the frame with the example, description, 
can be theories, comparison) 
Consequences 
Effect or consequences that are 
concluded from the frame 
Depiction 
(Depiction of the issues that is connotative. It could be 
lexicon, vocabulary to label something) 
Visual image 
Picture, graphics, image that support the frame in the 




According to the unit of analysis, I identified the frame as two strategies: (1) defending, and (2) 
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Table 12 
Strategy and Indicators 
 
No Strategy Definition/indicators 
1 Defending Treat someone as distinct from or unconnected with the wrong 
doing   
 mindlessness 
  Denial Refusing to admit that a threatening perception is relevant, by 
denying:  
(1) its existence altogether; 
(2) its relevance to self 
(3) postponing the matter 
  Avoidance Finding ways of keeping out of the way of threatening perception, 
by:  
(1)   sitting silently – silent 
(2) spinning a verbal cocoon to prevent incoming messages   from 
getting through 
(3) hiding from one another through “formula”, communication - 
drawing morals, creating slogans, adhering to social 
convention whereby they discuss safe topics instead of 
important ones. 
(4) making humor    
  Repression Protect the person from being aware of motives or emotions he or 
she thinks are undesirable  
  Projection Burying unwanted feeling inside, the person projects them outside 
and attributes them to someone else 
  Rationalization Making excuses for or try to explain away a frustration situation, try 
to find a ‘good’ reason for their behavior and its outcome  
  Attribution 
bias 
(1) Considering someone else behavior is a product of their 
personality but attribute our own behavior to situational factors. 
(2) Ascribing our own successful behavior to personal effort and our 
failure to circumstances. 
2 Adapting  Actively seeking and interacting with information to create more 
useful interpretation and internal state 
(1) Attempting to resolve discrepancy of information that violates 
their expectation 
(2) Assessing the validity of discrepant information, examining and 
changing their existing conceptual systems. 
   mindfulness    
 
Beside the two big strategies, the text is identified into the several strategies that are categorized 
as apology strategies, as described below: 
1. Present a competing narrative describing the situation favorable to the organization. 
2. Diffuse anger and hostility toward the organization through a statement of regret 
3. Dissociate the organization from the wrong doing, that are divided into three types: 
a. By judging the accusers do not have the facts, they only want to sell more 
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newspapers, and they do not have ethics and integrity. 
b. Blaming or scapegoat a specific part or group or individual as the person who 
have to be responsible; 
c. Saying that the wrong action can be admitted but have to be framed on a longer 
term or bigger issue.  
These apology strategies can also be identified as defense strategy. All strategies and indicators 
are used to analyzing the statements of the Presidents about crisis (the first level of the text).  
The object of research in the first and second level (context) is the organizational 
structure and the structure in the larger system or the environmental situation” can be seen on 
table 13. 
Table 13 
Unit of analysis in 
Second and Third Context   
Text 
Production 
The organizational structure of government 
institution.  
Document  Document 
analysis 
 Vision, mission and goals Document Document 
analysis 
 Public Relations’ s human resources  Document Document 
analysis 







 Public Relations activities and programs 
















The rules, regulation and policy about 
authority, roles, functions, and tasks of 








(2nd  context) 
 Political and Social situation 
1. Publics/ media confidence in 
government  
(Government’s credibility or 
reputation in crisis resolution) 
2. Government openness(Government 
and public/media perception):  
a. Degree of willingness of 
 











1st  context 
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government to communicate with 
publics/media 
b. Degree of ability to reforms or to 
change policies, strategies to crisis 
resolution, suggested by normative 
public/media critiques.   
   
 Crises situation 
1. Degree of violence/ damage occurred 
2. Degree of publics involved in crisis 
(affect and affected by crisis) 
3. Degree of publics/media pressures 
4. Degree of government and public’s 
stress 
5. Government and public perception 
about the degree of the threat of 






















To find out the strategy of crisis communication strategy and the interaction factors, I linked 
the three layers by combining system and structuration theory. It means that to find out the 
answers of the research, I need to make links between (1) text and context, (2) system and 
environment, and (3) structure and agency.   
   
1.4. RESEARCH DELIMITATION 
This research is emphasized more on the Megawati’s administration (2001-2004). It is based on 
the reason that her presidency and her government administration were longer than those of 
others. The longer duration of authority holding can be meant that the president and 
government’s behavior, which is related to the crisis responses, was more established and 
persistent. Crisis responses of the president are also focused on the three biggest cases which 
have to be handled by Megawati and her cabinet, namely: (1) crisis in general, (2) international 
terrorism; and (3) corruption, collusion and nepotism. The last two cases are important issues 
that contribute to the prolonged crisis resolution.  
As a unit of observation of this research is limited on the government and as unit of 
analysis is the president of Megawati. The president is selected as the unit of analysis based on 
the reason that she is one of most responsible persons in the government, especially in the 
situation of crisis.  As a research object is her written speeches which are related to the crisis 
responses in the three cases above. However, this research was limited on the textual/ written 
speeches of the president of Megawati delivered during the crisis time (1998-2004). It ignored 
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the oral statements or the action which have been done by the presidents in crisis resolution. It 
leads the possibility that the statements were different from the real action. The factors which 
might contribute to the crisis response strategy were also limited only on the several factors 
which are mentioned on the theories. The other delimitation is to identify the contextual 
factors: personal, organization and environment, researcher uses only news editorial, 
organizational documents and archives and other printed references. It means that researcher 
did not collect the data by interview or observation. It is done by reason that the printed 
material can also give the picture of research object.   
     
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
The research report is divided into five chapters. Chapter One is an introduction,   describing 
the research background Indonesian situation during the crisis (1998-2004), images of the 
presidents and their administrations and the several factors which were claimed by several 
people influence the crisis and their images. This chapter also describes research background 
which leads the researcher to explore the strategy of the presidents in responding to the crisis, 
and the factors might influence of the strategy selection and the effectiveness of the strategy for 
the crisis solution. It describes also about research methodology, includes the method of data 
gathering and analysis, and interpretation. In the final part, it describes the research 
delimitation. Chapter Two is description of system theories by Parsons and Luhmann and 
structuration theory by Giddens. These theories are used by reason that strategy can be made 
by the presidents not only because of the organization or social system determines what the 
president must do and don’t have to do about the crisis but also because of the president itself 
has personal willingness to do or not to do. These theories are connected to the public relations 
concepts and knowledge in which the concept of crisis and crisis communication strategy is 
laying on. Chapter Three and Chapter Four are data description and analysis. The first one is 
the description of Megawati statements and reactions to the crisis in general. It is including her 
image based on media’s point of view; the second one is the explanation about Megawati 
statements and reactions to the two cases: terrorism and corruption, collusion and nepotism 
(CCN). These issues are thought as the issues which shape and are shaped by the crisis. The 
final chapter is Chapter Five. This chapter is a conclusion. It covers summary, theoretical 
discussion and recommendation for the theoretical and practical aspects.
  








.1. INTRODUCTION  
 As mentioned in chapter one, there are several factors influence organization in 
strategy selection. One of these factors is related to the crisis situation. It assumes there are any 
other factors interact to the strategy of crisis communication. To explore any possible factors, 
system theory and structuration theory can be used.  According to system theory, government 
institution is an organization, and president can be seen as a part of the organization. 
Organization as a system developed during 1970s and 1980s, especially regarding the 
organization-environment relation, work and the development of contingency theory, and self 
organizing system (Deetz in Jablin and Putnam, 2001:21). In the same time, there was a shift in 
perspective of view of organization, from objectivity toward subjectivity. The objectivist views 
focus on structure, on the other hand the subjectivist views focus on behavior. Based on 
objectivity view, organization is something concrete, with set, observable qualities; but based on 
subjectivity view, organizations (the order and meanings) created by the members themselves, 
are ongoing processes of organizing (Fisher, 1996:76). But, dichotomy of subjectivity and 
objectivity has been dissolved by Giddens through his structuration theory. Referring to the 
theory, I think that organization and organization behavior can not only be analyzed by macro 
theories but also micro theories. There is dialectic process between macro and micro. 
Therefore, for analyzing the selection of crisis communication strategies and the factors which 
interacts to it, we need to analyze two levels; macro level means structure and micro level is 
individual/agent/agency. Organization can be seen as structure, and the president and her 
strategy can be seen as agent and agency. Dialectic of structure and agency means there is 
interplay between organizational structure or system and the strategy as an action of the agent.     
This chapter contains the description of the two theories when are applied to analyze an 
action of the President in responding to crisis. It is also used to identify the factors may be the 
context of the crisis communication choice. It is started by the description of an organization 
based on system theory. According to this theory, organization composed by several elements 
or units that have different, stratified, interconnected functions and roles. One of the elements 
has certain function and roles, especially related to crisis, is Public Relations (PR). This element 
interacts with other elements in the system and does information exchange with its 
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environment or with larger systems. The action of PR is always a part of the system action, and 
PR practitioners stand for organization. 
In the next part, how the structuration theory applied to this research is describing to 
analyze crisis communication strategy and its contextual factors. According this theory, 
organization is seen as structure and strategy is action made by agent. There is interplay 
between structure and agency. It means strategy is not only seen as product of the structure, but 
also it produces the structure. By this theoretical frame, organization as structure means rules 
and resources. Public Relations procedures, mechanism, communication model, role and 
function are a part of the structure, where as the strategy applied by the president is action. 
President can be seen as an agent or agency. There is an interaction between PR and the 
organizational structure and the strategy.  
 On the basis of thinking that an organization is a system and also a structure, this 
description is started by description of the two theories, and finally of the description of 
theoretical implication for analyzing crisis communication strategy. Description about crisis 
communication strategy is divided into two elements, these are: (1) Public Relations, one of 
organizational elements, have role and function related to organizational communication 
including crisis communication. It is a part of the system and structure; and (2) crisis 
communication strategy – it can be thought both as personal and organizational action that is 
created by an actor, called as agency.          
          
2.2. ORGANIZATION BASED ON SYSTEM THEORY    
System is generally defined by its characteristics; (1) wholeness  and interdependence among 
parts or elements which compose the system, (2) hierarchy, (3) self regulation and control, (4) 
interchange with environment, (5) change and adaptability, (6) equifinality (John, 2002:41045). 
On the other hand, systems can be distinguished by the different characteristics of the parts of 
the system, such as: (1) from quite simple in structure to very complex; (2) from  highly stable 
in their state to highly variables, and (3) from relatively impervious to system forces to being 
highly reactive to the workings of the system to which they belong. Based on the differences 
parts and the relations, we can understand that systems move from mechanical through organic 
to social systems, in which of the parts of the system are composed more complex and 
variables.  Ashby (1968) and Buckley (1967) as quoted by Scott (1998:83) said that in the 
mechanistic systems, the interdependence among the parts is such a way that their behaviors 
are highly constrained and limited. The structure is relatively rigid and the system of relations 
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determinants. In the organic systems, the connections among the interdependent parts are 
somewhat less constrained, allowing for more flexibility of response. In social system, such as 
groups or organizations, the connections among the interacting parts become relatively loose: 
less constrained is placed on the behavior of one element by the condition of the others. 
Based on the complexity of their parts and the relations among the parts, Boulding 
(Scott, 1998:83) identifies the types or levels of system categorized into open system and closed 
system, which both are indicated as the degree of openness. Closed system is indicated by low 
degree in complexity, lose of tight, dependence on information flow, capability of maintain and 
renew, capability to grow and change and open for environment. Whereas, open system is 
indicated by high degree in all indicators. This model also shows that the degree of openness of 
system is relative. It means that there is no system absolutely open or totally closed. Social 
system is relatively more open than the others (see Model 2).   
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boundaries. Open systems are responsive to environmental changes. Survival and growth of 
open system depends on interchange with its environment. Open system adjust and adapt to 
counteract or to accommodate environmental variations. The goal state of the system is 
survival.  In the dynamic environment, open systems must continually adjust to maintain states 
of equilibrium or balance.  It means that the systems have to change to remain the same, an 
enduring set of interacting units. Social system cannot be completely closed or totally open, so 
they are either relatively open or relatively closed. The degree of openness is varied.24
 A logical application of system thinking describes the development, structure and 
maintenance of human organizations, as such the general system theory that was adopted by 
Katz and Kahn as a model for describing organizational behavior. As a system, based on Talcot 
Parsons in his structural functional theory25, an organization is seen as one of an open system. 
Organization itself, based on Parsons’ structural functionalism, is defined as “social collectives in 
which people develop ritualized pattern of interaction in an attempt to coordinate their activities and efforts in the 
ongoing accomplishment of personal and group goals” (Kreps: 1986:100). This definition is similar to  
the definition of organization represented by general system theory, that is “a complex set of 
interdependent parts that interact to adapt to a constantly changing environment in order to achieve its goals”. 
(Cutlip, Center and Broom, 2000:233). Some of the key components of the make up 
organizations are individual organization members, structural and functional groups and 
organizational technologies and equipments (Kreps, 1986:99-110). Relating to the Parsons 
structural functionalism, an organization as a system means that the individual organization 
                                                 
24 Kreps (1986:104-105) explained that openness of system is dependent on the degree of system in responding 
its environment, especially on the amount of information which is taken by system. It is no possible for system 
to ignore or receive all information from environment. in context of organization, Cutlip, Center and Broom 
(2000:233) said that the degree of openness of the system is dependent on the several factors. For examples, 
more competitive or more potential to conflict, more dependent on the internal and external resources,  more 
rational or easier to predict the outcome of organization, more complicated the structure, more highly 
heterogeneous, also bigger of the organization, more decentralist in authority distribution will be followed by 
the more sensitive the organization to respond the changes of environment. It means in this situation, system 
will be more open.   
25 Mentioned by Parsons, there four functional imperative for all systems, that is popular with the term AGIL 
Scheme: A – adaptation: A system must cope with the changes of the external situation. It must adapt to its 
environment and adapt the environment to its need; G -  Goal attainment: A system must define and achieve its 
primary goals; I -  Integration: A system must regulate the interrelationship of its component parts, and also 
manage the relationship among the other three functional imperatives (A, G, L); L -  Latency (pattern 
maintenance): A system must furnish, maintain  and renew both the motivation of individuals and the cultural 
pattern that create and sustain the motivation. The behavioral organism is the action system that handles the 
adaptation function by adjusting to and transforming the external world. The personality system performs the 
goal attainment function by defining system goals and mobilizing resources to attain them. The social system 
copes with the integration function by controlling its component parts, and finally, the cultural systems 
performs the latency function by providing actors with the norms and values that motivate them for action 
(Ritzer, 2000:93-108).   
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members are functionally structured, having hierarchical status and different roles, interacting 
to each other in order to achieve the organization goals26. It also means that an organization has 
a goal (s), or need(s) to be fulfilled27. Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, (Scott 
1998:83) notes “organization we must consider as something in which there is interdependence between the 
several organized parts but in which this interdependence has degrees”. The open system approach to 
organization analysis recognizes the influences of environment upon the interdependent parts 
of the organization. Organization interact with the other organizations, associations and 
institutions in an interdependent manner and can be seen to be part of the sub system of the 
wider system-that of society. Scott (1998:89) said that open systems are capable of self 
maintenance on the basis of a throughput of resources from the environment.28   
 An organization as an open system is also claimed by the design and contingency 
theorists. Based on contingency theory, organization whose internal features best match the 
demands of their environment will achieve the best adaptation, that in turn, best adaptation of 
organization to the environment leads best organizational performance. On the other hand, 
rules, hierarchy, and decentralization are viewed as mechanism determining the information-
processing capacity of the system. Organization must select a structural arrangement that is 
appropriate for the information processing (Scott 1998:96).  Based on contingency theory, the 
best organizational structure must be established in order to adapt appropriately to the 
environment. Weick (Kreps 1986:111-131) emphasized the term “organizing” means 
information processing in general, and in particular, equivocality removing. The activities of an 
organization are directed toward the establishment of a workable level of uncertainty, including 
three stages: enactment, selection and retention. The concept of enactment emphasizes the role 
of perceptual processes and it also recognizes that organizational members are selectively 
                                                 
26  Parsons used the status-role complex as the basic unit of the system. Status refers to a structural position 
within the social system, and role is what the actor does in such position, seen in the context of its functional 
significance for the larger system. The actor is not viewed in terms of thoughts and actions but instead (at least 
in terms of position in the social system) as nothing more than a bundle of statuses and roles.  In his analysis of 
the social system, Parsons was interested primarily in its structural components. Based on action system, 
Parsons made it clear the hierarchical arrangement and the levels are integrated in system in two ways, (1) 
each of the lower levels provides the condition, energy, that are needed by the higher levels; (2) the higher 
levels control those below them in the hierarchy. The lowest levels are the physical and organic environment, 
involves the non symbolic aspects of the human body, its anatomy and physiology. The highest level is a 
metaphysical flavor (Ritzer, 2000:93-108). 
27 That system has need(s) was criticized by Anthony Giddens in his structuration theory. This theory 
explained that the individuals have need(s) to be fulfilled. “Actors also have motivation to act, and these 
motivations involve the wants and desires that prompt action. Motivations provide overall plan of actions but 
not all actions are directly motivated.” (Ritzer:2000:392-397)    
28 These statements against the prior statements which claim that organization is closed system. Closed system 
means that organization can survive and grow and renew by itself, ignore the influence of environment.  
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perceived and they directly influence the state of their environment through their own action. 
That statement means that organization is not only capable to adapt but also adjust to the 
environment pressures.29 The second process is selection, in which organizational members 
accept some information and reject other information. The third process is retention in which a 
certain thing will be saved for future used. The main goal of the three processes is that the 
activities of organizational members are to monitor information changes and determines degree 
of uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty can be identified by rule process and communication 
behavior cycles.         
 On the other hand organizations can be a closed system. It is characterized by a 
concept of self sufficient entities insulated from extra organizational factors and thus, the 
environment can be safely ignored. Based on Jerald Hage’s statement (Clegg and Dunkerley 
1990:192), one of the most important instances of a closed system model of the organization is 
the axiomatic theory of organization. Hage constructs the axiomatic relationship between 
organization goals and means to achieve these goals.  It is similar to Parson’s four functional 
problems. The first goal is adaptation or flexibility. Flexibility may refer to adaptations of the 
system to external disturbances. The second goal is production, the third is efficiency and the 
fourth and the final goal is job satisfaction.  Whereas the axiomatic organizational means to 
achieve these goals; (1) complexity/ specialization, (2) centralization or hierarchy of authority, 
(3) formalization/ standardization, and (4) stratification. All means above are intra-
organizational, which determine the goal achievement. It means that organizations can achieve 
their goals by themselves and by using the intra organizational resources.   
 The axiomatic theory of organization by Hage is supported an assumption that 
organization is rational. The rational model of an organization describes that the results of 
everything are being functional-making positive and give an optimum contribution to the 
overall result.  All resources are appropriate and their allocation fits a master plan. All actions 
are appropriate and the outcomes are predictable (Thompson 1967, as quoted by Clegg and 
Dunkerley 1990:193). Because of its rationality, closed system is autopoiesis, the capacity for self 
production through a closed system of relations. The aim of closed system is ultimately to 
produce themselves; their own organization and identity.  Maturana and Varela (Morgan 
1997:253-254) argue all living systems are organizationally closed, autonomous systems of 
                                                 
29 Based on Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000), adaptation means that organizations have to change themselves 
to make a best appropriateness for the environment, while adjustment means that organizations have capability 
to change their environment. There is interaction and interdependence between organization and environment. 
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interaction that make referringence only to themselves. Living system is characterized by three 
principal features: autonomy, circularity and self reference. These characteristics make the 
system has the ability to self create or self renew.  
 The concept of autopoiesis was adopted by Niklas Luhmann in his system theory in 
1990s. Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) argued that social system is an autopoietic system 
which has the following four characteristics: 
1. An autopoietic system produces the basic elements that make up the system. 
2. An autopoietic system is self-organizing in two ways – they organize their own 
boundaries and they organize their internal structures. They organize their boundaries 
by distinguishing between what is in the system and what is in the environment. What 
is inside or outside an autopoietic system is determined by the self-organization of the 
system, not, the functional necessities of the system. Within its boundaries, an 
autopoietic system produces its own structures.  
3. Autopoietic systems are self-referential, not refers to the individual. 
4. Autopoietic systems are closed systems. It means there is no direct connection 
between a system and its environment. Instead, a system deals with its representations 
of the environment. Even though an autopoietic system is a closed system, the 
environment must be allowed to disturb its inner representations. Without such 
disturbances, the system would be destroyed by environmental forces that overwhelm 
it. In a closed system, individuals are not part of it, but they are part of the 
environment. 
 
One of important example of social systems is society. The basic element of society is 
communication and communication is produced by the society. Participants in society refer to 
the society through communication. The individual is relevant to the society only if he or she 
participates in communication or can be interpreted doing participation in communication. 
Anything which is not communicated or is not communication, is not a part of the society, but 
a part of the society’s environment. This includes the biological systems of human being and 
even their psychic systems.  
 The two parts of the systems based on Luhmann are the social and psychic system. The 
psychic and social systems – the systems of all of communication – have a property in 
common. They both rely on meaning. Meaning is related to the choices that a system makes. 
The meaning of an action (object) is different from those of other possible actions. An action 
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has meaning only to the extent that a selection is made from among a range of possible actions. 
Psychic and social systems that rely on meaning are closed because: (1) one meaning always 
refers to the other meaning; (2) only meaning can change meaning; (3) a meaning usually 
produces more meaning. Meaning forms the boundary to each of these systems. What is not 
meaningful is seen as the outside of the system, as a “cause” of our action, while what is 
meaningful is inside the system as a “motivation” for our action. In the social system, meaning 
is the difference between a communication within the system and noise from outside of the 
system. Psychic and social systems have evolved together. Each is a necessary environment for 
the other.  
 The social system based on communication creates social structure in order to solve the 
problem of double contingency – every communication must take into account how it is 
received, but how it is received depends on the receiver’s estimation of the communicator. 
Because of this, communication is improbable, but social structures have developed to make 
communication more probable. It can be done if the structures are developed to permit earlier 
communication to connect with later communications. The selection made in one 
communication is restricted by the selection made in the previous communication and the 
present communication also restricts future communication.  Luhmann called it as “regulates 
the evolution of social systems.” 
 Based on Luhmann’s thought, as a system, organization is a closed system that is 
composed by the basic elements of the system that is communication. Individuals are not a part 
of the system if not bound by communication. It can be meant that organization means a set of 
shared meaning. Something which is not meaningful means noise, that is a part of the 
environment. As a closed system, organization does not directly interact with the environment, 
but it does not mean that the environment does not influence the organization. The changes of 
the environment have to be responded by communicating between the organization and the 
representation of environment.       
 Based on the explanation above, organization can be analyzed as closed and open 
system. For this research, I take assumption that organization is relatively open system. Besides 
has criteria as explained, organization also does the exchange of goods and services between 
organization and their environments The linkage of input, throughput and output, and 
exchange of raw material between organization and environment can be indication of open 
system, as described on model 3 : 
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         Relating to the way of interaction between organization and its environment,  
Buckley (1967, as quoted by Scott 1998:90) distinguishes between two basic steps of system 
processes: morphostasis and morphogenesis. The term morphostasis refers to those processes 
that tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, structure or state. Morphostasis in 
social system would include socialization and control activities. Morphogenesis referrings to the 
processes that elaborate or change the system- for example: growth, learning, and 
differentiation. In adapting to the external environment, open systems typically become more 
differentiated in form, more elaborate in structure. Organizations exhibit such an amazing 
capacity to change their basic structural features, based on the input from the environment. In 
other word, source of maintenance, diversity and variety is the environment. There is a close 
connection between the condition of the environment and the characteristic of the system 
within it: a complex system cannot maintain its complexity in a simple environment. In the 
similar context, Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) said that to reduce the complexity of the 
environment, the systems develop subsystems and establish various relations between these 
subsystems. System is increasing the differentiation. Differentiation is defined as the replication, 
within a system of the difference between a system and its environment. It means that there are 
two kinds of environments; these are one common to all subsystems and a different internal 
environment for each subsystem. Each of the subsystems has a different view of the internal 
environment of the system. This creates a highly complex and dynamic internal environment. 
This differentiation31 leads to increasing of the complexity of the system and allows for a 
 
30 Adapted from the system transformation model (Kreps, 1986: 101) 
31 Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) identifies four forms of differentiation, segmentary, stratificatory, center-
periphery and functional. Segmentary differentiation divides parts of the system with the similar function that 
is to fulfill the basis of the need. Stratificatory differentiation is a vertical differentiation – different in rank and 
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greater ability of the system to respond to the change of environment, as well as to make 
evolution faster. It can be meant that based on Luhmann’s argument, to adapt the change of 
environment, system can be self-organizing and self-referential, -- not dependent on the 
environment. In the context of an organization, as a system, to adapt the change of 
environment, an organization has to be divided into several parts (units) with the same 
function, or different rank or status or function. In other simple word, we can say that 
organization is structured. 
      What is environment? For a given system, the environment is the set of all objects 
whose attributes affect the system and also those objects whose attributes are changed by the 
behavior of the system (Hall and Fagen 1956, as quoted by Scott 1998:123). System theorists 
typically define the environment as anything that provides the change pressures—“matter, 
energy and information inputs”—to the system.  On the other hand, Weick (Kreps 1986:115-
116) defines organizational environment is not the physical surroundings but the information 
to which they react. The focus of the organizational environment shifts from a traditional 
structure, static view of the physical surroundings to an action, process view of the messages 
that organization members perceive and the meanings that they create in response to these 
messages. The concept of organizational environment, based on Weick, can be conceptualized 
as a communication construct. The organization’s environment is derived from the exchange of 
messages and creation of meaning by organization members. In another part of Weick’s 
explanation (Kreps 1986:240), environment consists of all external factors of an organization. 
To specify the element of the environment that is most critical to the organization, the concept 
of “relevant environment” that was introduced by Rogers. Relevant environment includes all 
factors external to the organization’s boundary that have direct influence on the organization 
and its members. As Weick indicates, the relevant organizational environments are really 
information environments. This argument is similar to the Luhmann’s definition about 
environment. As mentioned previously that whatever is not communication is not a part of 
system, but a part of environment. It can be understood that boundary of the system or 
organization can be identified by creating communication and construct shared meaning. This 
boundary can be used to define what elements are within in the system or which one is a part 
                                                                                                                                                      
status in a system, hierarchy.  Every rank has different function in the system. Higher and lower rank may be 
unequal but both ranks depend on one another and the social system can survive only if all ranks successfully 
realize their function. Center-periphery differentiation is a link between segmentary and stratificatory 
differentiation. The fourth form of differentiation is functional systems. Functional differentiation is the most 
complex and the one that dominates modern society. It allows for the greater system flexibility, but if one 
functionally differentiated system fails to perform its function, the system as a whole may fail. 
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of the environment.  
 Lawrence and Lorsch and others define the content of environment. Lawrence and 
Lorcsh (1967 in Clegg and Dunkerley, 1990:200) distinguish three elements in the environment 
– market, research and development, and technology. They show that they can change at any 
different rate. Hall (1999: 207-214) identified the general environment of organization, based 
on condition of the environment: technological condition, legal conditions, political conditions, 
economic condition, politico-economy conditions, demographic conditions, ecological 
conditions and cultural conditions. Scott (1998:124) said that conceptions of environments vary 
by level of analysis as well as substantive focus. An analysis level includes the organization sets, 
organization population, inter-organizational community, and organizational field. Each focuses 
on a somewhat different aspect of organization-environment relations. In substantive interest, 
environment has been devoted to the technical and institutional aspect of environment. 
 
2.3. ORGANIZATION BASED ON STRUCTURATION THEORY    
Analyzing a government as an organization by using system theory is not quite comprehensive. 
The action of the government or the member of the organization sometimes can not be 
determined by the system or organizational roles and functions. It can be a personal or 
individual action. Due to this reason, structuration theory is more useful to analyze what factors 
can be the context of the action. The following part explains the structuration theory and how 
this theory explains an organization.  
 Structuration theory was formulated by Anthony Giddens as reconstruction of social 
theory, by criticizing three schools of very important social theories, interpretive sociology, 
functionalism and structuralism. He purposed to maintain the three of social theories but he 
also tried to find out the way to eliminate their weaknesses and made a bridging among the 
differences. It covers re-conceptualization of relationship among action, structure and system, 
in order to integrate them into one new theory, and the later time, it is called as structuration32 
theory (Ross in Beilharz 2003:191-198). Critics to theories which are analyzed by Giddens are 
focused on the concept of dualism. Dualism is a tension between subjectivism and objectivism, 
and, voluntarism and determinism. Subjectivism and voluntarism are the tendency of 
                                                 
32 Structuration is a process in which the unintended consequences of action create norms, rules, roles and 
other social structures that constrain or affect future action. Structuration occurs constantly in all social 
systems. (Littlejohn 2005:252).   
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perspective which has priority to personal act and experience meanwhile, objectivism and 
determinism focus on the general phenomena prior to act and personal experience. The main 
object of social science is neither on the social role, as in Parson’s theory, nor hidden code as 
on the Levis Strauss’s structuralism, and on the unique situational as written on symbolic 
interactionism of Guffman. It is not about a whole or a part, not structure or personal act, but 
it is about integration between them (Priyono, 2003:5-7). Giddens‘s critics to functionalism 
theory is on concept function and role. That the individual acts is only based on the social role 
constructed by society, not by himself, is the main focus of his critic. According to Giddens, 
there are some thoughts; (1) individual is not passive and stupid, they are not robot who acts 
only base on programs determined by society. An individual as an actor has capability of self 
introspection and control; (2) a social system does not have needs. Actor has; (3) social 
symptoms are bounded by space and time. Giddens also criticized structuralism and post 
structuralism which reject the existence of subject. Giddens saw that this school of thoughts is 
going to be imperialism of social object to subject or thinking which give priority to the 
structure, not to the actor. (Priyono 2003:7).              
 The basic domain of the study of structuration theory is neither the experience of 
individual actor, nor the experience of the form of social totality, but social practices ordered 
across time and space. The core of this theory is a theory of the relationship between agency 
and structure. Thus, agency and structure are not apart from each other; they are two sides of 
the same coin. They are duality. All social actions involve structure, and all structures involve 
social actions. Practices or activities are not produced by consciousness, or by the social 
construction of the reality, nor are produced by social structure. However, in expressing as 
actors, people are engaging in practice, and through that practices, consciousness and structure 
are produced33. By simple words, it can be said that the main idea of structuration theory is that 
human action is a process of producing and reproducing various social systems. In his other 
thoughts, Giddens defines social system as reproduced social practices, or reproduced relations 
between actors or collectivities organized as regular social practices. 
 In organization context, structuration theory posits that communication contributes 
                                                 
33 Structure, according to Giddens, is a set of rules and resources which creates repetition of social practices. 
The social practices, in turn, create rules and resources. It is the reason why Giddens created structuration 
theory to combine concept of structure and system, where the power of structure in system is implemented and 
reinforced in practices which establish systems. Thus, structure is social practices reproduced space and time. 
The concept of action, based on Giddens perspective, is neither object determined by structure, nor 
independent subject, but the subject who actively self creates through the ongoing social practices (Ritzer, 
2000:387-395)  
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both to the formation of individual personality and to the development of the larger institution 
through the production and reproduction of structure. This structure can best be understood as 
the rules and resources that people use in everyday interaction. Individual consciously draw 
upon interpretive schemes (standardized stock of knowledge) in the production of meaning. 
These interpretive schemes have a strong obligating quality – their chronic reproduction 
legitimizes the social actions they constitute. Interviews, business meetings, reports, and even 
incidental conversation can be analyzed through the interpretive schemes the people use in 
making sense of transactions. Social systems that are “chronically reproduced” in day to day 
activity is institutions. These regularized practices are sustained by systems of meaning, role 
prescription, and socialization (Goldhaber and Barnet, 1995:135).    
 The process of social structures shape people’s actions, while at the same time these 
structures are shaped by their action. Structuration refers to “the production and reproduction 
of the social system through members’ use of rules and resources in interaction.” Interaction 
means that people are relatively free to act as they will. Structure can be understood as rules and 
resources. Rules are implicit formulas for action, recipes for “how to get on in life”. Resources 
are all relevant personal traits, abilities, knowledge and possession people bring to an 
interaction. Since rules and resources are constantly changing, structuration is a fluid process. 
Production happens when people use rules and resources in interaction. Reproduction occurs 
when an action reinforces features of systems that are already in place, and thus maintain the 
status quo. (Poole in Griffin 2003:244-257) 
 The structuration theory was adopted by Marshal Scott Poole (Griffin 2003:244-257) to 
analyze communication in organization. The core assumption of this theory is that a lot of 
times people in groups build up structures or arrangements that are very uncomfortable for 
them, but they don’t realize that they are doing it. The point of this theory is to make them 
aware of the rules and resources that they are using so that they can have more control over 
what they do in groups. Poole called his theory as an adaptive structuration theory because he 
observed members of task groups intentionally adapting rules and resources in order to 
accomplish their decision making goals. Rules were thought as “propositions that indicate how 
something ought to be done or what is good or bad.” These rules contain member’s collective 
practical wisdom on how best to reach the group goals. The resources, as Poole thought, is that 
the individuals bring to the task, such as materials, possessions, or attributes that can be used to 
influence or control the actions of the group or its members. Poole notes that group members 
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sometimes appropriate rules or resources in ways that thwart their intended use. He calls it “an 
ironic appropriation” because it goes against the spirit of the structure. Giddens’ “duality of 
structure” concept explains that rules and resources are both the medium and the outcome of 
the interaction. In context of the organization, Poole says that decision is not only affected by 
the structure of the group, but at the same time it also has an effect upon those same rules and 
resources. It helps explain why groups are sometimes stable and predictable, yet why they are 
often changing and unpredictable. It depends on how the group members appropriate rules and 
resources. Structure is stable if actors appropriate them in a consistent way, reproduce them in 
similar form over time. The implication of this assumption for group decision making is (1) 
groups create themselves, yet members don’t always realize they are crafting and reinforcing the 
tools that do the work, (2) groups step up from a passive role to have an active voice within 
your group, and (3) groups have knowledge of how rules and resources work will equip low 
power members to become agents of change.   
 Focusing on the communication action or organizational communication, Poole and 
McPhee define structure as both a manifestation and a product of communication in the 
organization. Organizational structure is created when individuals communicate with others in 
three metaphorical sites or centers of structuration. The first is conception. It includes episodes 
of organizational life in which people make decision and choices that limit what will happen 
within the organization. The second site is implementation. It is the formal codification and 
announcement of decision and choices. The third is reception. It is the organizational members 
act in accordance with the organizational decision. The communication activities at these three 
sites are often difficult and conflict laden and the communication patterns may be complex and 
time consuming and the outcome is very much affected by the skill of the people involved. 
Organizational climate is also mentioned in structuration theory. Here, the climate is the general 
collective description of the organization that shapes members’ expectation and feelings and 
therefore the organization’s performance. Poole and McPhee define climate as “a collective 
attitude, continually produced and reproduced by member’s interaction.” In other words, a 
climate is not an objective “variable” that affect the organization, nor is it an individual’s 
perception of the organization. Climate is a product of structuration: it is both a medium and 
an outcome of interaction. Climate is not static but is constant in the process of the 
development. Three interacting factors enter into this development; (1) structure of the 
organization itself; (2) various climate-producing apparatuses or mechanisms designed to affect 
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employee perceptions and performance; and (3) member characteristics, their skill and 
knowledge (Littlejohn 2005:252-254). 
Table 14 describes briefly the differences of an organization based on four theories.              
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2.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATION  
For this research, a governmental organization is seen as a relatively open system.  The 
government is consisted of several elements (individuals, units, departments) that have 
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different, stratified and hierarchical roles and functions but interacts to each other, as well as to 
its environment, in order to achieve the government’s goal. The government’s members, 
including president, are a part of the organization. They make action based on roles and 
function set up by the organization. Strategy of crisis communication applied by the president, 
therefore, is action that set up by the government. It is considering as collective action, not 
personal action.   
 As an open system the governmental organization is dependent on the environment. 
The environment of the government’s environment can be meant as information and 
communication which is relevant for the government. Government’s environment can also be 
meant as a larger system or other systems. Situations or conditions composed by information 
could be government’s environment. Condition or dimension is assumed to play the most 
important role in the governmental organization as the public organization is political 
condition. Politics plays a role at the local level as well as at the national or global level. Many 
researches on political conditions and organizations would undoubtedly reveal more such 
pattern.  The collapse of the former East Germany is a case in point. The changed political 
system had remifications for almost all organizations. Even cultural organizations such as a 
symphony orchestra, is affected by this jolt (Allmendinger and Hackman 1996, as quoted by 
Hall 1999:210).   
 In order to achieve the goal or organizational needs, the government always creates and 
develops interaction with its environment by communication and information exchange. 
Degree of the government interchange information with something external factors determines 
the degree of the organizational openness. As explained, the degree of openness of the 
government can change and different from time to time. For my purpose, it is difficult to claim 
that the organization is definitely set on the certain degree of openness without giving attention 
to time and current situation. In the past, Indonesian government can be a low degree of 
openness but in the different time and situation, it can change to be higher degree of openness.  
In crisis situation government can be highly open but less open in the normal situation.    
       Crisis response strategy which will be analyzed is seen as one of organizational 
behavior or action. It can also be seen as a product of organizational decision making. In the 
context of crisis that occurred in Indonesia, the organizational action which will be analyzed is 
the government’s response to the crisis. By using system theory or structural functionalism by 
Parsons, the government as an organization can be seen as the   example of the social systems. 
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The action of the organization can be thought as a social action. Strategy that is set by the 
organization or the members of organization is determined by the structure. What the members 
do means what the organization does. An organization has set each status and role for the 
members. In case of crisis, what responses of the members to the crisis, including of its leaders, 
are done as their status and roles. Looking at the government actions and the factors might 
interact with it by the structural functionalism is not so different from looking at it by the 
concept of bureaucracy. The concept of bureaucracy aroused firstly in the term of mechanistic 
organization by Max Weber. Bureaucracy theory provides a descriptive model of the nature and 
structure of effective hierarchical organization. It refers to the ideally structured human 
organization that can be achieved through the formalization of rules, structures and processes 
within organization. According to Weber (Kreps 1986:68-70), the ideal bureaucratic 
organization exhibit eight structural characteristics, namely: formal rules, specialization of 
organization members’ roles, hierarchy of formal organizational authority and legitimacy of the 
power roles, employment of qualified personnel that is based on technical competence, 
interchangeability of personnel, impersonality and professionalism, detailed job description and 
rationality and predictability. These characteristics are indications that bureaucratic organization 
can be seen as machine. Each individual civil servant is a cog in the machine with no personal 
interest. They act if only it is related to their roles and functions in the organization that is 
hierarchically structured. Based on Parsons individual personally is not a part of the system, but 
a part of environment and what they act is determined by structure, not by themselves as 
personal or individual.  
Those characteristics of mechanistic organization lead us to think that government 
bureaucracy is usually called as officialdom – a kingdom that is lead by a group of officials 
(Thoha, 2003:2). These officials have power because of their higher position in hierarchy. 
Higher position means higher power. These positions are completed by all facilities. Everyone 
who does not have position means powerless, and they are not a part of the organization. That 
is people who are powerless. Because of their powerlessness, people are very dependent on the 
government. The more dependent the people the more powerful the governmental officials are.  
In the term of system, officials who have position and power are within the system, and people 
who don’t have power and position in the structure are outside of the system – as a part of 
environment. Officialdom can be understood by indication that there is no direct relationship 
between organization/ officials/ system with people/public/ environment. Officialdom is also 
indicated by unequal relationship between government and public. The concept of pyramidal 
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hierarchy or bureaucracy is usually called by businessman as the damn bureaucracy. It can be 
concluded that government is a closed system whereas the survival or existence of this 
organization is not dependent on the energy exchange with its environment.   
On the other perspective, Heckscher and Donellon (Thoha, 2003:4) claimed that 
mechanistic organization, as described by Weber, can’t be properly used in the modern era. The 
future bureaucracy is Post Bureaucratic organization, in which is not only focused on internal 
coherence and centralized power, but also concerned for external interaction and social 
interaction. Powering is not the only one method to operate the machine of bureaucracy, but 
also empowering the bureaucracy. Closed and centralized bureaucracy will change into open 
and decentralized bureaucracy. To remain the survival of bureaucracy, this bureaucracy has to 
adapt and adjust the changed environment, for example, by changing the structure and also 
reforming of mindset and behavior of government officials to be more open people34.  
Decentralized bureaucracy means that the government is not the only power center. 
Government has to “return” the power to the people or empower them35. Related to the future 
government bureaucracy, there are two contradictive models of government, these are (1) 
pluralist democracy, and (2) administrative efficiency (Yates 1982 in Thoha, 2003:30-35). The 
two models are antithetic to one another, whereas the one can be existed if only the other is not 
existed. Pluralist democracy model assumed as follows: (1) there are many group interests in 
society that are different to one another and compete each other; (2) government has to offer 
equal accessibility and means of participation for all group interests; (3) government has a 
balance of power by distributing power vertically or horizontally; (4) government and politics 
have to be accepted as arena of minority interests competition; (5) there is high probability that 
an active and a legitimate group in population can made this group listens to the crucial steps in 
policy making; (6) competition among government and non governmental institutions can 
cause bargaining and compromising, and also a power balance in society.  The main assumption 
                                                 
34 Actor, in this perspective, is very important. Structure will be not changed if it is not begun by the change of 
actor. To be open and decentralized government bureaucracy, structure and agent together determine the 
changes of organization and its environment. About the importance of individual, it is described in the 
structuration theory. Giddens in his theory criticized the theory of system and structural functionalism of 
Parsons. “Every research investigation in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action (often 
used synonymously with agency) to structure…there is no sense in which structure determines action or vice 
verse” (Giddens, 1984:219, in Ritzer, 2000:387-395). Thus, agency and structure are not apart from each 
other; they are two sides of the same coin. They are duality. All social actions involve structure, and all 
structures involve social actions. Giddens also said, “Whatever happened would not happen if that individual 
had not intervened”. Giddens emphasized on the importance of agency. Agents have a great power and 
ability to make a difference in the social world. 
35 In the structuration theory, structure is not only constraining, but also enabling action. It can be used to 
explain why government is not only powering the people but also empowering them (Ritzer 2000:387-395).    
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of pluralist democracy model above is that government has to listen to the public or people and 
together with them in policy making. It can be said that this model assumes bureaucracy should 
be an open system, rather than a closed system.  On the other hand, an administrative 
efficiency model is totally not giving the area to manifest political theories and ideology, as 
described by pluralist. This model seems so similar to the Weberian bureaucracy. Government 
as a closed system may apply this model.  
For this purposes, government as an object of observation is seen as an organization 
that uses the model of pluralist democracy. It means that bureaucracy of government has to be 
an open system that is characterized by there is matter –energy, raw material or information—
exchange between organization with its environment. In the context of bureaucracy, 
government has to interact equally with its publics. Publics, as mentioned before, can be 
defined as people who are powerless, are not within or a part of the structure. Bureaucracy 
should provide equal relationship among three components, these are government, citizen or 
civil society and business persons, people who work in the private sectors (Thoha, 2003:63-64), 
as described by the model 4.  
 
Model 4 
Equal relationship among three components 
(Model of good governance by UNDP 1997) 
 
 
By this perspective, it can be assumed that all public policies must be a product of the 
interaction among those three components. For this research purposes, it can be said that any 
communication strategies that carried out by government in crisis, those are determined by the 
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construct the image of government in crisis is dependent on a mutually interrelationship among 
those three components. It means post bureaucracy which is fit for democratic era needs the 
governmental system with high degree of openness.   
  Relying on the structuration theory governmental organization means structure and the 
president is an agent or agency, and the strategy of crisis communication applied by the 
president is an action. Structure means rules and resources. The rules in government are social 
and political practices or habit, norm, guidance, mechanism, procedures, regulations, policies 
and other similar things that help the organization and its members in doing action. The rules 
can be derived into stratified levels, from central to local or unit or sub unit level. Whereas 
resources are all relevant personal traits, abilities, knowledge and possession of the members 
bring to interaction. The members who have high ethic, discipline, skill, dedication, competence 
and professional can be good resources. These help members to interact and communicate to 
the other people, both inside and outside of governmental organization.  
 Different from system theory, based on structuration theory, the president is an 
organization’s member can be not a part of the structure. She or he can do the action as a 
personal entity. The action can be made by a personal interest or a need of president. It means 
president’s action is not seen as a government’s action but a personal action or individual 
action. President is an active person who has his or her own needs, interests and capabilities to 
change and produce new structure.  Even though, as described on system theory, president can 
also be a part of the structure. It means that the president shapes and strengthens existed 
government’s rules and resources by his or her repeated action. By using concepts of 
structuration, we can say that president’s action may produce and reproduce the structure. 
 Using this assumption, government rule, regulation, climate, role of each member, 
organizational structure of the government itself and the characters, skill and knowledge, and a 
perception of the members of government including the president are the factors or the 
contextual factor in crisis communication strategy choice.  In addition, a larger structure, such 
as the social and political practices, regulation, norms, and habit can also be understood as 
other contextual factors. It means that the action of the president, -- strategy--, is selected, not 
only on the basis on the contextual factors determination, but also on his or her own 
willingness. The first one president reproduced the structure and the latest one president 
produce structure. Whatever action made by government, including in crisis or in not normal 
situation, must be thought as process of dialectic of the structure and agency.  
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In context of crisis, public relations structure is dominant. As a part of organizational 
structure, public relations has roles and functions of image building and communication.  
According to the system theory, to make easier in adapting to the high complexity of its 
environment, an organization needs to be divided into several sub systems or units with the 
different roles and functions. For monitoring environment changes, an organization takes its 
function over to the public relations (PR) as a sub unit to deal with it. PR is also responsible for 
establishing good relationship between organization and its publics. It is established by 
communication. There is some guidance, regulation and rule – what should do and shouldn’t 
do, good or bad – for PR practitioners in doing their role and function. It can be called as 
structure, composed by rule and resources, as sub structure of the larger organizational 
structure. Some parts below describe about PR practices, called as “one of organization 
structures”. 
 
2.4.1. Public Relations as a Structure    
Since organization is set up as an open system and its bureaucracy is democratic, 
communication between an organization and its publics must be two ways and equal. It means 
an organization and its publics must have an equal opportunity to get involved in 
communication activities and processes. There is no domination in communication process by 
one part to another, including in the process of decision and organizational policy making. An 
organization must give opportunity to the publics to get information access about organization.  
It must be transparent in communication with publics.  PR which is structurally represented 
organization must be open in communication with publics. So, the model communication of 
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Model 5 
Open System Model of Public Relations 
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In crisis situation, the role of PR is to deal with crisis communication.  In this not 
normal situation, an open system model of PR has to be applied optimally.  In the situation in 
which uncertainty is going to be escalated, PR must be selectively sensitive to those publics and 
it must have the capacity for initiating corrective action within the organization and for 
directing efforts to affect knowledge, predispositions and behaviors of publics. It is one 
indicator of equal relationship between an organization and its environment or publics. An 
organization performs the function of PR by establishing mutual interrelationship with its 
publics.   
 The definition of public relations (PR) and its relation to the organization, crisis and 
crisis communication are described on the following parts.  Firstly, it will be described the 
definition of PR.  These definitions contain also  PR’s functions and roles. Secondly, it will be 
described about the implication of system toward PR’s communication with its publics or 
environment. Finally, it will be explained how PR performed its function in the situation of 
crisis, and how strategy that carried out by this PR in order to  main good image in publics’ 
mind. In this part, it is also explained about the relation between PR practitioners and 
journalists. Good “personal” relationship is very important to explore because what they think 
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and what they do individually is also determinant on the social practices, as argued by Giddens 
in his structuration theory.   
 
2.4.1.1. Roles and Functions of Public Relations 
To understand the definitions of Public Relations we can search the Public Relations (PR) 
practices in the duration of its development. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) divided the 
development of PR into many steps begin on the ancient genesis into the era of PR maturity.  
In early of development, PR is understood as information distribution, publicity, political 
campaign and persuasion, press agentry, advertising. In the era of maturity, PR is posited as an 
organization’s tool to defend the organization’s image against the muckracing journalism, to 
promote ideas and products, and in the current time, PR is posited as a mediator for various 
interest conflicts.  Referring to those roles, PR is defined as:  
“PR is about communicating in order to achieve understanding through knowledge. The 
techniques of PR are to do with the sending and receiving of messages so that the both 
sides understand each other: in other words, two way education.” 
 
 “PR as inducing the public to have understanding for and goodwill.” (Edward L Bernays 
: 1955 in Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)  
 
“PR is the art or science of developing reciprocal understanding and goodwill” 
(Webster’s Third new International Dictionary—During World War II in Cutlip, Center 
and Broom 2000:3) 
 
“PR is the deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual 
understanding between an organization and its publics.” (The British Institute of Public 
Relations in Jefkins, Frank 1993:7).  
 
“PR as an interactive concept, ‘the planned effort to influence opinion through good 
character and responsible performance, based on mutually satisfactory two way 
communications (Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)”  
 
“PR is the management of communication between an organization and its publics. 
(Grunig, 1992:4)”  
 
“The basic function of PR is to reconcile or adjust in the public interest those aspects of 
our personal and corporate behavior which have a social significance” or “PR function is 
to help organization adjust to their environments (Childs, 1930s in Cutlip, Center and 
Broom 2000:3)”. 
 
Based on these definitions, Public Relations can be understood as a communication 
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function that can be categorized into two kinds of different concept of communication; (1) PR 
as one way communication, which is implemented as communication practices, such as 
propaganda, persuasion and publicity, and (2) PR as two way communication function, which is 
emphasized on exchange, reciprocity, and mutual understanding between organization and its 
publics, such as organizational adjustment, counseling management and corrective action. 
Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) called it as “evolution of PR’s concept”. PR as 
communication function has been followed by the other similar definitions that more 
emphasize on the PR function in the context of organizational management processes, such as 
the following definitions:  
 
“Public Relations is the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies 
the policies and procedures of an individual or an organization with the public interest, 
and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and 
acceptance.(Seitel, 1995:7)” 
 
“Public Relations is a distinctive management function which helps establish and 
maintain mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation 
between an organization and its publics, involves the management of problems or issues; 
helps management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines and 
emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps 
management keep abreast of and effectively utilize change, serving as an early warning 
system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication 
as its principal tools” (Rex F. Harlow , as quoted by Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:4). 
 
The definition shows the function of PR in practice, which also emphasizes its functions for 
publics, these are (1) management function, and (2) communication function. Management 
function means that PR has contribution to help or advise management in the decision making 
processing and has participation in management policy making. Communication function 
means that PR has responsibility build and maintain communication and mutual relationship 
between the organization and its publics. This definition also clearly shows that the role of PR 
has changed from the original one in its early stages. The early stage of PR in America was 
characterized by the need of companies for defending themselves from the attacks from the 
journalists who at that time tended to uncover their rottenness. Therefore, the relations of 
organizational PR and journalists tended to be adversary relations (Cutlip, Center and Broom 
2000). PR played the role to defend organization’s interest by presenting information that is 
positive for company, on the other hand, journalists had an interest in presenting negative side 
of the company as an informational commodity.  The description shows the communication 
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performed was defensive in nature.  They manipulate the information if needed to cover the 
company’s rottenness. Information provided by PR was developed based on organizational 
interest. PR’s philosophy then emphasized how to persuade media to get them informing what 
the organization expected disregarding whether the journalists believed the informational 
content. Referring to PR’s practices at that time it can be said that the communication of 
organization with its publics constituted one-way communication. The informational source 
was the organization and public was the destination. The function of PR was as the press 
agentry, those are seeking public attention for the organization, in anyway possible (Grunig, in 
Heath 2001). On the later development, however, when democracy has been established, 
indicated by the freedom in expressing opinions and thought, PR did not think that publics 
were merely a passive object. Therefore, the PR-public model then became the public 
information. PR’s function delivered accurate information to the publics, though the 
information was only limited to the advantageous information for the organization. 
Concerning the operational roles of PR, from various studies on PR in practices, four 
main categories of PR’s roles are found (Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:37-44): 
1. Communication Technician 
In this role, the PR practitioner is oriented to perform technical jobs such as writing and 
editing newsletter, developing web-site, and developing contacts with media. In this role, 
PR is not involved by management in defining organizational problems and selecting the 
decisions. They are directed to operate communication tools, even with no need to know 
the motivation or purpose of the communication products. This role limits the PR 
practitioner to participate significantly in making management decisions. 
2. Expert Prescriber 
Practitioners who hold this roles have an authority to define problems, to develop 
programs and to be responsible for implementation the program. In an organization, a 
manager gives full power, and does not interfere in the PR’s operations. Such role for the 
practitioner is indeed satisfying because of its independence in performing anything 
wanted, and it benefits the manager too because he/she can be sure on the performance 
of these experts. On the other hand, however, such PR’s role makes the practitioner 
become isolated from the organization’s dynamics. The manager may also feel 
irresponsible over the failure or success of the program performed by the PR 
practitioners. 
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3. Communication Facilitator 
This PR’s roles are to be a sensitive listener and information bearer. The practitioners 
serve as liaisons, interpreters, and mediators between the organization and its publics. 
They maintain two-way communication and facilitate the information exchange by 
eliminating the communication barriers and opening communication channels. This PR 
role understands that two-way communication can increase the quality of organizational 
decisions, which  promote its own and the public’s interest mutually. 
4. Problem Solving Facilitator 
This role means that PR’s participation in overcoming organizational problems is 
substantial. They become a part of the strategic planning team, along with other 
managers. 
 
The four PR roles can be reduced into two major roles, these are: technician and 
manager roles. The technician is not indicated as the member of the management team. They 
concern more with the process, which is producing and implementing various techniques used 
by PR. The manager’s role performs research both formative and evaluative in their jobs. This 
research capability make them always be involved in the process of defining problems and 
making organizational decisions, as well as in strategic plans. They involve more in defining the 
outcome, not on the process to reach the outcome. PR manager uses more environment 
scanning, negotiating, coalition building, issue managing, evaluating and management advising. 
Cutlip, Center and Broom called managerial role of PR is functional, and technician role of PR 
is functionary. Functional means that PR plays more in decision making processes, whereas 
functionary means that PR in the organizational structure has no opportunities as member of 
strategic planning team along with the other managers.  In practice, the role of PR in 
organization is based on the organizational environment. In organization with high degree in 
innovation because of the rapid environment changing and high environment’s threat, the roles 
of PR is more on PR manager. In the crisis situation, for example, the roles of PR should be 
manager, especially be expert prescriber. On the other hand, in the organization which is 
relatively stable and low environment’s threat, the role of PR is as technician.        
Some studies show that PR practitioners play numerous roles, yet on a given time there is 
a dominant role. PR’s role mainly met is the problem solving facilitator and the expert 
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prescriber, only a few that play the role as communication technician. In Japan, South Korea, 
India, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Public Relations practitioners in companies 
work more in media relations activities that focus on the promotion or product publicity and 
the most of all, the role of PR are technician (Sriramesh et al 1999, Putra, I G 1996, 
Perbawaningsih 1991, Rhee, Yunna 2002). They believe that information that is written by 
journalist about the organization is more credible for publics. As a result, the media relations 
objectives are persuading journalist to inform good news for establishing the organization 
reputation. PR practitioners treat the journalist as very important public, so media relation is the 
most important activities. In China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Britain, Russia, and New 
Zealand, PR activities are based on government or political party’s interests, which are 
emphasized on the educational persuasion or campaign for government’s programs. In China 
and Russia the role of PR tends to be functional, whereas in India, Indonesia and Taiwan, PR is 
functionary for government (McElreath et al 2001, Miller and Schlesinger 2001, Motion and 
Leitch 2001, Samra 2001, Weaver 2002, Perbawaningsih 1999). Based on their studies, it reveals 
that PR in the developing countries or Asia tends to be technicians and the role is functionary 
for organization.   
 
2.4.1.2. Communication Models of PR  
The development of democracy that was characterized with the freedom in expressing opinion 
for wider community, even for criticizing the state, showed the people’s power vis-à-vis the 
ruler. Democracy was clearly characterized with the existence of the equality between the 
people and the state. In such an era, the organization’s public is not in the position as the object 
for PR’s activities anymore. Therefore, the relationship between  the organization an the public 
is equal. Grunig (Heath 2000) suggested that there were two models of relation of organization 
with the publics, these are the two-way asymmetrical model and the two-way symmetrical 
model. The first model shows PR persuading public’s behavior which is expected by the 
publics, whereas in the second model, PR uses investigation and dialog with the publics to gain 
changes in ideas, attitude and behavior which are beneficial for both sides, i.e. the organization 
and its publics. The communication occurs in this relation was two-way communication. This 
relational model between organization and publics was labeled by Grunig as The Excellence of 
Public Relations. The use of two-way symmetrical model, or the combination of two-way 
asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical model (mix motive model) could increase the 
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contribution of PR to the accomplishment of organizational objectives. In most cases, Grunig 
believed that the two-way symmetrical model was normatively ideal. Nonetheless, this concept 
was criticized even Grunig himself saw that the two-way symmetrical model was utopian effort 
of PR. In practice, PR which is established and works on behalf of organization, would never 
be separated from its function to benefit the organization, even though evidently the 
organization is on the ‘wrong’ position. Van der Meiden (Grunig in Heath 2000) stated that 
“the two-way symmetrical model means that organizations would have to abandon their self 
interests, something considered as unrealistic”. 
Gordon and Kelly (1999) formulated operationally the PR models formulated by 
Grunig, as follows: 
PR Models and Its Implementation 
 
• Two-way symmetrical model: 
1. Determine how public reacts to the organization. 
2. Negotiate with an activist group. 
3. Help management to understand the opinion of particular publics 
4. Use theories of conflict resolution in dealing with publics 
• Two-way asymmetrical model: 
1. Get publics to adopt behavior that your organization wants them to adopt 
2. Use attitude theory in a campaign 
3. Manipulate publics scientifically 
4. Persuade public that your organization is right on an issue 
• Public Information Model 
1. Provide objective information about your organization 
2. Understand the news value of journalist 
3. Prepare news stories that reporters will use 
4. Perform as journalist within your organization. 
• Press Agentry Model 
1. Convince reporter to publicize your organization 
2. Get your organization’s name into the media 
3. Keep bad publicity out of the media 
4. Get maximum publicity from a staged event. 
 
The four model of PR demonstrates that there are differences in organization - public 
communication flow. It indicates also that there are differences of the importance of public 
opinion for organization. Press agentry model shows one way communication that is from 
organization to publics. The main task of PR is building and maintaining organization 
reputation. The public information model implies the higher importance of publics for 
organization. It is indicated by the organization willingness to provide the objective information 
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about organization to publics, especially for media. Two way asymmetrical communication 
model focuses on changes public’s attitude which is conducive for the organization by 
persuasion approach. The last model is the two way symmetrical communication. It means that 
public is important for the organization. PR efforts are to fulfill public’s need by doing 
negotiate with publics. There are equal position between organization and publics.    
Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) described the PR development in United States in a 
continuum line, started from 1850 when PR was used for the first time by the Press Agent for 
railway and circus, until in 1952 in which Cutlip and Center published their first book, “The 
Effective Public Relations”.  The continuum line also reveals importance of public for 
organization. A continuum line shows the changes in PR concept, as follows: 
 
 (1850)             (1900)     (1923)                      ( 1952)  
Public-Be Damned  → Public-Be Informed  →  Mutual Under-   →  Mutual-      
Era                 Era                                   Standing Era           Adjustment Era 
 
This Cutlip, Center and Broom’s depiction was in line with the development of PR functions 
generated by Grunig aforementioned. The essence of this PR development was the evolution 
of PR communication function, from the one-way persuasive communication to the equal two-
way communication. The evolution of communication functions is followed by the changes of 
PR’s Role, as described by Crobb and Pincus (Heath 2000): 
 
Press Agentry  →  Publicity  → Information    →  Relationship      →  Organizational 
     Sharing        Management      Positioning 
 
1900’s    1940’s & 1950’s 1960’s & 1970’s           1980’s & 1990’s         21st century  
  
 TACTICAL                                                STRATEGIC 
“Business Ignorant”                                           “Business Savvy” 
 
The model above describes that current PR’s role is emphasized on maintaining the 
organizational positioning. It means that PR participates in strategic planning, together with 
other management. The recent role is different from the early role.  It is only emphasized on 
technical or tactical function.    
Similar to Grunig, Cutlip, Center and Broom also stated that the ideal PR was the one 
that develops relation of organization and public with mutual adjustment, willing to make 
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changes for the benefit of both parties. This meant that PR made a substantial contribution for 
the achievement of organizational objectives only when it used the equality relation model 
between the organization and its publics, as well as the two-way communication (Gordon and 
Kelly 1999, Grunig 2000, Plowman 1998). By other words, in crisis, Public Relations as a part 
of organization has role as communication facilitator and/ or expert prescriber and apply two 
way communication model. It is a kind of structure, as mentioned by Giddens or Poole.  
About PR practices, almost in all Asian countries or in developing countries, PR was 
functioned more as the press agentry with one-way linear communication. In Japan and Indian, 
as mentioned before, the main activity of PR is media relations, that is the principal form of 
press agentry model (Sriramesh and friends 1999: 271-292). In Indian, none of the 
organizations engaged in sophisticated research, a key component of the two way model. It can 
be attributed to a lack of commitment to strategic public relations by the dominant coalition. 
This fact was not different from those in other countries such as South Korea. Beside through 
mass media, PR uses personal influence model. The personal influence model is a quid pro quo 
relationship between the PR practitioners and strategically placed individuals, such as 
government regulators, media persons and tax officials. The using of this model is supported by 
the culture, such as nomunication 36 in Japan, giving Ddukgab37  and chaebol 38 system in South 
Korea. The three cultures above remain one way communication, even more, asymmetrical 
communication model. In Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia, that PR was also 
functioned as the press agentry and Public Information model (Sriramesh et al 1999, Putra, I G 
1996, Perbawaningsih 1991, Rhee, Yunna 2002). PR practitioners in China state that they apply 
two way asymmetrical communication and two way symmetrical communication with publics.  
Government PR said that they always listen to the public’s voices in planning the national 
development program. In Russia, PR uses two way asymmetrical model in order to get publics 
acceptance. Generally, government uses media to do the propaganda, and to do the street 
demonstration (McElreath et al 2001, Miller and Schlesinger 2001, Motion and Leitch 2001, 
Samra 2001, Weaver 2002).  Therefore, in general, the PR model used indeed tended to be the 
one-way communication.  
                                                 
36 Nomunication is adopted from Japanese culture, nomu means drink. It means that to make a good relation 
between PR or organization and media people, company invites media people to make communication 
activity that goes on during this drinking session.  
37 Ddukgab is money for buying Korean cakes. Giving Ddukgab is culturally acceptable tradition, which 
conveniently circumvents laws against giving bribes.    
38 Chaebol system actually is coming from Japan, chaibatz,  the system that remains collectivism, consists of a 
small group of business conglomerate s that dominates the Korean economy.     
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2.4.2. CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS AN ACTION  
In crisis, every members of organization should be responsive. Taking action in a right time by 
a correct way is very important. Furthermore, an action must be a part of strategic 
organizational action. In contrast, according to the structuration theory, an action can be 
personal and individual. Referring to Coombs (1998), understanding the crisis situation is 
important and basic for selecting best strategy.  In order to understand it better, we need to 
explore more about the definition, typology, and the development stages of crisis, and finally 
followed by explanation of crisis communication strategy.       
 
2.4.2.1. Crisis Definitions 
There are many crisis definitions. All reveals the characteristics of crisis which are different 
from the other concepts, such as problem, disaster, breakdown, conflict and incident (Lagadec 
1993, Bank 2000, Brecher 1993). Seeger (1998:233) quoted some crisis definitions from several 
communication researchers, are follow:      
“Crisis is low probability/ high consequences events that threaten the most fundamental 
goals of the organization. Because of their low probability, these events defy 
interpretations and impose severe demands on sense making.” (Weick 1988:305). 
 
“Characterize an organizational crisis as a situation that “is marked by a sense of 
urgency” and “close observation by the media” and that “interrupts normal business 
operation with the potential loss of revenues and credibility” (Williams and Treadaway 
(1992:57). 
 
“Crisis that includes three conditions: (1) threatens high priority values of the 
organization goals, (2) present a restricted amount of time in which a decision can be 
made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization” (Hermann 1963:64). 
 
Seeger (1998:233-5) concludes from various definitions of crisis that there are three 
components of crisis : (1) a trigger event that signals the threat; (2) decision makers have short 
response time. Crisis produces immediate uncertainties that create media scrutiny and pressure 
and pressure for immediate explanation; (3) surprise. It is a consequence of being suddenly 
confronted with circumstances seen as unlikely and inconsistence with routine, familiar 
activities. A crisis is by definition non routine and outside of familiar, predicted patterns of day 
to day life. 
Some scholars also described the situation or characteristics that indicate the existence of 
crisis, as below: 
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“Crisis is a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the 
organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, services or good 
name. A crisis interrupt normal business transaction and can sometimes threaten the 
existence of the organization. In crisis, emotions are on edge, brain is not fully 
functioning, and events are occurring so rapidly that drafting a plan during a crisis is 
unthinkable.” (Bank 2000:2). 
  
“A crisis may contain a high degree threat to life, safety or to the existence of the 
organization, and that contain elements of the unexpected. Certainly a crisis can be put 
organization into the forefront of unwanted publicity and may call into question of 
competence of personnel” (White and Mazur 1995). 
  
“Crisis is a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. Quite often it 
is not what really happened in the incident, it is what the key audience believe happened, 
that counts. It can damage its employees, products, services, financial condition and 
reputation and image.” (Barton 1995, as quoted by Dolphin 1999:120). 
 
That description shows that the impact of crisis is not only in the material/ physical things, but 
also, in the perception of publics. What people think, feel and believe about the crisis and its 
impact on the organization’s future can deteriorate the impact of crisis itself. 
Crisis does not only occur in business, but also in politic.  Brecher (1993:3-4) defines 
crisis in the context of world politics, as follows: 
 
“A change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive interaction between two 
or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities, that in turn 
destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system.” 
 
Brecher distinguished between crisis and conflict. Conflict is characterized by two or more 
parties engaged in mutually hostile actions and using coercion to injure or control their 
opponents. International crisis and international conflict are not synonymous, though they are 
closely related. Every crisis reflects a “state of conflict” between two or more adversaries, but 
not every conflict is reflected in crisis. In political context, crisis tends to affect on the 
perceived and established relations, structures, goals, objectives and values (Robinson 1968, 
Holsti 1972, Head, Short and McFarlane 1978, Nomikos and North 1976, Milburn 1972, 
Brecher 1993). In politic, crisis can be analyzed into two levels; unit level (actors, participants) 
and system level (organization, environment) (Wiener and Kahn 1962, Young 1968, 
McCormick 1978, as quoted by Brecher 1993:22).  On the other aspect, Young mentioned that 
violence or subjective perception about the prospect of violence is existed in crisis (Brecher 
1993:22).  Violence on this perspective can be considered as an indicator of crisis. Concluding 
from all crisis definitions above can be concluded that crisis is:  
  
 77___________________                
 
“The event or the serial of events that occur unexpectedly; and are unpredictable, 
surprise, non routine, specific, inconsistent with routine, outside of familiar; and contain 
high level uncertainty and low probability for the future; and may potential to threaten, 
or are perceived to threaten, or damage the organization’s image, reputation, credibility, 
existence, high priority goals, fundamental goals, stabilized relationship and structure. It 
is the urgent situation in which leads on high degree of public and media exposure, high 
degree of public anxiety, and high degree of the prospect of violence, high complexity, 
interest conflicts and high ego involvement; and need organizational decision making and 
responses in the very short time”. 
   
 
This definition contains the specific characteristics of crisis that is different from the 
characteristic of problem, conflict, breakdown or disaster of organization.   
 
2.4.2.2. Typology of Crisis 
Identifying type of crisis is very important to determine the strategy to resolve it. Seeger 
(1988:235-236) categorized the crisis according to similarities in the locus, source and cause of 
the threat, based on some researchers that usually occurred in corporation, as below: 
   
1.  Meyers and Holusha identify nine types, based on the sources:  
(1) crisis in public perception: public confidence in  organization or industry is 
threatened; 
(2) crisis the sudden market shift, such as the changing of consumer’s preferences; 
(3) product failure which include product recalls; 
(4) top management succession; 
(5) cash crisis; 
(6) strikes and job actions; 
(7) hostile take over; 
(8) adverse international events; 
(9) regulation and deregulation, which can create high levels of uncertainty.        
 
2. Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava (1988) have developed a more discrete system by 
grouping crises according to their underlying structural similarities: 
(1) breakdowns or defects in product, plants, packages, equipment and people. 
(2) extreme anti social acts directed at corporations, products, consumers, 
executives, employees, and employee’s familie. 
(3) external economic attacks such as extortion, bribery, boycotts, and hostile 
takeovers, 
(4) external information attacks, such as copyright infringement, loss of 
information, counterfeiting, and rumors.  
(5) environmental accidents. 
 
3. Meyer (1982) stated that the environment is a frequent locus for the development of 
organizational crises.  
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4. Smart (1985) and Smart and Verstinky (1977) argue that uncertainty and the inability 
to communicate with the environment completely are the central elements in most 
organizational crises. Based on Smart and Meyer, can be identified that locus for the 
development of crisis is environment and the capability of organization to 
communicate with environment. It means that unsuccessful communication between 
organization and publics (environment) can be a crucial source of crisis.  
 
ICM (Institute of Crisis Management) identified four types of crisis, based on its causes (Center 
and Jackson 2003:321): 
(1) Act of God (storm, earthquakes, volcanic action, etc. 
(2) Mechanical problems (ruptured pipes, metal fatigue, etc) 
(3) Human error (the wrong valve was opened, miscommunication about what to do, 
etc) 
(4) Management decision, action or inaction (the problem is not serious, nobody will find 
out, etc). 
 
By the same way, Newsom, Turk and Kruckeberg (2000: 482) divided type of crisis (typology of 






Sources of crisis Violent: cataclysmic – immediate 
loss of life or property  
Nonviolent -  sudden, upheaval but 
damages, if any, are delayed   
Act of nature Earthquakes, forest fires Drought, epidemics 
Intentional Acts of terrorism, including product 
tampering, when these result in loss 
of life or destruction of property.  
Bomb and product-tampering threats, 
hostile takeovers, insider trading, 
malicious rumors and other 
malfeasance  
Unintentional  Explosion, fires, leaks, other 
accidents.  
Process or product problems with 
delayed consequences, stock market 
crashes, business failures.  
 
 
Mitroff et al (1998:85-86) proposed the framework of crisis factors that could be internal and 
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Model 6 
 Types of Corporate Crisis 
Technical/Economic 
Cell 1      Cell 2 
Product/ service defects    Widespread environmental 
Plant defects/ industrial accidents   destruction/ industrial accidents 
Computer breakdown    Large scale system failure 
Defective, undisclosed information   Natural disasters 
Bankruptcy     Hostile takeovers 
       Governmental crises 
       International crises 
       INTERNAL         EXTERNAL 
 
Cell 3      Cell 4 
Failure to adapt/ change    Symbolic projection  
Organizational breakdown    Sabotage 
Miscommunication     Terrorism 
Sabotage      Executive kidnapping 
On-site product tampering    Off-site product tampering 
Counterfeiting     Counterfeiting 
Rumors, sick jokes, malicious slander   False rumors, sick jokes, mali- 
Illegal activities     cious slander 
Sexual harassment     Labor strikes  





According to the list of typology of crisis, the sources of crisis can be identified, as: (1) human 
or nature (acts of God), (2) internal (organization) or external (environment), (3) unit level 
(actor/ participant) or system (organization/ environment), (4) technical or management. The 
characteristics of the source of crisis can be categorized into: (1) violent or non violent; and (2) 
intentional or unintentional. It is very possible that the crisis develops because of many sources, 
locus or causes.   
 
2.4.2.3. Development of Crisis 
Crisis can step up if it is managed improperly by organization. Responses of organization to 
crisis have impact on the next situation of the crisis.  Identifying stage or phase of crisis can 
help organization to set the acts up, in order to respond to crisis. Each step of crisis might be 
responded in a different way.   
Each communication researcher categorized development of crisis in a different term. 
Some researcher called phase of crisis, another one called stage, domain, or period of crisis for 
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the same thing. Sturges et al (1991) and Fink (Seeger 1998:237) stated that there are four stages 
of crisis (1) crisis build up or prodromal period. In this stage, the crisis signals already emerge; 
(2) crisis breakout or acute crisis. In this phase, the damages resulting from the crisis is already 
apparent both physical, fiscal, and emotional damages; (3) abatement or often called chronic 
crisis. In this period, effects of the damages mentioned in the acute crisis stage continue taking 
place, even more severe. Public claims, demonstrations, repression against the demonstrators, 
legal actions, interrogation, and media coverage continue to take place, that likely to exacerbate 
the crisis effects; (4) the ‘termination’, that is the phase in which resolution signals occur 
suggesting that the crisis will soon be over, and it is not felt threatening the viability of the 
organization and its publics. Crisis, according to Fink, is cyclical, with repeated prodromal, 
acute, chronic, and resolution stages.   
In another context, Turner (1976, as quoted by Seeger 1998:237-9) proposes a 
comprehensive development sequence of stages of crisis. He argues that crisis may be 
understood as “a disaster occurs because of some inaccuracy or inadequacy in the accepted 
norms and beliefs”. The stages of crisis are described as follow: 
1. Stage I: radical departure from the pattern of normal operations. 
2. Stage II: the incubation period, events that are outside the parameters of and/or at 
odds with the accepted belief about hazards and the norms for their avoidance 
accumulated unnoticed.  
3. Stage III:  trigger event that signals the inadequacy of accepted beliefs about hazards 
and the norms for their avoidance. This is the important first step to readjustment of 
belief about hazards and avoidance.  
4. Stage IV: the onset of the crisis and its immediate, direct and unanticipated 
consequences.  
5. Stage V:  the rescue and salvage, where the immediate collapse of belief about the 
world, its hazards and avoidance norms are recognized.  
6. Stage VI: a full cultural adjustment takes place in beliefs about the world its hazard and 
avoidance norms, so that they are compatible with the new insight and understanding.  
 
Bank (2000:8-13), in relation to the crisis management, describes five stages of a crisis. He 
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1. Detection: this phase may begin with noting warning signs. Some crises have no 
noticeable prodromes, but many do. 
2. Prevention/ preparation: phase in which organization prevents the blows of crises, or 
limit the duration of crises. This phase is called also as crisis preparation when 
organization deals with crises that cannot be prevented.  
3. Containment: referring to the effort to limit the duration of the crisis or to keep it 
form spreading to other areas affecting the organization. 
4. Recovery: involves efforts to return the company to business as usual. Organization 
wants to leave the crisis behind and restore normalcy as soon as possible. Recovery 
may also mean restoring the confidence of key publics, which means communicating 
to normal business. 
5. Learning: a process of examining the crisis and determining what was lost, what was 
gained, and how the organization performed in the crisis. It is an evaluative procedure 
designed to make the crisis a prodrome for the future.  
 
In the context of international politic crisis, Michael Brecher (1993:25-29) states four 
interrelated domains/phases of crisis:     
 
1. Onset: identifies the initial phase of an international crisis.  This coincides with the 
per-crisis period of a foreign policy crisis, in which the non-crisis norm of no (or low) 
perceived value threat by a state’s decision makers gives way to low (or higher), that is 
increasing, threat from an adversary and with it. Low (or higher), that is increasing 
stress. Onset is indicated by outbreak of a crisis, that is, the eruption of higher than 
normal disruptive interaction.  
2. Escalation: denotes much more intense disruption than onset. Escalation may – but 
need not – be characterized by a change from no violence to violence, or from low 
level violence to high level violence.  
3. De-escalation: the “winding down” of a crisis. At the macro level, it is indicated by 
reduction in hostile interaction leading to accommodation and crisis termination. At 
the state level, de-escalation is operationalized as a decline in perceived threat, time 
pressure and war likelihood toward the non crisis norm. As such, it denotes the end 
crisis period and is characterized by decreasing stress for the decision makers.  
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4. Impact: designates the phase following crisis termination, that is, its aftermath, the 
counterpart of post crisis or beyond crisis. It identifies the consequences of a crisis. 
 
PHASE Onset Escalation De-escalation  Impact 
Interaction Incipient 
distortion 
Peak distortion Accommodation  Non crisis 
interaction
PERIOD 




































Brecher clearly stated that the steps of crisis link to one another. It means that crisis 
handling or crisis management in the certain step affects on the situation of the next step. In 
this categorize steps of crisis Brecher mentions stressful and feel threatened in each step of 
crisis. Higher steps means more stressful and more threatened.  It declines since the crisis is 
going on termination.    
Generally, scholars define that crisis develops in the period of time, that is started by 
the existence of signals of crisis which intrudes the normal operational/ established values of 
organization and ended by the crisis resolution. Even though scholars used the different word 
such as phase, stage, domain, and period, all explained about the process of crisis development. 
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Build up Crisis signals are 
existed/ initial 
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 Break out  
The damages of 
crisis are existed 
 
 
Chronic Stage III: 
inadequacy 
accepted belief   















Termination Signals of 
resolution are  
existed/ the end 
of crisis  






   
On the other part of their research, some scholars (Bank 2000, Turner 1976, Fink 1986) 
believe that crisis is a cyclical process. The output of the end stage of crisis will be input for the 
initial or early stage of crisis. Bad output of bad crisis management will cause a new crisis. Based 
on this point of view, Bank (2000) mentioned learning phase to emphasize that an organization 
must learn from the crisis that has occurred before. It is important for an organization to 
prepare or to improve its ability to detect the new signal of crisis. It is called as “sense of crisis”.      
 
2.4.2.4. Crisis Communication  
As explain earlier, immediate and accurate responses to crisis will inhibit or even stop the 
development of crisis to be worse and minimize its impact. As happened in Indonesia, the 
failure of government to predict potential crisis and detect crisis signals in early step of its 
development caused its development is uncontrolled. It brought negative impact not only on an 
area but in many areas of Indonesian life. Indonesian image worsened, as bad as the 
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government image on national or international publics. In crisis resolution, good image helps 
publics to set the predisposition toward organization.  Image is going to be very important to 
recover the crisis. Therefore, it is described the importance of image in relating to the image 
restoration strategy.    
 
2.4.2.4.1. The Importance of Image 
There are many definitions of image. In the simple way, image is defined as a person’s 
perception or impression about an object. More comprehensive, Aaker and Myers (1982, as 
quoted by van Riel (1995:78) states that “an image is the set of meanings by which an object is 
known and through which people describe, remember and relate to it. That is, it is the net result 
of the interaction of a person’s beliefs, ideas, feelings and impression about an object.” Image is 
also defined as “a representation of mind. It affects attitudes which in turn affect behavior. The 
impression creates –consciously or unconsciously, whether it wishes to or not- inevitably 
affects people who do business with (Bernstein 1986, as quoted by van Riel 1995:76). Based on 
these definitions, it can be understood that image has a close relationhip with the impression, 
perception, belief, feeling of a person or people. In general, image is created based on the 
audience’s perception about object that can be things, ideas, products, and also an organization. 
Perception does not always reflect accurately the profile of the object but for one doing the 
process of the perception, the perception is a reality (Gregory, 1996:2). Using this point of 
view, image means reality, even though it is accurate or not. Image is not about right or wrong, 
but it is what the public think of. On the other side, Baker (2000:314) suggests that the 
reputation is more real than image. The reputation itself is given meaning by Baker as not really 
different with the understanding of the image that is “public’s judgments of the organization’s 
behavior.”  Reputation is the credibility about what to say, to do and to fix on the future hopes 
for the organization. Therefore, an organization should communicate the right reputation to 
the public in order to create organizational credibility. 
The relation of image building by communication is also stated by the group 
understanding the image from the sociological point of view. Using this point of view, in the 
beginning image is the representation of the reality, but eventually, reality becomes the 
representation of the image. Alvesson, as quoted by Van Riel (1992:80) suggests that the image 
consists of two things, i.e. (1) the sense of image that is the one’s depiction on perception 
object, (2) the communicated image, that is the impressions on what to communicate by the 
perception of the object.  Communicated image is in general born from the impression of 
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information conveyed by the press or interpersonal communication, it is rarely born from direct 
experience with the object of perception. The concept acquires criticism since it ignores the 
possibility of image discrepancies between the one shaped by the direct experience (personal 
experiences) and the image created by the press. The criticism rises with the background that 
Alvesson conceives that Western people are overwhelmed by the image created by the press, 
and there is such a great discrepancies between sense of image and communicated image. Therefore, 
among such people, the organization is very oriented to strengthen its image among the public 
to counter image created by the press that could be less accurate. The organization thought it is 
necessary to have strategies of mass communication in order to build the desired image. In this 
sense, corporate communication then plays an important role, mainly the communication with 
the external public. In performing the communication, the press becomes an important tool for 
the organization. 
Why should image be established, maintain and repaired in case that it is threatened? 
Van Riel (1995:75-77) writes that image is not only important for the object of perception, but 
the subject who perceives. In the terms of corporate image, image is very crucial for the 
corporate or public who perceive. For an organization, the positive image is the basic 
precondition to build commercial relationship with the target groups, while for the public, the 
image helps the subject to simplify or conclude the truth about the organization, in certain terms 
such as good-bad, useful-useless. The higher organizational image affects the public in making 
decisions, the more important for the organization to build an image. In general, image 
determines the success, continuity, credibility and reputation of the organization. 
Understanding that image is determinant for the existence of an organization, it is very 
important for an organization to construct and to remain the positive image on publics’ view.  
Good image or favorable image is very helpful for an organization when: (1) information on 
the basis of which people  have to make decision is complex, conflicting and/or incomplete, (2) 
information is either insufficient or too wide-ranging to be able to judge, (3) people have a 
degree of  involvement that is too low to be able to go through an extensive information –
processing process, and (4) certain conditions in the environment that obstruct the decision 
making process, such as time constraints (Poiesz 1988 as quoted by Riel 1995:76).  Situation as 
described above is clearly happened in crisis. Organization that already possesses good image or 
favorable image will respond to the crisis in a better way. 
 It can be concluded that in crisis to established positive image of an organization is 
very helpful for publics to maintain or to build trust to organization and in turn the public trust 
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is very useful for an organization to reconstruct its image. Referring to description in chapter 
one, we can see that image of Indonesian governments were not quite good in time of crisis. 
Crisis that can’t be resolved quickly worsened the government and president’s image, and vice 
verse. In other word, there is a chain of effects. The chain can be broken by the appropriate 
and accurate communication crisis responses and good image of an organization on its publics, 
both communicated image and sense of image.  
Related to good image building and well crisis management, an organization does not 
have to wait for the crisis to happen. Crisis management should be done as one of 
organizationally operational management. Thus, an organization needs to build high sense of 
crisis and capability in crisis management, including crisis communication management, by 
doing risk communication and issues management. It is one of PR responsibility in an 
organization.   
  
2.4.2.4.2. Risk Communication and Issues Management 
 Crisis management does not mean only overcoming crisis that already happens; more than 
that, crisis management means “strategic planning to prevent and respond crisis and negative 
events, a process of eliminating risks and uncertainty and making the organization more able to 
control the achievement of organizational objectives” (Banks, 1998). In this framework, crisis 
management is not only an effort to control crisis but also to arrange strategic plans for 
preventing and anticipating crisis. This concept of crisis management emphasizes that there is 
no event or problem that can not be predicted before by the organization. This differs from the 
traditional concept on crisis that defines as “unpredictable course of events that threatens the 
organizational image, so that it must be dealt with within very narrow range of time”.   
The understanding that crisis as one of functions or phases in organizational 
development is characterized by incorporation of crisis management as a part of organizational 
operations. With such understanding, the PR practitioners are involved in crisis and monitoring 
issues, risk assessment and communication, and the crisis planning, as well as the PR’s 
involvement in disseminating information post-crisis, management and the recovery of 
organizational image (Seeger et.al., in Heath 2000:155-165). Thereby it is clear that crisis is not 
an event that can not be anticipated. Issues management and risk assessment constitute PR 
activities related to the monitoring of changes in internal and external environment of the 
organization, that constitute an early detection of crisis signals. This activity is an effort to 
minimize the uncertainties and to improve the predictive capability toward the future of the 
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organization by making adaptation to the changes. Such activities are called by Weick as 
organizing. Weick in his theory suggests that “Organizing consist of adapting to an enacted 
environment, an environment which is constituted by the actions of interdependent human 
actors”. In other words, Weick said that organizational environment as a communication 
construct, comprising interaction processes of communication among people. This 
communication is performed to overcome “information equivocality”, the comprehensibility of 
communication. Some of the aspects of equivocality are ambiguity, complexity, and unclearness 
level of information (Kreps 1985). Referring to this theory, then the contemporary concept is 
justified on crisis as a natural process in the organizational development, and crisis management 
constitutes the organization’s effort in communicating with its environment, to create mutual 
understanding on the part of the organization as well as its publics about the organizational 
circumstances. 
A part of the organizing process within the context of crisis management is issues 
management. This includes activities of identifying, monitoring, and analyzing trends of key 
public opinion that can become public policies or rules. Issues management argues that an 
organization should adopt an external focus and enact their environment by attending to 
relevant issues (Seeger, in Heath 2000:155-165).  Newsom et al (2000: 495) called it with the 
term “issue monitoring”. Based on his point of view, it is the one of invaluable contribution of 
PR.  When an organization fails to respond to crisis, it is often because of the irresponsible 
reaction to crisis signals or forewarnings. There are three responses of organization that cause 
trouble; (1) arrogance, (2) failure to get objective information from all publics that might be 
involved in a potential problem, and (3) using bad judgment. Arrogance leads to making some 
assumptions that some publics are just not important enough for consideration. Failure to get 
objective information might caused by unwillingness of the organization to communicate with 
all publics. This response may lead to making bad judgment. Responsibility of PR is to manage, 
include monitor issues in good manner is very important in the situation of crisis. Crisis that 
contains high degree of uncertainty creates public debate about the event. Public opinion might 
break down into two groups; pro and contra or positive and negative opinion for organization.  
Based on Sturges et al (1991:22-27), there is public opinion node that usually occurs at the 
break out stage in duration of crisis. In this time, the minimal objective of the issue 
management is to maintain positive public opinion and to limit negative public opinion. 
Howard Chase (Seitel 1995) defines issues management as the capacity to understand, mobilize, 
coordinate, and direct all strategic and policy planning functions, and all public affairs/public 
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relations skills, toward achievement of one objective: meaningful participation in creation of 
public policy that affects personal and institutional destiny. The most important from this 
definition is that issues management is intended to involve public participation to create public 
policies that have an impact on their personal or institutional objectives. While another part of 
organizing is risk communication. Risk communication is PR research performed based on the 
understanding that “organization must promote informational exchanges among related parties 
on the nature, importance and control of risk”. This reflects informational exchange and 
knowledge sharing, based on the dissemination of messages on the relative size of risk, 
prevention norms and risk reduction strategies. The crisis communication strategy itself 
depends on the risk size, such as the damage or loss that will be experienced by organization, 
including organizational image impairment. This is also suggested in the conclusion of Coombs 
study (1998) “communicative response options for overcoming crisis are determined by the 
appropriate understanding on the prevailing crisis situation”. In other words, overcoming crisis 
effectively is determined by characteristics of the crisis situation. The more the organization 
recognizes the crisis potentials or signals, the better the organization in responding to the crisis. 
Some studies show that an organization that is very cognizant on the importance of 
crisis management, and performing issue management, risk communication and crisis planning, 
will be more successful in overcoming crisis than the one that does not perform those activities 
in the organizational processes (Coombs 1998, Pratt in Heath 2000, Heath 1997, Wissenblit 
1989). 
The above description clearly shows the role played by Public Relations in relation to 
organizational crisis. PR not only has a role in the crisis recovery stage but also has  roles in 
each phase or stage of crisis.  The failure of PR in playing its role will result on the failure of 
conflict resolution and the achievement of organizational objectives. The failure of PR to take 
responsibility at each phase of the crisis will contribute to create bad image for the organization. 
It is obvious that bad image on an organization might represent a bad organization.  What the 
PR has done on each phase of crisis? What are the function and roles of PR in crisis? Whereas, 
on the other hand, some studies show that technician role makes only a few contribution to the 
organizational effectiveness, including in the crisis resolution. In relation to the crisis occurring 
in the organization, the two-way symmetrical model between the organization and publics, that 
also indicate two-way communication, in fact it is more effective in anticipating, preventing and 
overcoming crisis (Banks 1996). The two-way communication between the organization and its 
publics demonstrates the understanding that organizational environment constitutes an 
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extremely strong influence factor in the organizational life. This environment consists of the 
organization publics. In Weick’s organizing theory, the environment intended consist of human 
interaction, the process of information exchange and communication. Thus it is clear that in 
crisis condition, PR practitioners can make considerable contribution to deal with the crisis if 
they do their role such as defining problems by conducting research on the human interaction, 
and together with the other managers arranging strategic planning and making organizational 
decisions. In other words, PR’s role that is contributive for the crisis resolution is the 
managerial role by implementing two-way communication method between the organization 
and its environments, and using the two-way symmetrical relations model or the combination 
between the two-way asymmetrical and the two-way symmetrical models. 
 
2.4.2.4.3. Dealing with the Media in Crisis 
Whatever crisis communication strategy is undertaken by an organization, media is one of the 
extremely important parts. What are media’s roles in crisis? How much is media’s contribution 
to the crisis resolution? As mentioned previously, crisis is any event that threatens the personal, 
organizational, and social-system images. The image itself is shaped more by the subject 
through what he/she receive from media on the perceived object. Therefore, organizational 
image is the image created on the organization that is perceived through mass media, not as the 
product of direct experience of public with the organization. From this perspective, it is clearly 
demonstrated that the shaped image is influenced much by media. Public Relations, that is 
essentially responsible in influencing public perception on the organization, has huge interest in 
(mass) media. Moreover in the crisis situation in which public obtains information on the crisis 
more through media than from any other channels, PR must work harder in handling media 
(Banks 1999). A bad relationship between an organization and media will have a fatal impact 
for the crisis resolution because mass media will not have much time to compromise on what it 
will report on the crisis. In some events it is admitted that media contributes more in 
exacerbating the crisis than resolving it. It must also be admitted that media plays substantial 
roles in provoking conflicts and wars, that ends with creating crisis (Raboy and Degenais 1995). 
This condition raises many ethical and political questions on media’s role in growing 
democracy. In one hand, media promotes democracy, but on the other, media kills democracy. 
In case of an organizational crisis, it is not rare that a bad relationship between public relations 
practitioners, as a representation of an organization, and journalist, as a representation of 
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media, lead to the crisis worse. It is usual, sometimes the journalist construct news about crisis 
in a negative way.       
Speaking about the relationship between the PR practitioners and the journalists, we 
can understand it by searching the root of PR development in United States. PR in the early 
time is positioned as defender of an organization, against the journalists that published bad 
news about the organization. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) called that a journalist and PR 
practitioner relationship is adversary. Journalist tends to expose something bad about 
organization, whereas, in contrary, PR practitioner in that time hired by organization to defend 
the organization’s image that was attacked by media. This adversarial relationship is believed 
still remain in recent times.  Newsom et al (2000: 497) explained that there is a number of 
difficulties for PR practitioners when they have to work with mass media to communicate the 
reality of a crisis. One is the inclination of reporters to be more interested in the rare and 
unusual, especially in communicating risk. The second one is the difficulties of PR practitioners 
to get access to communication channels. Communication channels are usually disrupted by 
crisis. In either case, extra efforts have to be made by an organization (PR) to get information 
to mass media. Another problem is the tendency to close down the normal communication 
channel. Often the crisis is such a threat to an organization that either the organization itself or 
others with control over it, like the government, severely limit information about the crisis.  
The adversarial relationship between journalist and PR practitioners is also supported 
by Sallot and his colleagues (1998:366-377). Based on their research, there is misperception 
between each other about news values. Even though journalists and PR practitioners have the 
similar news value, journalists tend to be underestimated to PR practitioners in relation to the 
news values. Journalist perceived PR practitioners hold inferior values, in which more 
emphasized on the values “depicts subject in favorable light” and “interest to reader” than 
focus on the values “factual accuracy” and “fairness to different views”. Sallot also found that 
the discord between journalists and PR practitioners involves more than just news values. In an 
effort to gain ink and air time, PR practitioners offer journalists unsolicited assistance in the 
performance in their job. In the other side, journalist perceived that practitioners have self-
serving motives for offering this “services”. Based on journalists’ perception the “service” is 
their job.  Cameron, Salllot and Curtin (1997: 111-155) listed many researchers such as Jeffers 
(1977), Swarts (1983), Aronoff et al (1984), Kopenhaver (1985), Stegal and Sanders (1986), 
Sallot (1990), Carrol (1994), Cline (1982) who found the similar data about the underestimation 
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made by journalist to PR practitioner in relation to the news value.  
Moloney (2000:119-132) described the same thing about the relation of journalists and 
PR practitioners, that he called it as “hostility”.  In the early history in UK and USA, journalists 
tended to make a distance to PR practitioners because of their judgment that all PR is bought 
with gold, can corrupt other weak ones with gold. However, recent studies show that the 
relation of journalists and PR practitioners has been changing.  More and more journalists 
depend on PR in composing news story. PR’s influence on the news is getting stronger (Turk 
1991:211-222, Sallot et al 1998:366-377) that is indicated by more published news stories in 
mass media are based on news release or “hand-out” of PR. The similar statement launched by 
Moloney (2000:119-132). He said that there many kinds of news are the product of the merger 
between journalism and PR. The PR practices and journalism are becoming borderless.          
Referring to the media’s strength during crisis in this democracy era, the PR practitioner 
clearly has to work together with the journalist. The relationship between an organization and 
media is divided on two situations, (1) organization is highly depended on the media, it means 
an organization is under media control; (2) media is under an organization control. The first 
condition, an organization does more bagging to the media in releasing or not releasing 
organizational information.  Doing “blackmail” to organization usually is utilized by media, in 
these bagging efforts. In the second condition, organization has high power to influence media. 
An organization can do everything to the media in goals attaining, including manipulating 
information.  The principle of PR in crisis that says, “the most important thing is persuading 
media to cover the organization as expected, not to persuade media to entrust or distrust the 
information reported” can be implemented easily. This kind of PR’s principal is usually 
increasing the number of unethical journalist, the journalists who are persuaded easily to 
publish or perish certain information, as long as they are paid for it.  In an organizational crisis, 
“buying” a journalist is becoming usual because there is too much “sensation” information, that 
it can be negative for organization but positive to increase the media selling. The organization 
and media relation as described above is apparently not a good relationship between 
organization and its publics that mentioned on PR functions. This concept runs against the 
journalist as well as its own ethics that the one is to present accurate and correct information. 
Good relationship between journalists and PR practitioners should be indicated by willingness 
to communicate the crisis that co-orient to publics’ interests. Contribution PR in dealing with 
media or journalist is (1) conducting the delicate negotiations that have to go on between 
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source and media about what to use and what not to use; (2) providing enough opportunities 
for information to be given to the media, such as distributing news releases and conducting 
news conferences, (3) educating as well as informing, so that journalists don’t fall back on 
stereotyping to explain the incident itself or the people involved in it. This stereotyping leads 
bias crisis reportage that in turn, it creates crisis impairment. Good relationship between PR 
practitioners and the journalists, in the larger context, good relationship between an 
organization and its external publics could influence an effectiveness of crisis resolution efforts.   
 
2.4.2.5. Crisis Communication Strategies  
Strategy determines the effectiveness; therefore strategy must be planned carefully. Strategy, 
according to Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) is the entire conceptual approach or program 
planning in general that is designed to reach an objective. Strategy can also be defined as the 
determination of organizational objectives and goals, a series of actions performed and the 
allocation of resources needed, in order to reach the objectives. Thus strategy includes 
objectives and goals, actions and allocation of resources in order to reach the objectives and 
goals. Crisis communication strategy therefore is the planning of the entire communication 
program including the formulation of objectives and goals, and the resources allocation, that is 
designed to anticipate, prevent and overcome crisis. 
Many researchers have explored crisis communication strategy in context of   
organization. They focused on analysis of the message of communication between organization 
and its publics in crisis. Some researchers called it as crisis communication strategy, other 
researchers used the different terms such as image restoration strategy, crisis response strategy 
and apologia strategy. All terms reveal the same thing, “how organization communicate to its 
publics in defending its image in crisis.” Dionisopoulos and Vibbert (1988), as quoted by 
Coombs (1998) said that organization frequently use apologia, how individuals use 
communication to defend their character (image) from public attacks, as the one of  image 
restoration strategy in crisis situation. Identifying and evaluating of strategies open to 
communicators during crisis, to repair an image and to respond to criticism or to accusation of 
wrongdoing is called “rhetorical tradition of apologia”. (Benoit 1995, Hearit 1995, as quoted by 
Seeger et al 1998: 249, Ihlen 2000).  Most often, these efforts draw on the rhetorical genre of 
apologia (Downey 1993, Ware and Linkugel 1973, as quoted by Seeger et al 1998:248). Hearit 
(1994) defined the goal of apologia is presenting “a compelling, counter description…to situate 
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alleged wrongdoing in a more favorable context” and Ryan (1982) and others have broadened 
the scope to include all speech of self –defense, such a form of discourse.”   
According to many researchers, there are many strategies of communication to respond 
to crisis, in order to defend the organization’s image, as the following list.   
1. Benoit (1995, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt. 2000: 163-178) described five image 
restoration strategies: (1) Denial: organization did not do anything wrong – organization is 
not involved in a crisis. Denial strategy is divided two kinds: (a) simple denial: denial of an 
undesirable act; and (b) shifting denial: moves the guilt from one person to another; (2) 
Evasion of responsibility: organization has limited responsibility for the crisis; (3) Reducing 
the offensiveness of the act: organization tries to get publics to see the crisis or organization 
as less threatening; (4) Corrective action: organization attempts to repair current damaged, 
prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both; (5) Mortification: organization takes the responsibility 
for the crisis and issue an apology. This typology is defined by Benoit, based on his analysis 
of words and actions of the organization employed to defend its image. There is no 
evaluation to define the appropriated strategies for the certain crisis and stakeholders. 
2. Coombs (1998) based on Benoit (1995, 1997), Allen and Caillouet (1994) and others who 
have articulated crisis responses, grouped crisis-response strategies into seven categories.  
The seven categories are described on table 17 as follows:  
 
Table 17 
Crisis Communication Strategies Defined 
 
1. Attack the accuser Crisis manager confronts the person or group who 
claims that a crisis exists. This may include a threat 
to use “force” (e.g, a law suit) against the accuser. 
2. Denial                   Crisis manager states no crisis exists. This may include 
explaining why there is no crisis. 
 
3. Excuse Crisis manager tries to minimize the organization’s 
responsibility for the crisis. This can include denying 
any intention to do harm, claiming the organization 
had no control of the events that led to the crisis, or 
both. 
4. Justification Crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived 
damage associated with the crisis. This can include 
stating there was no serious damage or injuries or 
claiming that the victim deserved what they received. 
5. Ingratiation Action is designed to make stakeholders like the 
  
                                                                                        94  
organization. 
6. Corrective action Crisis managers seek to repair the damage from the 
crisis, take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis, or 
both. 
7. Full apology Crisis manager publicly states that the organization 
takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks 
forgiveness for the crisis. Some compensation (e.g 
money or aid) may be included with the apology.   
 
Marcus and Goodman (1991), as quoted by Coombs (1998), divided strategy to respond 
crisis into either accommodative or defensive. Accommodative strategies accept 
responsibility, take remedial action, or both, whereas defensive strategies claim there is no 
problem or try to deny responsibility for the crisis.  Model 6 places Crisis Communication 
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In a crisis situation that is a perception of crisis organizational responsibility strengthens, the 
threat of image damage should strengthen, meaning crisis managers need to utilize more 
accommodative strategy. On the other hand, the defensive strategy logically become less 
effective as an organization is viewed as more responsible for the crisis. In the crisis situation 
that has weak personal control, crisis managers need to utilize more defensive strategy. On 
the other side, in the crisis that has strong personal control, crisis manager has to utilize the 
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more accommodative strategy. Based on that approach, to analyze the strategy of crisis 
communication, we need to know the type of crisis. How far the responsibility of an 
organization does for crisis depends on the degree of organization involvement in building 
the crisis up. Higher involvement of an organization in crisis meaning organization needs to 
utilize the more accommodative strategy. 
 
3.  Brinson and Benoit (1999, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt. 2000: 163-178) define image 
restoration strategies, based on their analysis of Texaco racism crisis. Texaco messages were 
analyzed and revealed the use of four image restoration and a fifth strategy that combined 
three image restoration strategies: 
 
1. bolstering: reminding people of organization’s policies against discrimination and 
noting the actions where outrageous; 
2. corrective action: indicating of investigation of allegations and policies designed 
to prevent a reoccurrence of the problem;  
3. shifting blame: identifying the problem employees as bad apples who are not 
representatives of Texaco as a whole; 
4.  mortification: admitting guilt and apologizing for the racist comments; 
5.  separation: a combination of bolstering, shifting blame and corrective action. 
The analyst called it as a new form of image restoration strategy. Bolstering note 
an act violates a company’s policies; shifting blame, creating a scapegoat that can 
be separated from the organization itself; and corrective action, action taken to 
prevent a repeat of crisis.  
 
According to Coombs and Schmidt (2000), separation is not a new strategy, because there is 
the other strategy that captures the separation strategy. 
                                 
4. Hearit (1994, 1995) identified an individual and group dissociation strategy that involves 
blaming or scapegoating a specific part or group within the organization.  Based on research 
on organization and apologia strategies he has identified three typical objectives of 
organizations seek when charged with wrong doing: 
1. Present a competing narrative describing the situation favorable to the organization, 
often by strategic definitions that seek to delimit the issue by establishing certain 
premises.  
2. Diffuse anger and hostility toward the organization through a statement of regret. 
3. Dissociate the organization from the wrong doing, that are categorized into three 
types of dissociation in its apologia: (1) Opinion/ knowledge: the charges are deemed 
groundless. The accusers do not have the facts; they are stating an opinion. This could 
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take the form of a counter attack. The accusers are not interested in acquiring the facts 
because they want to sell more newspapers. The apologist also could challenge the 
ethics or integrity of the accusers; (2) Individual/ group: individuals are said to be 
responsible (i.e scapegoat) for the wrongdoing; they are acting without organizational 
sanction; (3) Act/ essence: it is admitted that the act may be wrong, that it has 
happened, but the apologist begs it should be judged on its along term record; “this 
does not represent the true nature of the organization”. 
 
Drawing on the research of a number of scholars, Hearit (2001: 501-511) concludes that 
corporation regularly takes one of five stances when dealing with the problem of their guilt: 
denial, counterattack, differentiation, apology or legal. Each of the five stances is rooted in 
the notion that the fundamental problem in apologetic situations is that of guilt and that the 
motive for apologist to distance (or dissociate) themselves from their guilt (Benoit 1995 a, 
Fisher 1970, quoted by Hearit 2001:505).  Denial is chosen by organization because either 
(a) they are not guilty; (b) they are in position to deny that the action were intentional (and 
therefore of limited culpability), or (c) they choose a defensive strategy out of fear of liability 
in which they deny guilt regardless of the public evidence. Counterattack is a variant of 
denial. In such occurrences, organization not only deny that they are guilty of the charges, 
but also take the criticism one step further and allege that their critics are ethically suspect for 
having leveled false charges. Here, organizations deal with the problem of guilty by denying it 
and subsequently attempting to transfer it to the accusers. Unfortunately, the organizations 
that are guilty use also the counterattack strategy. In this case, counterattack is an unethical 
tool for an organization to seek to extricate itself from criticism. Differentiation is one most 
frequently strategy that employed by an organization. It is because corporate acts are seldom 
guilt free. Companies bear some level of responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing although 
the degree to which they are guilty is not always entirely clear. Organizations are most likely 
to engage in some forms of an individual – group dissociation in which they find scapegoats 
and then argue that individuals act on their own behalf without organizational sanction. In 
some cases, organizations shift the blame to their employees who can then be disciplined, 
fired and/or prosecuted by the authorities. This leaves the organization to play the role of 
innocents. Both employees and their subsidiaries are scapegoating target. The fourth strategy 
is apology. In this posture, an organization has no other choices,  although it is seldom that 
an organization offers clear statements that seek forgiveness. They tend to make use of 
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statements of regret in which companies extend how sorry they are that the accidents 
occurred. In the same time, they carefully avoid any acknowledgements that they are indeed 
responsible. The fifth strategy is legal. In this strategy, organization adopts a legal stance 
toward their alleged wrongdoing. Organization is using an opinion-knowledge 
dissociation to argue that those who criticize the integrity of their products do so without 
full understandings of “all the fact”. Fitzpatrick and Rubin (1995:22, as quoted by Hearit 
2001) described the component of legal strategy:  
 
(1) say nothing; (2) say as little as possible and release is as quietly as possible; (3) say as 
little as possible, citing privacy laws, company policy, or sensitivity; (4) deny guilt and/ or 
act indignant that such charges could possibly have been made; or (5) shift or, if 
necessary, share the blame with the plaintiff….Never admit blame.              
 
5. Hobbs (1995, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt 2000:163-178) identified a similar strategy 
in his analysis of Toshiba’s illegal sale of weapons technology.  
6. Apologia strategy is called by Ware and Linkugel (1973, as quoted by Ihlen 2002: 202) as “the 
speech of self defense” of character. They suggested that four different strategies for 
apologist: 
1. Denial: disavow committing an act or an attempt to present a disclaimer of intent. 
2. Bolstering: identify with something viewed favorably by the audience. 
3. Differentiation: separate some facts, sentiment, objects or relationship from some 
larger context within which the audience currently views the attribute.  
4. Transcendence: join some facts, sentiments, objects, or relationships with some larger 
context within which the audience does not presently view the attribute.  
 
The first two strategies are reformative - do not alter “the audience’s meaning for the 
cognitive elements involved”, but work in the accepted understanding of the publics, where 
as the latter strategies are transformative, that organization tries to establish the new 
meaning, which may be achieved by asking that an act should be judged in a different 
temporal perspective or by requesting that an act should have been seen in a larger context. 
7. In the context of defensive behavior in small group, Roger Harrison (Fisher 1996: 246-253) 
said that when something violates our expectations, our first tendency is to respond 
defensively. This is the natural reaction because we have formed and confirmed the validity 
of most our existing conceptual systems through experience. There are two general types of 
responses. These are possible when expectation have been violated: defending and adapting. 
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Defending involves denying, falsifying, or distorting reality in order to maintain an existing 
conceptual system. Adapting, on the other hand, involves examining the discrepant 
information, testing new ways of understanding it and forming new and more adaptive 
conceptual systems.  The defense mechanism is classified by Harrison are denial, 
avoidance, repression, projection, rationalization and attribution bias. Denial means 
refusing to admit that a threatening perception is relevant, by denying its existence altogether 
(“This isn’t so”), by denying its relevance to self  (“This has nothing to do with me”), or by 
postponing the matter (“I needn’t pay attention to this right now”). Avoidance involves 
findings ways of keeping out of the way of threatening perception. It can be done by sitting 
silently in a meeting, spinning a verbal cocoon to prevent incoming messages from getting 
through, and hiding from one another through “formula” communication:  drawing morals, 
creating slogans, and adhering to social conventions whereby they discuss safe topics instead 
of important ones. Another way to avoid is making humor. Repression is a mechanism that 
protects the person from being aware of motives or emotions he or she thinks are 
undesirable. Feelings of hostility are often repressed. Projection is a variation of repression. 
Here, instead of burying unwanted feelings inside, the person projects them outside and 
attributes them to someone else. Rationalization, the most frequently employed defense 
mechanism, occurs when people make excuses for or try to explain away a frustrating 
situation.  People try to find “good” reasons for their behavior and its outcome. Attribution 
bias centers around how people explain behavior. We generally consider someone else 
behavior is the product of their personality but an attribute of our own behavior to the 
situational factors. We also tend to ascribe our own successful behavior to personal effort 
and our failure to circumstances. On the other hand, when we explain the success of another 
we tend to make attributions the other way around.  The second type of response is 
adapting. It means that people actively seek and interact with information to create more 
useful interpretation and internal states. They might attempt to resolve the discrepancy of 
information that violates their expectation. Adapting is involving assessing the validity of the 
discrepant information, examining and changing their existing conceptual systems.  This 
defense mechanism is not different too much, comparing to the defense strategy in response 
to the crisis that is explained before.  
 
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the strategies of communication by 
organization in order to defend its image are moving on the organization – publics’ interest 
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continuum. It means that in one side, the strategy that is concerned for the organization’s 
interests – defensive strategy -- and in other side, the strategy is concerned for the publics’ 
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In addition to the crisis response strategies which are taken place on organizational 
setting, Robert Harrison (Fisher 1996:246-253) analyzes crisis response in personal or individual 
setting. He said that in the situation in which someone’s reputation, image or existence are 
attacked by another person, people normally will protect, self defense and fight for their 
existence. Harrison divides responses into two; (1) defending; and (2) adapting. Defending 
involves denying, blaming and distorting realities to maintain the established conceptual system. 
Defending is a natural reaction of human when his existence is being threatened. Not all 
defense reaction is bad. It is going to be bad since the self defense is going to be a habit. It 
makes people do not have willingness to try to understand or accept the other perspectives 
which might be worse or better than our own perspective. In context of intercultural 
communication, Ellen J Langer (Banks 1995:121-123) said the condition in which people 
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focuses only on their own perspective and ignores the others is called as mindlessness. 
Furthermore, people who are mindless mean people who rigidly adhere to preset categories of 
knowledge, exhibit automatic behavior and act from single, narrow perspective on the world. 
Where as mindfulness is characterized by always create a new category of understanding, open 
to new information and aware of multiple perspectives. We can say that defending responses 
have a close relationship with mindlessness and adapting responses have relationship with 
mindfulness. Adapting response is used in a situation in which people are mindful. Mindfulness 
needs dialogue that is the communication which is equal between communication participants, 
equal in accessing the standard for responsible treatment, equal in fundamental human rights, 
such as quality of life and success (Niel Thomassen in Bank 1995:120-121). Thus, in crisis, not 
only organization image, reputation and existence is in danger, but also those of the actors or 
the members of an organization. In case of crisis, people should be more mindful than 
mindless in order to create the effective response. It means that the selection process of 
strategy making also interacts with the openness of individual mind in responding to the change 
tensions which is inherent in the crisis. 
For this research, the analysis is relied on the crisis communication strategies below. 
These strategies are the summary of several strategies constructed by few researchers above. 
Crisis communication strategies for this research are focused on the strategies of image 
reconstruction or restoration. Table 19 is a list of the strategy and tactics, which are inferred 
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2.5. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
2.5.1. Crisis Factors     
Beside the strategies of crisis response, there are few researches which show that there are 
several factors influence the selected crisis responses strategy. Coombs said that the manager 
needs to evaluate the crisis situation in order to select the strategy of crisis responses. He 
believed that a better crisis understanding of crisis situation should produce a more effective 
crisis response (Coombs and Holladay, 1998). It means that crisis situation is one of several 
factors that can influence the strategy of crisis response, even though this factor indirectly 
influences the strategy. Crisis situation just affects the perception of crisis responsibility and in 
turn affects the threat of image damage. In detail, Coombs describe crisis situation in three 
elements, (1) crisis attribution, (2) organization performance and (3) severity of the crisis. Crisis 
attribution involves two dimensions: (1) external control and (2) personal control/ locus of 
causality. External control is the degree to which external agents could control the crisis events. 
Personal control/ locus of causality is the degree to which the organization itself could control 
the crisis events. Organizational performance is mentioned frequently as an element that should 
influence crisis management efforts. It is believed that an organization with history of positive 
performance and good deeds should find it easier to maintain a positive image during a crisis.  
Crisis damage varies in degree and intensity. It seems reasonable that more severe crisis should 
produce greater image damage than crisis trivial damage.  
 Based on his research, it can be concluded that the external control was found not to be 
unrelated to either crisis responsibility or organizational image. The personal control was 
positively related to crisis responsibility and negatively related to organizational image damage. 
Organizational performance intensifies the perception of crisis responsibility and image damage 
for the accidents and transgression crisis types. Crisis damage does not consistently intensify 
perception of crisis responsibility. In the end of his conclusion, he said that defensive strategy is 
most useful when crisis responsibility is weak, accommodative strategy is more useful when the 
crisis responsibility is strong.  It means that only in the crisis in which personal or 
organizational control is high, crisis situation becomes an influent factor for the perception of 
crisis responsibility, threat of image damage and in turn it affects the selection of crisis response 
strategy.   
In another research, Coombs (2001) divided organizational performance’s history, as 
one of three elements of crisis situation, into two things; (1) crisis history (whether the crisis 
was isolated or part of a pattern) and (2) past relationship –good works. On another way, the 
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early tests show limited, minor support for crisis history and the impact on the crisis situation 
(Coombs 1998, Coombs and Holladay 1996). However, past relationship or relationship history 
between an organization and its stakeholders is believed to influence a crisis situation and 
response (Coombs, 1999b). An unfavorable relationship history shapes how people perceive 
the crisis and the organization in crisis. An unfavorable history or crisis history leads people to 
perceive the organization as having more responsibility for the crisis. The effect on perceptions 
of organizational reputation is much stronger than the effect on crisis responsibility. 
Relationship history appears to be a more powerful predictor of organizational reputation than 
crisis history. The crisis situation can influence the selection and the effectiveness of crisis 
responses strategy. Organization which has bad crisis history and bad relationship with its 
publics can lead to the worse situation of crisis, and in turn, the bad crisis situation can lead to 
the selection and effectiveness of crisis responses strategy.  
On the basis of the two researches of Coombs and his friends, it can be concluded that 
there are factors that influence an organization or person to select the strategy of crisis 
response. The following model shows the connection of those factors. 
 
 
Crisis situation   
1. Internal control 
2. Relationship history/ Organizational performance 










Newsom supported by Coombs et al (2000:498) said that the more experienced an organization 
in handling crises, the better response it will do. It means that crisis history – how organization 
has experience to handle crisis in the past, affects in crisis responses strategy selection.  
Other researcher, Ihlen (2002:202-203) said that media pressure may push an 
organization to change its responses strategy. If the arguments in the crisis responses are 
proved wrong or are not accepted by major publics such as the media, the crisis response 
strategy has to be changed. An organization can mix or combine responses strategies, when the 
material and argumentation is coherent. Based on the research of the case of Mercedes A-Class, 
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Ihlen found that Mercedes used the combination of three image restoration strategies, these are 
attack, denial and excuse. This combination is argumentatively and materially incoherent. 
However, in the end, Mercedes restored the company’s reputation and that the A-Class turned 
out to be a success. In other way, Ihlen argues that “the success was perhaps due to handling of 
the crisis in its latest phases, but also it may be evidence of the unique position. Mercedes 
enjoys in the automobile market”. According to Ihlen’s argument, the using of strategy of crisis 
communication is determined by media and public acceptance of the initial strategy that is 
undertaken by the organization. 
Hearit (1994,1995) stated that the using of such dissociation techniques usually depends 
on the particulars of the accusation and potentially the intention and identity of the accusers 
and the context of mediation. They are influenced by the validity of the charges, the existence 
of a scapegoat, and the degree of guilt. Marcus and Goodman (1991), as mentioned before, 
explain that the strategy is determined by organization’s perception toward the degree of 
organization involvement in building crisis.    
Based on many researches above, the factors that could influence an organization or a 
person to select the crisis response strategy or the factors that can be related to the 
effectiveness of the crisis response strategy are: (1) crisis situation; (2) crisis history; (3) media 
and public acceptance; and (4) validity of the charges, the existence of a scapegoat and the 
degree of guilt, (5) perception of crisis responsibility, (6) threat of image damage. All factors are 
much more perceptual than factual. It means that in identifying those factors, an organization 
relies more on perception. It is about how and what the organizations think about those 
factors. 
 
2.5.2. OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Beside factors related to the crisis communication, the strategy also relates to the structural 
factors. Rules and resources of an organization, especially those of public relations, are the 
other contextual factors. Table 21 below describes the relationship between the structure and 
the strategy will be selected. An organization with closed structure indicated by a model of 
bureaucratic organization, administrative model of administration, one way communication, 
one way relationship between an organization and its publics and the mindlessness of human 
resources will respond to the crisis by applying defensive strategy. Contrarily, an opened 
structure of an organization which is indicated by a post bureaucratic organization, pluralist 
democracy, two way organizational communication, two way relationship between an 
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organization and its publics and mindfulness of human resources will apply accommodative 






   Closed System  Open System 
Model of Bureaucracy  Bureaucratic organization Post bureaucratic org. 
Model of Administration  Administrative/Weberian Pluralist democracy  
Model of Communication  One way Two way 




Two way asymmetrical/ 
Two way symmetrical 
Crisis Communication Strategy    
1 Personal/Individual Defending Adapting 
2 Institutional/Organization Dissociation Mortification 
   
 
In addition, not only an organizational structure is the contextual factor in crisis 
communication strategy choice, but also the larger structure, for instance, the social and 
political structure. It can be called as the structure which exists in the environment. For this 
research, there are three layers of the context of crisis communication strategy choice. It 
becomes a basis for organizational action, and also for individual action. After all, the 
relationship between public relations structure, organizational structure, the larger structure in 
environment and action is not linier. The three layers of the structure can be the contextual 
factors that help the members of organization to select the strategy. In this case, the structure 
becomes the medium for the action.  On the other hand the contextual factors are composed 
and constructed by the members’ action. Here the member of organization can be called as an 
actor, an agent or an agency. It means that there is interrelation, interconnection and interplay 
between a structure and an action.  The interconnection between structure and agency is 
showing on model 8.         
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Model 8 
 Theoretical Framework of the Research 
 
               
Social and Political Structure : 
  The dinamic relations between organization  
and its external publics 
 
                                                     
Crisis Situations 
 
                                                                 
Crisis Communication Strategy 




Structure (rules and resources, role and functions/  
hierarchical power and domination/ bureaucracy)  
  
                                    
 
              
This model emphasizes on the interaction among elements, from actors/agents to the level of 
system/structure. It means the crisis communication strategy is produced by the structure, the 
interaction between rules and resources, but also produces the structure. In case of this study, 
the crisis communication strategy applied by the Indonesian presidents can be produced by the 
structure. And in the same time, it produces the structure. This research is intended to know 
deeper about the strategy and also the factors which might “play behind the stage”. The 
selected strategies can be meant as the individual mentality of the political elites when they must 




There is no dualism between structure and agency. It is duality. It means there is interaction or 
interplay between structure and agency. In crisis, organization’s members, including PR 
practitioners and the president select and respond to the crisis by applying a certain strategy. It 
is selected on the basis of the context. Context means a structure composed by rules and 
resources. The structure can be in an organizational level, unit level or in a larger organization 
structure. The structure in the level of organization is organizational rules, regulations, 
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mechanisms, procedures, norms, values and all kind of organizational guidance,  which regulate 
organizational members’ in creating action. For this research, an organizational structure is 
focused on the presidential communication, including communication procedures and 
mechanisms. Structure in the level of unit is public relations’ rules and regulations, roles and 
functions of public relations, model of the relationship between the president and its publics, 
and all kinds of public relations practices in government institution. While larger structure 
means social and political practices outside of an organization which exist in the government’s 
environment.  
 Strategy of crisis communication can be categorized in two types; (1) defensive strategy 
and (2) accommodative/adaptive strategy. Every strategy applied by the government’s member, 
including by the president, relies on the three levels of structural context.  It means that the 
strategy is created on the basis of the existed structure. In the same time, the repetitively applied 
strategy creates a structure. The selected strategy which is relied on the three levels of structures 
is called as reproduction or establishment, and the strategy which creates new structure is called 
as production or innovation/ reformation.  
           What strategy applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, fifth President of Republic of 
Indonesia, and what contextual factors in crisis communication strategy choice will be 
explained in following chapters. 
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CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY  





This chapter describes the responses of the presidents to the crisis. Response means how the 
presidents, especially Megawati as the fifth President of Indonesia, communicated the crisis and 
how they reacted to the public, including the media voices who judge/ evaluate their 
performance in dealing with the crisis. The way they communicated to respond to the crisis can 
be seen as their strategy of crisis response.   
 This chapter is started by the description of Soeharto and Habibie’s, the second and 
third of the president of Republic of Indonesia, perception about the crisis and their response 
to their image which is constructed by Indonesian people. This part describes the factors can be 
the context of the strategy choice. The next part explains the strategy of Megawati in 
responding to the public “attack” about her performance in crisis resolution. In detail, this part 
is divided into several sub titles. Firstly it describes Megawati’s view on the multidimensional 
crisis. Secondly it describes her strategy to respond to the crisis.     
 
3.2. HOW THE FORMER PRESIDENTS RESPOND TO THE CRISIS  
The sense of crisis of the President is very important to deal with the crisis. Sense of crisis 
means that the President aware of the symptoms of crisis and the danger of crisis itself, so she 
or he is able to respond to the crisis accurately and properly. Without the sense of crisis, 
something unexpected can be occurred, crisis will really occur. 
As explored by Soedarsono as explained in the prior chapter, the four Presidents of the 
Republic of Indonesia had acknowledged the existence of the crisis in Indonesia. Based on their 
speeches almost of all Presidents are aware of the crisis, even though some of them were quite 
late in realizing it. On that time, the crisis was getting worse. Based on their point of view, the 
crisis was triggered by the monetary problem which occurred in the middle of 1997. It means 
that the crisis was beginning in the era of HM Soeharto’s presidency, the second of the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. It was the sixth time of HM Soeharto’s administration 
that ended in 1999.  
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That HM Soeharto admitted the occurrence of the crisis in Indonesia can be seen from 
his statements, especially in his last speech in 1998, in the political situation which was not 
really conducive for him. Below are his statements about the crisis. 
 
“Last year we experienced many accidents in the land, sea and sky. Our life of economy 
got disturbance […] Even though we have already had and started to execute the several 
clear and fundamental programs of reformation and restructuring, there is no indicator 
of progress and improvement. Even more, the life of  people was becoming more 
difficult […] Exchange rate of our currency is still in low rate, the situation is getting 
worse because there is someone who takes advantage in the difficult situation for himself 
[…] Economic growth is running slowly, inflation kept going on high rate till January 98 
[…] We are really in the difficult economical situation.” (HM Soeharto’s speech, March 
1st, 1998) 
 
That Indonesia faced the difficulties in economy was clearly stated by HM Soeharto, but 
surprisingly, he believed that the fundamental of Indonesian economy was still quite strong, the 
development and reformation during 1994-1996 were quite successful. This statement shows 
that HM Soeharto did not see that there was a problem in the internal situation as a cause of 
the economic difficulty.   
That the crisis in Indonesia was unpredictable was stated through the President’s 
statements. HM Soeharto did not think that the crisis in Asia gave a big impact on the 
Indonesian economic life.     
 
“Surprisingly, since in the middle of 1997, monetary problem had appeared. This country 
was facing financial crisis. And then, the crisis was getting deeper and longer.” 
 
“Since the second half of the last year the monetary problem had appeared. As if all the 
things we built by hard work was unsteady.” 
 
“In fact, 1997 was a difficult year for us. But, in the second half of 1997, unexpectedly 
monetary problem came to Indonesia.” 
 
After all, HM Soeharto said that the economic problem that occurred in Indonesia was caused 
more by international situation. Crisis in Indonesia was only the effect of monetary crisis that 
occurred in Asia, even in the world, but not a result of the national problem. Furthermore, HM 
Soeharto claimed that the crisis in Indonesia was unavoidable because it was only a small part 
of the huge crisis that happened in the world.  
 
“It is not because we do not know about the possibility of the crisis. In the recent time, I 
have said for many times that like or dislike, want to or not, ready or not, we must 
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experience the consequences of global economics. The impact of it is coming faster than 
we thought. Its bad impacts were bigger than we thought.” 
 
Based on his statement, it can be concluded that HM Soeharto seemed to have a good sense of 
crisis. However he has not. Indonesia was not ready in dealing with the crisis. HM Soeharto 
was also surprised when the economic life of Indonesia was in the very bad situation. He 
acknowledged that Indonesia was in crisis but it was not due to the weaknesses of the 
governmental performance. This statement was stated again in his speech in the end of his 
presidency in the front of the leaders of Indonesian Parliament, political fractions, social and 
political organization on May 1st 1998, two months after his annual speech. In that speech, he 
stated that Indonesia was in crisis, but in the other part of his speech, he said that Indonesia 
was in a good state.  
 
“Beside Catur Krida39, Kabinet Pembangunan VII has to finish the latest year of 
REPELITA VI and still has to face the monetary crisis situation and condition, which has 
impact on the economic crisis and trust crisis, both the trust to the currency value and to 
our banking system, world banking and market, especially in market of investment in 
Indonesia. This is not an easy task for us.” 
 
“We do not need to be discourage, because of our efforts which must be handled are not 
easy, especially in the crisis. It is not our own problem, but it is a part of global problem 
which is very influent on the accomplishing the Indonesian development, start from 
finishing all crises we have faced.” 
 
 
In that speech, HM Soeharto repeatedly said that crisis that occurred in Indonesia was a 
monetary crisis, which developed to be an economy crisis and trust crisis toward national and 
international banking system. It means that HM Soeharto did not admit that the crisis was 
caused by the weaknesses or failure or bad performance of the governmental institutions or 
internal problem of Indonesia. This kind of reaction can be called as self defense strategy or 
more precisely can be called as denial or avoiding strategy. 
This strategy was used again by Soeharto when he reacted to the people’s demand that he 
had to resign from his presidency. People claimed that Soeharto has failed to recover Indonesia 
from the crisis effects and reform all aspects of the country. In this strategy, he shifted the 
blame to the third party. They were the student and people who were called by Soeharto as 
                                                 
39 Catur Krida is the title of the Development Program Plan of Indonesian Government. Catur means four, 
Krida means activity. Kabinet Pembangunan VII is the name of the President’s cabinet of his sixth HM 
Soeharto’s presidency. Kabinet Pembangunan in English means Development Cabinet. REPELITA is 
abbreviation from Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (The Five Years of Development Plan).    
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militants. Soeharto saw them as the people who always create disorder of the development and 
reformation.  
 
“We feel, before annual meeting of the Board of People Representative, there are people 
who discredit to the New Order Government. It was starting by the activities before 
General Election until the General Election was performed. Even, they have tried to 
defeat the performing of general election…[…] They have tried to discredit , even to 
break down all the development activities. They entered to campus by using the term of 
academic freedom, demanded for reformation, both economy, politic and law…but 
because of the continuing of the activities of a small group of activist or militant as if all 
the universities have been influenced, so they claimed that their activities are the 
movement of people power. Of course, this thing is not beneficial for New Order efforts 
in the future and also it can disturb the national and political stability.” 
 
Soeharto’s statement above indicates that he suspected the third party, higher education 
students, through their movements, were the actors of disturbance of Indonesia development, 
and they were also the people who always tried to break down the development and 
reformation. Soeharto claimed that the people power never existed, but it is only a few of 
activities of small activists and militants who entered to some universities.  The second 
President of the Republic of Indonesia also showed his response to the people who were 
responsible for the development failure, by attacking and challenging them.  
The form of the attack and challenge shown by usage of the word “against”, “take 
actions against”, as written below: 
 
“I hope that the campus communities who really want to reform this nation must 
understand it in the constructive way and do not trap into the activities which disturb the 
politic and national stability. If it must be happened, indeed we have to be up against 
them because development must be kept as people mandate as written on GBHN, and it 
must be accomplished carefully. I am responsible for it. If, after they listen to our 
explanation and don’t want to accept it and keep going to do the harmful activities, we 
have to take actions against them…[…] Honestly, I have authority, which is given by the 
Board of People Representative in last Annual Meeting,  to do this.” 
 
The strategy of dissociation was also shown by Soeharto when he responded the critics that he 
has failed to reform. He said that the critics which were brought up by the students were not 
relevant because the reformation had been implemented since some years ago. He divided 
reformation program into some steps based on the period of time, namely: (1) before freedom 
proclamation, (2) after freedom proclamation, (3) after sovereignty acknowledgement in 1949, 
(4) Old Order, (5) New Order, (6) latest time reformation. Based on his explanation, it is clear 
that Soeharto has tried to dissociate from the wrong doing in case of the crisis. He denied to be 
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judged as the leader who failed to overcome the crisis. Even, he launched counterattack against 
the people who gave that statements. Soeharto said that the statements about the failure of 
Soeharto to do reformation were wrong, inaccurate and illogical. His speech as printed on the 
23 pages did not imply and contained the statement that there was something wrong with his 
cabinet and internal governance that might become the cause of the crisis. He also shifted the 
guilt to the people and students who mobilize “the people power”.   
This Soeharto’s speech can’t be trusted by people. Indonesia situation was getting 
worse. The demonstration by students and many groups of people which demanded the 
resignation of HM Soeharto as the President keep going on. As described on the earlier 
chapter, on May 13th 1998 there was a big mass riot. It is followed by the other accidents in 
which many more people, including students were killed. The political situation in Indonesia 
was getting much more difficult. On the May 21st, 1998 Soeharto resigned. BJ Habibie took 
over the position. This event was controversial. Some people said it was not constitutional, but 
another part of people said the opposite. Some people believed that BJ Habibie will be able to 
make progress in post crisis reconstructing.  
On August 15th, 1998 in his official speech, the President BJ Habibie spoke more about 
crisis. Habibie admitted that he did not think that Indonesia would be in crisis. It was shown by 
his speech, below: 
 
“We are shocked by the monetary crisis that occurred in July 1997. We do not expect 
that economy crisis would come. And it was much more surprisingly, we did not think 
that our economy system and national financial institutions actually were not able to 
anticipate the strong barriers toward the fundamental of the national economy.” 
(Habibie’s speech, August 15th, 1998). 
 
It shows that Habibie as a President did not have enough sense of crisis. He and the prior 
President and his cabinet might not apply the issue management, which can help people to be 
aware of the possibility of the crisis. By applying issues management, people are able not only 
to prevent the crisis but also to recover the crisis better and faster. That Indonesian leaders do 
not have enough sense of crisis is the common criticism, as written on prior chapter. Based on 
his speech, the low sense of crisis of the higher leader of Indonesia is reaffirmed the people 
criticism.  
As well as Soeharto, Habibie saw the crisis in Indonesia was a monetary crisis which 
developed to be economy crisis.  However he was different from Soeharto, Habibie mentioned 
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that Indonesia also faced political crisis.  The economy and political crisis accumulated to be 
much more difficult crisis. It becomes the trust crisis.  
 
“The accumulation of economy and political crisis are becoming triggered factors of the 
harder crisis, that is trust crisis. People do not trust, not only to the leader and the 
governmental institutions, but also to the values system and the fundamental of law in 
which the governmental institutions is built. (Habibie’s speech, August 15th, 1998) 
 
The same statement was launched again by Habibie on August 16th, 1998 in his official speech 
in the Board of Parliament meeting. The speech that was written on the 45 pages was a long 
explanation about crisis and the description of the government’s effort to recover Indonesia. A 
small part of his speech is written below: 
 
“At the same time, economy situation in Indonesia is facing the consequences of 
globalization, which is indicated by trade liberalization and speed capital movement. 
Crisis in Asia caused Indonesian economy to be in very harmful crisis.” 
 
That Indonesia was in crisis is admitted by Habibie, as written below: 
 
“We still remember, more than one year ago, our economy situation was really not good. 
[..] At that time, we were going to enter the door of hyperinflation..[…] In the same time 
we met many sad stories. International trust was decreasing to the lowest level, 
negotiation with the potential donors and investors was canceled […] Our country was 
almost isolated from international communities, not physically but economically and 
financially […] Remember, the crisis situation was very serious last year… “ 
 
Habibie claimed that the Indonesian political situation which was not transparent and not 
democratic were two triggered factors of political crisis. Political crisis was indicated by the 
crisis of trust to the capability of the Indonesian leaders in crisis resolution. The crisis, 
mentioned by Habibie, was also triggered by the violation of the law in all area: politics, 
economy, social and culture. Law or regulation was only a tool for the leaders to establish their 
power and position. Unfortunately, it is not a tool to promote the justice and welfare for 
publics.  
In the following time, Habibie finally recognized that the problem would be more 
difficult if the current crisis did not handle rapidly and accurately. He said that Indonesia 
needed systemic crisis resolution, which was started by exploring the source of crisis. 
 
“The impact of economy crisis causes the number of poor people was increasing, health 
services couldn’t be applied for publics…All makes our national defense was weakening, 
that it could cause of the economic bankruptcy and national disintegration.” 
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“…approximately for one year, we have worked hard to prevent the situation to get 
worse. The effort was started by understanding the main problem, not just the 
symptoms.” 
 
“The effort of economy improvement still takes time, and needs much more attention 
and systematic, professional and holistic approach in resolving our problem.” 
 
“To handle the difficult problem and the serious damage, we have to improve and 
change systematically, integrated and in detail.”  
 
“Based on our experience in handling the change through revolution, and so many   
victims of it, I decide to choose evolution as the best way, or more specific, accelerated 
evolution.” 
 
Habibie differentiated between evolution and revolution. Evolution is the fundamental changes 
which are created systematically, gradually, and it is planned, controlled and it is sustainable. On 
other hand, revolution is the fundamental changes which are created in a relatively short time 
and unsustainable. By choosing evolution for crisis resolution, it means that Habibie applied the 
strategy of systematic crisis resolution. Based on Soedarsono’s premise, as explained before, 
systematic crisis resolution is the right strategy to resolve the crisis in Indonesia. On the other 
part of his speech, Habibie admitted clearly that Indonesia was really in crisis and it had to be 
handled as soon as possible. Crisis in Indonesia, is admitted by Habibie. It was the result of the 
failure and the weaknesses of our economy system and national banking institutions. And it is 
influenced by the same crisis that occurred in Asia. It means that he admitted that the crisis was 
not only caused by the crisis in Asia but also national economy weaknesses.  
 
“Economic growth which was 7% per year could be maintained continuously for more 
than two decades. Unfortunately, in the era of New Order, it can not followed by 
democratically and transparently political and economical situation.”    
 
Based on his acknowledgement, it can be said that Habibie applied full apology strategy, even 
though he still shifted the blame to the international situation as the cause of the crisis. Habibie 
also admitted that weaknesses of the Indonesian government. Moreover he apologized to the 
Indonesian people for the inappropriate political and development strategies applied by the 
government. At that time, Habibie was criticized by people about the physical violence and 
human right violation which were done by the government’s apparatus/police/military. 
 
“I believed that we concern to the violation of human right in Indonesia. With patience, 
in order to give respect and perform human rights, I apologize to the family of the 
victims.” (BJ Habibie’s speech, August 15th 1998).         
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“I assume as the heaviest task as a president is having responsibility for the violence that 
was done in this country. We grieve for the people who died because of violence, we do 
not have the strength to see that so many people use violence as a way to solve the 
problem. I grieve for the victims of violence, and their family […] Whenever people die 
because of the incapability of the state, because of our  inappropriate political strategy, I 
apologize to you…please accept my sympathy.” (BJ Habibie’s speech, October 17th 1999) 
 
The Habibie’s apology can be meant as the admission of guilt of the government’s apparatus.  
Unlikely of Soeharto, Habibie also positioned the students or people as the victims of the 
arrogant apparatus’ behavior. He did not see the student movements as the source of crisis and 
the cause of failure of reformation and development. The response of Soeharto and Habibie to 
the crisis in Indonesia is shown shortly on table 21 below: 
 
Table 21 
HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie about crises  
(Based on Presidents’ speeches 1998-1999) 
 
 






 Mid of 1997 July 1997 
Type  Crisis of monetary,   crisis of economy, 
crisis of trustworthiness toward rupiahs 
and banking   
Monetary crisis, economy crisis, 
political crisis, crisis of 
trustworthiness toward leaders, 
governmental institutions, value 
systems and the fundamental of law.  
 Causes Factors  Monetary crisis in Asia, global crisis 1. Monetary crisis in Asia 
2. The weaknesses of Indonesian 
banking system.    
3. The ignorance of law in social, 
economical,  political and cultural 
aspects.   
4. Inability of the government in 
economy and political life.   
 Public criticism 
toward the 
Government 
• HM Soeharto was unable to solve 
the crisis.  
• Government failed doing 
reformation   
• Public forces the resignation of the 
President  
• BJ Habibie and his cabinet was 
still a part of HM Soeharto 
cronies. 
• The inauguration of BJ Habibie 
as the President was not 
constitutional.   




• Scapegoat   
• Opinion-knowledge dissociation   
• Counterattack  
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HM Soeharto was the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. He was the President 
since 1966 and 1994 until 1999 was his sixth presidency. It means that in 1997, when the crisis 
began, HM Soeharto was still in charge as a President. During his era, Indonesian people 
judged that Indonesia was lead by his authoritarian leadership. In the area of presidential 
communication, he was also very strict and centralized in structure. He used government public 
relations (GPR) as a means or a channel to disseminate his policies, information and 
statements. He also controlled mass media or press, by applying rules which gave the President 
right to publish permit and perish or close down the operation of mass media. In contrast to 
HM Soeharto, BJ Habibie, the third President of the Republic of Indonesia, had been trying to 
develop the democratic leadership. He chose the method of leadership to ensure Indonesian 
people that he had goodwill for improving Indonesia to be more democratic. The first step of 
BJ Habibie was the revocation a publish permit and let the Indonesian mass media was growing 
up without strict control by the government. It became the significant step of BJ Habibie to 
build the open and transparent dialogue between the government and its publics. This kind of 
communication style was followed by the open and transparent presidential communication. 
The structure of the presidential communication tended to be free flow communication. He 
wanted to listen from everywhere and widespread information by various communication 
media. It brought about the negative effects, such an opportunity for outsiders to intervene the 
formal information flow that caused the bias information. For the certain public, BJ Habibie’s 
leadership was called as “management by fear”. He listened to and concerned for public 
demands because of his fear to the public pressures. For another part of Indonesian people, BJ 
Habibie was still called as HM Soeharto’s cronies. It means that his leadership characters were 
not so different from HM Soeharto’s leadership.  
Based on Presidents’ statement in reacting to the crisis, for different cases, shown on 
table 22, they have different point of view about crisis.  HM Soeharto looked the crisis as an 
unavoidable situation which was caused by the same crisis in Asia. He stated that the root of 
the crisis in Indonesia was not the result of the problems in the area of Indonesian 
governmental institutions, but in the area of external/international problems. Therefore it can 
be said that HM Soeharto tended to use self defense strategy. There are three strategies used 
by Soeharto, all are categorized in self defense strategy, (1) scapegoating strategy; (2) opinion-
knowledge dissociation; and (3) counterattack strategy. Quite different from HM Soeharto, BJ 
Habibie saw that the weaknesses of the government in many aspects contributed to the 
occurrence of crisis. It can be concluded that BJ Habibie admitted that the Indonesian 
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government has made wrongdoing in relation to the crisis. This kind of statement can be an 
example of  apology strategy.  
Table 22 below describes a comparison between HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie, related 
to the other factors of the two Presidents and the strategy of crisis response.    
 
Table 22 
Contextual factors of the crisis response strategy 
Case on HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie 
 
 
 HM Soeharto  BJ Habibie 
 Leadership Style Authoritative Democratic 
 Communication Style Centralized, formal, one way 
communication 
Decentralized, informal, open,  
free flow communication 
President – Mass Media 
Relation 
 Structured, strict control Freedom of the press  
Crisis response strategy Self defense Apology 
 
 
The fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia was KH Abdurrahman Wahid, usually called 
Gus Dur. In his inauguration as President, Gus Dur did not mention anything about crisis. He 
just said, for many times, that he had very hard tasks, duties and responsibilities because he 
faced two things: (1) hard competition in the era of international free trade; and (2) 
disintegration threat. In his first presidential speech which was very short, he said: “I do not 
need to talk too much in this time, because the longer the speech, the more responsibilities I 
have to take in the future.” 
As written before, there are a few written speeches of Gus Dur during his presidency. It 
is because of the vision handicap of Gus Dur to read the text. He frequently gave speeches 
orally without text. Surprisingly, even though Gus Dur did not mention crisis so many times, he 
said that Indonesia was out from political crisis. Based on his statement, he said that the 
government would focus more on establishing security development and supremacy of law. 
 
3.3. MEGAWATI’S STRATEGY   
3.3.1. Crisis in Megawati’s View  
3.3.1.1. Year 2001 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia, during her 
presidency, had given a few hundred speeches, both oral or textual. Since her inauguration as a 
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president, Megawati gave many statements about crisis. She acknowledged that Indonesia has 
been in crisis since the middle of 1998.  A few of her statements about crisis is written below: 
 
“…current months which are so depressed, full of political conflict, even constitutional 
conflict….”(Megawati’s speech August 16th, 2001). 
 
“…in the latest four years our nation has been living in the anxiety because continuously 
we have been facing monetary crisis, economy crisis, security crisis, political crisis and 
more than this, we begin to face the institutional crisis and conflict. It happened not only 
in national level but also in local level.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001) 
 
“The dreadful economy difficulty and its impact on the missing of the field of endeavor 
for our people, in turn, has affected to the raising of social problems. Sooner or later if 
the problem is not quickly handled, the social problems will be followed by political 
problem and security disturbance.” (Megawati’s speech, October 5th, 2001) 
 
“In the uncertain world situation, and together with the condition of the nation which is 
still in difficulty…” (Megawati’s speech, December 27th, 2001)  
 
“…When the national situation has been tested, as happened recently, and when many 
various conflicts have been spreading and endangering the national unity, oneness and 
wholeness, most of all was socked.” (Megawati’s speech, December 29th, 2001) 
 
In early of her first official speech, Megawati mentioned crisis with the term of “conflict”. She 
said that Indonesia was in a political and constitutional conflict. However, in the next part of 
her speech, Megawati admitted that Indonesia has been in a crisis since the middle of 1997. She 
said that Indonesia faced a monetary crisis, it was continuing to be economy crisis, security 
crisis, political crisis and finally to be institutional crisis. Therefore, Megawati claimed that 
Indonesia has been in multidimensional crisis. Different from Megawati, HM Soeharto and 
Habibie did not mention about political and institutional crisis. It is clear why Megawati 
mentioned about security crisis. It is because in her presidency, Indonesia was full of terror of 
bomb and anti America movement which triggered the act of sweeping to the foreigners. Based 
on her statement, multidimensional crisis in Indonesia was triggered by the politic and 
constitutional conflict. But, when the conflicts uncontrollably developed, it became more 
intensive and to be an unexpected form, the conflicts change to be a multi dimensional crisis. 
Political and constitutional problem were also stated by Megawati in her speech at the 
anniversary of Indonesian Military, 5th October, 2001. She explained that all the problems 
influence one to another. 
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“We also face so many problems in term of ideology, constitution, and politics. All must 
be handled simultaneously in the frame of national reform. These problems are related to 
each other.” (Megawati’s speech October 5th, 2001) 
 
“As I know, during our national historical journey, we have not ever face hard 
temptation yet as we experienced in the current years. In the past, the temptation existed 
because of our own behavior which created problem. This time, we do not only face that 
problems but also face the new problems which are a result of our mistake in planning 
and impatience in achieving the goals. We often see that our efforts to resolve a problem 
created another new problem which is more difficult than the first problem. One 
problem is related to another problem, old or new.” (Megawati’s speech, December 13th, 
2001) 
 
“The probable factors that can disperse our country are many, both internal and external 
factors. In the recent years, all factors exist in the same time and relating to each other.” 
(Megawati’s speech, October 5th, 2001). 
 
These statements are asserted that the multi dimensional crisis in Indonesia was a systemic and 
serial crisis, which is indicated by the interaction among the problems, one problem influences 
to the other problems. Based on her statements, Megawati mentioned several term that replace 
the term of crisis. These terms are “problem”, “difficulty”, “fluctuation”, and “disturbance”. 
These terms are indicators of the existing of crisis.  
In the other parts of her speeches, Megawati also spoke about the conditions   
experienced by Indonesian people. The conditions can be called as the symptoms of crisis. 
Below is the several citations of her speeches. 
 
“We have been living too long in the uncertain situation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 
30th, 2001) 
 
“…normalization and stabilization are the preconditions have to be accomplished 
because in the last four years we have been living in the not normal and stable condition, 
where is so many national resources are damaged.” (Megawati’s speech, August 30th, 
2001) 
 
“I don’t want to talk again about how hard and complex the situation we have to face.” 
(Megawati’s speech, November 30th, 2001) 
 
The uncertainty, abnormality, instability, anxiety and complexity mentioned by Megawati are 
indicators of crisis. Based on the criteria of crisis, it can be concluded that Indonesia was really 
in crisis, multi dimensional crisis. And, that crisis is not a single crisis, but a serial and systemic 
crisis. The several crucial events accumulated to be a very harmful crisis. 
Based on the quotation of her speeches, it can be concluded that the level of 
development of the crisis was in the chronic level. That very serious crisis and the government’s 
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efforts to resolve  was stated by Megawati almost in every speech since her presidency. How 
difficult to resolve the crisis is shown by the government statements. The government needed 
time, public patience, slow resolution and gradual efforts. 
 
“…are we able to solve the multi dimensional crisis quickly and simultaneously? Of 
course not…there are many problems and systems we have to be restructured, not only 
the technical things but also function, structure and work methods of the nation and 
state institution, both in the level of supra structure and infrastructure.” (Megawati’s 
speech, August 16th, 2001) 
 
“We are able to solve all problems gradually, begin from the urgent matter. This kind of 
crisis is really impossible to solve in the short time and simultaneously.” (Megawati’s 
speech, August 16th, 2001) 
 
“How hard we tried, it is not easy for the government who is very busy and every time 
they are pressured by public opinion.” (Megawati’s speech, August 30th, 2001) 
 
“I don’t want to explain again how difficult and complex the problem we have to face 
recently.” (Megawati’s speech, November 30th, 2001) 
 
“I feel, in our national historical journey, we have never fought against problems as we 
face now. We concern as if the ordeals never end.” (Megawati’s speech, December 22nd, 
2001). 
 
“Every one knows that almost all of the people feel discourage in resolving the never 
ending problems.” (Megawati’s speech, December 27th, 2001). 
 
“There is no formula or one model can be used to solve all problems simultaneously, 
quickly and completely.  We must have priority. We need patience, seriousness, and 
strength of attitude to solve the problems. It needs wisdom, and professionalism to 
handle these problems gradually, one by one.” (Megawati’s speech, December 13th, 
2001). 
 
“By our limited capability, we must be one by one, little by little…” (Megawati’s speech, 
February 14th, 2002) 
 
“Realizing we have many limitation in our national life.” (Megawati’s speech, February 
14th, 2002)           
 
 
Based on the explanation above, table 23 below describes the Megawati’s statements about 
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Table 23 
Crisis in Indonesia 
(Megawati’s Speeches 16 August 2001-31 December 2002) 
  
 
 Crisis characteristics Systemic, serial of events  The problems were bounded one to 
another  
 The terms are related 
to the crisis 
 Conflict,  disaster,  problem, difficulties, 
trouble, disturbance   
Public situation   Anxiety, tension, uncertainty, deviation,  
instability, complexity, difficulty. 
Type of crisis Multi dimensional, many 
faces 
Politic, constitution, monetary, economy, 
security, institutional, ideology, social,  
leadership, trustworthiness.    
 Level of crisis  Chronic  Very hard, the damage of fundamental 





Gradually, step by step,   little by little, 
one by one, slowly, need long time.   




Disappointed, angry, emotional,   make 
fun of and heap on curses, not patient, in 
haste, skeptic, not believe, mock. 
 Desired public 
responses 
 Patient, calm, realistic, hardship. 
  
Period of crisis   
 Beginning on July 1997 and can be 
getting resolved on August 2002 ( one 
year after Megawati has the authority )  
 
 
Similar to BJ Habibie, Megawati tried to overcome the crisis systematically. She began her 
efforts by identifying the source or the root of the crisis. Based on the quotations of her 
statements in 2001, Megawati said that there were several factors which triggered, aggravated 
and complicated the crisis and the crisis resolution. She divided these factors into two 
categorizes: (1) internal factors, these are the national factors, and (2) external factors, these are 
the international factors. The internal factors are: 
 
1. A mistake in achievement management and impatience in performing the goals. 
2. Weaknesses of political supra structure and infrastructure. 
3. Public policy in the past which was inflicted a loss upon the people. 
4. Weakening social discipline, inconsistency in performing what we have planned 
indicated by disobedience of the law. 
5. Collusion, corruption and nepotism practices. 
6. Misperception of the concept of reformation. 
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7. Misperception of the concept of human rights. 
8. The weaknesses of Indonesian National Police and military. 
(Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001) 
 
9. The selfishness of the people.  
10. The ignorance of any group of people to the expected vision, policy and new strategy 
and inhibition in goal achievement.  
11. Bad development strategy 
(Megawati’s speech, August 30th 2001) 
 
12. Bad character and mentality of the law enforcer. 
(Megawati’s speech, September 3rd 2001) 
 
13. The usage of violence, terror and anarchism. 
14. Ideology fanaticism.  
15. Unstable political life. 
(Megawati’s speech, October 5th 2001) 
16. Less attention and moral education 
17. Weakening of social solidarity 
18. Weakening of humanity 
(Megawati’s speech, October 29th 2001) 
 
19. Disappointment and bitterness of life which is caused by injustice in the past. 
20. Inappropriate primordialism. 
21. Not proportional primordialism, ethnical and religion egoism.    
(Megawati’s speech October 29th 2001) 
 
22. Inappropriate debate about autonomy. 
(Megawati’s speech, November 16th 2001) 
 
23. Defensive attitude toward the threat of imported products. 
24. Fighting too strong to the national potency which is going to grow up, partial policies 
which inhibit national development. 
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(Megawati’s speech December 5th 2001) 
 
25. Not trust to each other 
26. Life  without  the spirit of God and humanity  
(Megawati’s speech, December 27th 2001) 
 
27. The weakening of the spirit to solve the problem and skeptical attitude 
28.  Minimal and out of date military and police weapons system 
29.  Unprofessional Indonesian Military 
30.  Low in prosperity of Indonesian Military staffs 
(Megawati’s speech, December 29’ 2001) 
 
All the weaknesses above are internal inhibited factors which are rooted on national problems 
whereas the external factors are (1) international terrorism, (2) global economy crisis; and (3) 
imbalance international reportage. Table 24 shows the internal and external factors which are 
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Table 24 
Triggered and inhibited factors for crisis resolution  
(Megawati’s speeches August –December 2001) 
 





The weakening of social discipline and disobedience 
of the laws     
The improper knowledge of human rights    
Mindlessness 




The weakening of the spirit of devout  
Individual/ 
Actor/Agent 
Misconception of reformation  
 
 
         
 
               None 
The weaknesses of infra  and  supra structure of 
politic 
Problems in the past 
Corruption, collusion  and nepotism 
 
 Monetary crisis in Asia 
The unprofessional human resources  
Inaccurate planning  
International or global 
economy crisis.  
The ignorance to the expected vision and mission.   
International terrorism 




The improper  policies and strategies for national 
development    
The imbalance of 
international media coverage  
 
 
Megawati’s speeches in 2001 are emphasized on the crisis as the biggest national problem and 
the crisis resolution as the biggest Indonesian government and governmental responsibility, 
task and duty. The crisis in Indonesia is very serious and hard crisis, multi dimensional and 
systemic crisis. Indonesian crisis is systemic because the problems which are triggered the crisis 
influence to each other. Because systemic, crisis has to be solved by systemic resolution efforts. 
It was the evolutional process, gradual resolution and it also needs time to look the result of the 
resolution efforts. 
Even though in her speeches she stated that economic condition seemed better in a few 
months after her presidency, Megawati admitted that the crisis was not totally resolved yet. It 
was because our national and statehood problems were also contributed to the main crisis. The 
two problems were the old problems which   accumulated with new problems. The several 
internal problems and weaknesses and also the external or international crisis were mentioned 
persistently by Megawati as the source or factors of the existence of the crisis in Indonesia.  It 
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can be concluded that Megawati admitted that crisis in Indonesia was not only because of the 
influence of internal or national problems, both institutional and individual, but also 
international problems. Even, based on her speeches in 2001, the internal weaknesses or 
problems were claimed by Megawati contribute to the prolonged crisis and the difficulty of 
crisis resolution.     
 
3.3.1.2. Year 2002 
More than six months after Megawati was inaugurated as President, crisis was still ongoing and 
more difficult to be solved. It was mentioned by Megawati many times in her speeches.  
 
“Recently, the life of nationhood and statehood must be tested by the very serious 
problems, even by very hard crisis. It makes us to realize that the damage of fundamental 
social system has a very serious effect. (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 2002) 
 
“If we want to look back for a while, I think, all of you understand that the several 
problems we have are started by the problems of Indonesian economy. Certainly, we also 
realize that it is not only economic problem we have to face but also several social and 
political problems.” (Megawati’s speech, May 10th, 2002). 
 
The statements above show how hard the crisis was. It is shown by her statement that the crisis 
was caused by the damage of social system. It means that crisis is affected by the abnormality of 
the fundamental matters. On her speeches, Megawati also stated that not only fundamental 
social system which is damaged, but also the law and the political systems. About systemic crisis 
resolution, as the best method, has been stated for many times by Megawati.  
 
“To resolve all the problems we face is absolutely not an easy task or can be done 
simultaneously and quickly. We all know about it. We know too that our resources are 
very limited. Therefore, we have to finish all the problems step by step, one by one, as 
our priority.” (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 2002). 
 
“There are still many problems we have to solve…We do not need to deny even though 
we have to solve it one by one, step by step. We do not need to be worry if to resolve the 
crisis, we need time.” (Megawati’s speech, April 19th 2002) 
 
“Different from our neighbor countries which have come out of the crisis quickly, we 
need longer time because our problems are not only  economic problem but also social, 
politic and culture problems, even the problem of constitution which related to the 
whole system of the governance and state. (Megawati’s speech, October 5th 2002) 
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Megawati also said that it was important to be patient  to know the result of the crisis 
resolution. As she has said for many times, to solve the crisis is not easy because of its 
complexity, its high degree of damage, and the limited resources and human resources we have.  
 
“Not only difficult, but also we need to be patient.” (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 
2002) 
 
“I know there are many people who becoming not patient with the process. Some of 
them are angry..[…] How great our expectation, we really can not solve the crisis quickly 
and simultaneously. The limitations of our capability and human resources, insist on us 
to be realistic. We have to solve it one by one and not in a short time.” (Megawati’s 
speech, April 19th 2002) 
 
“The problem is, when we have to start to work, in the same time, we still have to work 
hard to solve many difficulties which are not solved in the past. I have said for many 
times, that is the reality. Like or dislike, we have to solve all the problems one by one, 
step by step. We have to be patient. It is because of our limited resources.” (Megawati’s 
speech, May 24th 2002) 
 
“We need to be patient and need to work hard to make peace and quiet, so we are able to 
work better. Based on our experiences, we need a longer time. We have to take action 
step by step, how great our expectation to solve the crisis. We need to be realistic, that 
there is no instant and quick solution for our complex problems.” (Megawati’s speech, 
August 1st 2002). 
 
“Our patience and firmness are very important because reformation is a long process and 
it needs time.” (Megawati’s speech, October 3rd 2002). 
 
“To improve or change the old condition or even life pattern needs process and time. 
Often we need to be patient. In the very complex situation, there is no something better 
but to be calm and patient. We will be not able resolve so many works without these 
attitudes. I believe by being calm and patient, we will be able to consent our attention to 
solve all problems one by one and gradually.” (Megawati’s speech, November 21st 2002). 
 
Even though Megawati said that we need patience to find the output of the crisis resolution, 
and to eradicate the crisis since it can not be done in a short time and fast, contrarily she also 
said she and her cabinet had made Indonesia better than the prior condition in the last four 
years. The movement to the better condition in the area of social, economy, politic, and 
security was also mentioned by her, especially in her speeches in the first year of her presidency. 
 
“Even though it is very difficult and complex, I believe we are getting closer to resolve 
our national problems well.” (Megawati’s speech, April 16th 2002). 
 
“We have really done all efforts in order to raise our nation up from several   complex 
difficulties. We can see and feel these improvements but there are still some of big 
  
                                                                                        126  
problems have to be handled fundamentally and carefully.” (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 
2002). 
 
“However, we can’t say that there is no impact of our effort to eradicate the crisis. We all 
can see and feel that. At least when we do not want to say it verbally, I believe we still 
have capability to see and feel it by our heart.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2002) 
 
“We should thank to God, in the condition we have limited resources, we are able to 
manage the dynamic of the nationhood and statehood which keep going forward.” 
(Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
“Recently, our political life keeps developing to be more democratic, as our reformation 
goal..[…] The threat of national disintegration which occurred since some years ago and 
social and political problems which are caused by inter group conflicts in several areas 
have also subsided.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
“In general we see a progress in our social life. All shows that the government has 
willingness to improve the situation and our past mistakes.” (Megawati’s speech, August 
1st 2002). 
 
“By working hard and using our capability, we are able to move forward. Even though 
not always in the same time  and quality,  we can see and feel the positive changes in all 
area of life.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
“By working hard, we just resolved monetary crisis that occurred four years ago as well 
as the various difficulties followed, included the threat of national disintegration. All is 
done by hard working and maximizing our limited resources.” (Megawati’s speech, 
August 20th 2002). 
 
“In Indonesia, now we have made progress, several steps forward from the condition of 
crisis in 1997/1998. The improvement of political condition and security and also macro 
economic are expected to give the positive impact on the  economic growth in 2002.” 
(Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2002). 
 
The statements above show that five years since the crisis occurred in 1997, Indonesia has 
started to enter to the phase of declining of tension and crisis threats. Based on the theory, 
Indonesia was in the phase of resolution where there are improvements in many aspects of 
Indonesian life. If there are still weaknesses or even no progress as output of crisis resolution, 
Megawati said that it was because of many weaknesses or situation, as written below: 
 
(1) Limitation of human resources and minimal another resources. 
(2) New problems as impact of old problems resolution, such as threat of national 
disintegration, horizontal and vertical conflicts. 
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(3) The difficult and systemic crisis because of the fundamental damage caused by that 
crisis.    
(4) Indolence in reform.  
(5) A bad plan and schedule of development.  
(6) Imbalance between the expectation and the capability to accomplish it. 
(7) The weakening of togetherness and nationalism. 
(8) Political and security instability. 
(9)  Low degree of professionalism 
(10) Unprofessional and unproductive bureaucrats and public officers 
(11) Unprofessional journalists and press. 
(12) Has no newest arms    
(13) Realization of reform is not carefully measurable so that causes an excess or 
new problem.  
(14) National reform is done partially and one-sided. 
(15) Low in social discipline and bad attitude and mentality of the certain people. 
(16) Misunderstanding about differentiation and pluralism of Indonesia which 
influences the existence of social conflicts and bad social tolerance. 
(17) Group interests are more important than national interests. 
(18) Disproportional relation between center and local government, unfair power 
struggle, complicated services and procedures in business propose, low ethic 
and behavior of business. 
(19) Potential alienation between political elite and their supporters. 
(20) Arrogant, not sensitive to public voices, mindless leaders.  
(21) Unprofessional Indonesian National Police and military, both in knowledge, 
skill, mentality and behavior. 
(22) Not completely recovering of the banking system, slow resurgence in real 
sectors, deficit budget, high amount of national obligation installment, 
decreased investors trust. 
(23) Uncertain law, instable policy and security, and not conducive labor force and 
manpower policy.  
(24) Not sophisticated education system. 
(25) Improper understanding about the concept of freedom.  
(26) Using violence to solve problem. 
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(27) Slandering is usual in our social and political life. 
(28) Increasing in number of corruption, collusion and nepotism action and 
violation of law. 
(29) Disproportional democracy euphoria (ultra democracy) 
(30) Few budget for Indonesian military. 
(31) High discrepancy between expectation and capability. 
(32) Temperamental, emotional and not patient attitude. 
(33) Bad performance of the members of legislative institutions. 
(34) Disproportional demonstration. 
 
As stated on Megawati’s speeches, there was no significant change of the crisis situation in 2002 
from the situation in 2001. The weaknesses and factors inhibited the crisis resolution were quite 
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Table 25 
 Triggered and inhibited factors for crisis resolution  
(Megawati’s speeches in 2002) 





Unprofessional human resources   
Weak nationality and unity    
Do not have spirit of pluralism  
Bad social discipline 
Arrogant leadership/cannot be criticized  
Misconception about freedom/ euphoria of 
democracy.   
Anarchism  
Slander was becoming Indonesian culture  












National disintegration  




Improper planning  Imperialism 
Political and security instability   
One side and partial reformation efforts  
Global/ regional conflict  
Bad relation between center and local govern.   International terrorism 
Limited resources and financial   International violence 
Uncertain law    
Dysfunction/ malfunction of economical 
institutions   
Not sophisticated education system  
Not conducive policies  





Inefficient and ineffective public service procedures  
The inability of the world 
institutions to promote the 
truth and justice  
   
 
These factors, based on Megawati’s speeches, are a kind of weaknesses and limitations of 
Indonesia in resolving crisis. This is also a picture of crisis situation in the area of social, politic, 
economy, ideology, culture and security and defense, which can not be solved in 2002. 
Compare to her speeches in 2001, the factors mentioned by Megawati are not different. There 
were some factors in 2001 that still existed in 2002. It can be concluded that there was no 
significant change in the crisis resolution and in basic influent factors. In 2002, Indonesia was 
still in a crisis situation, and Megawati emphasized the weaknesses of the human resources was 
the most important factor which contributed to the crisis and the difficulty of the crisis 
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resolution. Dissatisfaction of the Indonesian people to the performance of the government in 
the crisis resolution was not because of incapability of the government, but more on the people 
themselves who were not patient to see and feel the result of crisis resolution and people who 
were not want to understand how hard the crisis is. Based on Megawatis’ speeches, many 
Indonesian people did not accept the fact that the crisis that happened in Indonesia was not 
similar to those in Asia. The crisis in Indonesia was multi dimensional, fundamental and it is an 
accumulation of many problems in the past.  
It shows that there is no clear explanation and communication by Megawati about the 
crisis. In one part, she admitted that the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution was the result of 
the incapability of human resources, but in another part, she did not accept the people’s 
opinion that the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution is as the result of the incapability of the 
government. She tended to blame the people who were not patient to wait for the crisis is 
resolved. She saw that some people individually and personally had attitude and behavior which 
were not conducive for the crisis resolution and reformation. 
Based on her speeches in 2001, Megawati tended to apply apology strategy to respond 
public’s criticism about crisis and crisis resolution, but in 2002, Megawati tended to shift the 
blame to the people who didn’t react to the crisis and crisis resolution done by government 
positively. Shifting the blame to the other parts is one kind of denial strategy or dissociate from 
the wrong doing.  
 
3.3.1.3. Year 2003 and 2004: The end of Megawati’s Presidency   
In 2003 Megawati rarely mentioned the words that related to the difficult situation as the 
impact of the crisis, as well as the factors which contributed to crisis. At that time, Megawati 
emphasized more on the crisis resolution progress and improvement made by her cabinet and 
government. Here are her several statements about the progress. 
 
“Even though there are still many problems that have to be handled, and some of them 
are very difficult, step by step we are able to feel that in the current years our national life 
is becoming stable and other aspects are improving. More than that, with all weaknesses 
and limitations, we are able to make our national life still exists as a unitary state.” 
(Megawati speech’s, August 1st 2003) 
 
“In the field of economy and finance, I can say that even though in the real economy 
sector has not been completely recovered and the rate of unemployment keeps high, the 
macro economy shows that the Indonesian condition is going to be better.” (Megawati 
speech’s, August 1st 2003). 
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“Actually, our efforts to resolve the crisis are not useless. Even though not all, we have 
improved many aspects. Economy recovery can be done successfully after the economy 
crisis had destroyed our banking system. The problems that exist in many areas in 
Indonesia, which triggered by group conflicts and almost destroy our nationhood and 
statehood, can be reduced. The threat of separatism in many regions, which is using 
labels of democracy, transparency, and human rights can be eliminated by building 
dialogues and using comprehensive and integrated development approach. Of course, 
not all can be solved, but at least direction and the forms of problem solving principally 
are visible…[…]. All is our reality, indeed we are in progress.” (Megawati’s speech, 
August 1st 2003). 
 
“The government keeps going to try to maintain political stability and security, which is, 
time to time, improved.” (Megawati’s speech, February 27th 2003). 
 
“Inter group clash in our society or even the expectation of the people to be separated 
from Indonesia, recently decreased and is under controlled. (Megawati’s speech, August 
8th 2003) 
 
“We are also successful in handling monetary and economy difficulties, which in the first 
time they almost destroyed our national life. Furthermore, we are also successful to 
establish our politic, governance and security which in the past they were unsteady. Even 
we are getting more capable to improve our macro economy and we are strong to make 
progress. All is factual, they do not need to be covered.” (Megawati’s speech, October 2nd 
2003). 
 
“We are happy that the autonomy is getting stronger, real and now, it is growing.” 
(Megawati’s speech, September 5th 2003). 
 
“…Our economical condition has been running again after all efforts to recover the 
crisis has affected in positive way. In the higher tempo and dynamic, we create a stability 
of social and political life, particularly after we have applied our new social institutions 
and after we successfully eliminated the conflicts and the threat of armed violence in the 
certain areas.” (Megawati’s speech, December 23rd 2003). 
 
In 2004, almost in all her speeches Megawati mentioned the progresses and improvements 
made by thr government, as the result of the crisis resolution. 
 
“No need to talk too much, it is the fact that our efforts to overcome the difficulties in 
economy and financial that in the past was spreading in the other areas, have given us 
positive result. (Megawati’s speech, January 12th 2004). 
 
“We should not deny that our movement is also still shrouded by the weaknesses, and 
even shortcomings.  However, with a clear mind and an open heart, let us admit that we 
have actually achieved a lot all this time. This is all owing to our hard work, seriousness 
and patience.” (Megawati’s speech, May 1st 2004) 
 
“Now in general everything is going to be under controlled. […] Now we see that the 
condition is going to be better, especially if we compare it to the last year’s condition. 
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Security disturbance has been reduced and fear from armed violence is getting subsided. 
Economic activities restore and the Indonesian governance in all levels is becoming 
better..[…]. The situation improvements as mentioned above are indeed possible because 
we take firm and clear attitude in the field of security and law enforcement, and we also 
took our real steps to increase the social welfare.” (Megawati’s speech, May 18th 2004). 
“Even though so many crises we have faced, the unity and oneness of our nation are still 
remained well. Bad predictions, which wondering about disintegration, do not come true. 
Facing all problems, we have improved and reformed all aspects of our life.” (Megawati’s 
speech, May 24th 2004). 
 
“But, in other side, we are also finding our nation is not unsteady, our unity state still 
exists and not to be separated. From time to time, strength to maintain and establish our 
unity state and national life  is growing.” (Megawati’s speech, May 27th 2004). 
 
“Our efforts are not useless. We can see its positive impacts in the last three years.” 
(Megawati’s speech, June 5th 2004). 
 
“Even though it is very slow, we can see the progress. Our concern to the environment 
keeps going to be increasing […] The efforts to improve social prosperity are going to be 
sustainable activities and needs time..[…]. We can see the result even though only in 
some aspects. All is well done even though not completely finish yet.  No need to be 
arrogant, our efforts within the last tree years, can increase the degree of social 
prosperity. In three years, we worked so hard and little by little we were able to repair 
many things. Aware or not, we have done so many works and its results.” (Megawati’s 
speech, June 7th 2004). 
  
“Even though sometimes we are very tired, we have really stepped over the difficult time. 
Our efforts to be free from many difficulties, even though not in all aspects yet, are going 
to be effective. Once again, even though it is not as successful as we expect, and 
sometimes it accumulates with the new problems, because of our hard working, the 
economic activities are going to work.” (Megawati’s speech, June 17th 2004). 
 
In her state address in the Indonesian Parliament Meeting August 16th 2004, Megawati said that 
the crisis is over. She said that Indonesian government had successfully recovered Indonesian 
situation that had been destroyed by crisis.  When she delivered  the speech, Megawati claimed 
that Indonesia was in the better time and better condition.  
 
“We all understand about the very heavy problem we have. Only by hard working, we 
finally resolved all the difficulties caused by monetary crisis, as well as all its impacts on 
our economy and social situation. In the same time, we also have a task to accomplish 
our reform goals in our national life. Together with all excesses which are also difficult to 
be resolved, all becomes uneasy works. We are the witnesses who see how difficult of the 
conflict and the threat of disintegration in our unity state. Only by our hard working, we 
can eradicate the crisis impacts. Our existence as a nation, are still remained. Our 
government stability, especially in the relation between center and local government, can 
be more established. Even though is not completed yet, we have been able to pass to the 
hardest part of our transitional situation that is usually existed in every reformation steps. 
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We do not be unsure that we all together have been able to solved an hardest part of our 
reformation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004). 
 
The several improvements made by Megawati and her cabinets as a result of her crisis 
resolution efforts were also mentioned by Megawati in her dialogues with various foreign 
publics, both in Indonesian and overseas forum. 
“Since the time of departure until today, all Indonesian situations are running well. 
Indonesian security can be controlled and stable. Economy activities are also running 
well, Indonesian currency is not  fluctuate too much, the prices are not too high.” 
(Megawati’s statement, April 17th 2003). 
 
“[…] Especially in Indonesian situation. But, alhamdulilah, since we have entered to 
reform era until now, Indonesia is getting stable. Because in the several area in Indonesia 
which are in conflict in the past, now the conflicts can be reduced.” (Megawati’s 
statement, April 19th 2003). 
 
“In the conflict area, it now relatively is stable. The economic growth and development   
are running well […] Our national life is also getting better.” (Megawati’s statement, 
April 26th 2003). 
 
“Alhamdullilah, that within two years everything is going to be better, security, economy 
and social culture.” (Megawati’s statement June 22nd 2003) 
 
“…[…] Now, there are so many things can be solved. There are many development 
projects can be approved, executed and …[…] a difficult project can be executed.” 
(Megawati’s statement. June 24th 2003). 
 
 
However, Megawati still mentioned that the national crisis recovery, after six years the crisis 
was started, was a long and complicated process that needed hard working to solve. 
Reformation in all aspects was a main way to eradicate the impacts of crisis. This reform 
process, based on Megawati’s speech, needs many pre conditions. Even in some speeches, she 
frequently criticized Indonesian people who did not support the government in crisis 
resolution. She saw people tended to be apathy to the effectiveness of government’s crisis 
resolution efforts, by saying that the crisis resolution runs very slowly and ineffective. She saw 
that kind of people attitude had precisely made the ineffectiveness of government’s reform 
efforts. Below are some statements which contain a picture of Megawati’s responses to the 
people reaction. 
 
“It is weird that for their own interests and by whatever reasons, people like to tell about 
the failure and the bad side of the government performance and even use it as a tool to 
discredit or assassinate or show the bad picture of others. This attitude, in the same time, 
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only gives us a bad picture of our own nation in which its people like mocking to 
themselves and using themselves as an object of mockery. Like or dislike, some days we 
will feel that blaming ourselves, showing our own failures or bad side or incapability off, 
keep growing as our nation attitude.” (Megawati’s statement, August 1st 2003) 
 
“The bad attitude, as explained before, actually makes us as an object of mockery and 
laughing stock for others. We have to leave the bad and unbeneficial attitude out from 
our life. There is no part of our nation will take advantage from this attitude. Contrarily, 
all only makes us discouraged us. In this forum and through all the leaders and the 
people’s consultative assembly’s members, I ask my brothers and sisters in Indonesia, 
together to change that attitude. If we have any mistakes or weaknesses, let us fix it  
together.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003). 
 
“[…] I think that each of us understand that for our pluralistic nation, reform activities 
are not a simple process and easy to be accomplished. During the fast changing of value 
system in our environment, and also compiled by the difficult and complicated problems 
caused by the past mistakes, many of us are not patient to wait for the positive effect of 
our own reform efforts.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003). 
 
“There are many of us do something, based on their assumption that in the reform era 
everything from the past have to be changed or removed. On the other side, in this time 
also, there are many of us, coming from various different social backgrounds, create 
assumption that in the reform era or by reformation, we can do or can’t do everything as 
we want.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003). 
 
“Often we hear the explanation – even though it makes boring image—that all is just 
excess of the transitional situation, that is usually happening in the society who is looking 
for the best way or suitable form in self actualizing and expressing their thought and 
aspiration and role in the process to enter the new institutions.” (Megawati’s speech, 
February 9th 2003). 
 
“Whoever in our lovely country knows that the trip to get the direction of our reform 
needs long time and it is not always smooth.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003). 
 
“Democracy euphoria that was born in the reform era has displayed so many politicians 
who do not only less understand about the complexity our nation, but also do not know 
better yet about the ethic of politic.” (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 2003). 
 
“It is indeed impolite and also exceptional not beneficial, in the time  we need good spirit 
and support the contradictive attitude and activities take place. We have already known 
that in our community developing attitude and behavior that tends to mock and blame 
ourselves, always asses everything we have done by negative view and sometimes laugh 
ourselves. That kind of attitude and behavior are displayed or followed by various mass 
media. It is actually not only different from reality, but it also scrapes the spirit and 
national proud which we need. (Megawati’s speech, October 2nd ’03) 
 
Based on the several statements above, Indonesian people who gave critics about the low 
performance of the government in crisis resolution were accepted by Megawati as people who 
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like mocking their own country. For Megawati, this attitude is not good and need to be revised 
because it is definitely not conducive for reform efforts and crisis resolution. In the end of 
2002, Megawati already mentioned it, but in the last two years, 2003 and 2004, the similar 
statement had stated repeatedly. It shows that Megawati was very disappointed to the people 
reaction or response which did not appreciate and respect to the government’s efforts to 
eradicate the impact of crisis. Moreover, in 2004 she preferred not to mention too many about 
crisis. She did not often criticize herself or her cabinet, as she did in 2001 and 2002. For 
Megawati, 2004 was the era of her to proclaim the successful stories of her cabinet, progresses 
and positive impacts in crisis resolution and reformation. In this time also, she talked more 
about the general election that would be performed in 2005, which used a new methods of 
election as written on the constitution amendment. Beside general election, Megawati 
emphasized her speeches more on the national disintegration problems as an effect of the 
various inter ethnic conflict or conflict among the members of different religious community, 
included the conflict as an effect of the national and international terrorism issues. 
 However, Megawati said that if the problem or difficulty which is still remained, it is only 
because of the excess of every policy, procedure and new action made for resolving the crisis, 
and not because of weaknesses or failure of the government. In the end of her presidency, 
Megawati still saw that the criticism about government who failed in crisis resolution as a 
discouraged form which was expressed by people to discredit the government, even to their 
country. Megawati also expressed her disappointment to this kind of criticism in her several 
speeches, as following statements.  
 
“Whatever the result or the meaning of the government’s efforts to resolve the crisis, as 
usually mentioned by observers, we have made many meaningful improvements and 
chance to progress..[…] We have to see all of this by honesty. Only by the simplest logic, 
it is so weird if people say that our efforts are useless for reducing the number of 
unemployed people. It precisely is illogical, if day by day we accept comments or 
opinions about the high rate of the unemployment.” (Megawati’s speech, January 12th 
2004). 
 
“While we criticize so many weaknesses and flaws, I hope my brothers and sisters always 
remember about our success and other positive things, whatever its   degree, the progress 
must exists in every aspects. I think it is not exaggerated if I remind you that for all 
members of this society, even for the members of the society who involve in the difficult 
situation, hopes or opportunities can determine their future. Dosage of critics, in the 
normal situation, can be a panacea, but sometimes it causes destruction in a very sensitive 
situation.” (Megawati’s speech, February 10th 2004). 
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“We should not deny that our movement is also still shrouded by weaknesses, and even 
shortcomings.  However, with a clear mind and an open heart, let us admit that we have 
actually achieved a lot this time. This is all owing to our hard work, seriousness and 
patience.  Don’t forget this achievement. Do not let a momentary interest or any short-
term political interest disturb us and then we close our eyes and heart and deny, defame, 
or cover up the results and progress that we have achieved. Do not make it as a 
temporary campaign.” (Megawati’s speech, May 1st 2004 ). 
 
“I want to say that we need to be honest and balanced in assessing our progress and 
viewing the problems. This problem is very important in order to view everything we 
have done not only in the negative aspect but also in the positive way. Conveying 
problems inaccurately is absolutely indicating an inequitable attitude.” (Megawati’s 
speech, June 5, 2004) 
“I believe we see and feel the results and positive improvements. It is because of our 
hard working. The government is only a part of a long chain of distribution in order to 
eradicate poverty and unemployment […]. Therefore, it is illogical if any one of us, for 
our own interests, said that the poverty and unemployment in Indonesia are increasing. It 
is as illogical as the promising statement that the poverty and unemployment can be 
eliminated in a short time. Beside not realistic, it is also a misleading statement.” 
(Megawati’s statement, June 7th 2004). 
 
“As I feel, I believe that you know more and feel how hard the criticism about the 
performance of Indonesian attorney in general. Often, this criticism is not only too hard, 
but also precisely makes people feel discourage. […] Even though, in fact, your 
performance is not too bad.” (Megawati’s speech, July 22nd 2004). 
 
Megawati also said that many of the critics were not accurate, subjective, imbalance and tended 
to emphasize only on the negative side and ignored the positive side. She also said that people 
or publics did not have good capacity to help government, nation and Indonesia in crisis 
resolution and reformation. Often she attacked publics by her statement that they were 
improper to criticize her and government because of their own weaknesses.  
 
“We have to look at all things here with honesty. Only by the simplest logic, it is very 
ridiculous if people say there is nothing, as a working result, which can be contributed to 
eliminate the number of unemployed people. It is illogical, if day by day we have to see 
some comments or opinion about the huge number of unemployed people.” (Megawati’s 
speech, January 12th 2004). 
 
“Especially I appeal for all national journalists to be willing to intensify education 
function of the press, as well as information and entertainment function.” (Megawati’s 
speech, February 10th 2004) 
      
“[…] Short cut in the level of political infrastructure can be a form of riot, mass violence 
action, “revolution” even, anarchism which can not be controlled. Frequently we hear 
that the kinds of short cut are claimed as “reformation” or even, democracy. This claim 
is wrong or can be said, extremely it is not true.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 
2004). 
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“No need to say again, the same as the many number of criticisms to executive, a huge 
numbers of criticism is also addressed to the legislative, both in the local    and national 
level. As the side effect of the reformation or realization of the concept of National 
Reform Movement, so many people accept the concept of local autonomy as a concept 
about a freedom for a certain region to do everything for their own interest. This kind of 
concept is absolutely not right.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 2004). 
 
“No one should not think and behave that autonomy means small states in one big state 
which can do everything as they want. Many times I have received reports about the local 
governments in kabupaten or \kotamadia which ignore the direction and instruction from 
their governors, by any reasons.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 2004). 
 
“It becomes a public knowledge that we do not have good discipline in implementing 
urban plan which we have already planned. Not only because of the changes of space 
function, but also because of the changing process is done without legal procedures, as 
written on the urban plan regulation.” (Megawati’s speech, March 8th 2004). 
 
“Therefore, when many of us have been easy talking about the low cost education, or 
even free of charge, we know the kinds of statements are not only contradicted with the 
fact, but it also mislead.” (Megawati’s speech, May 5th 2004). 
 
“[…] Religion education has created fanatic people – even though not all— which 
tended to see a certain religion is the best and look at the other religion in contrast. This 
attitude creates a hostility behavior to the other religion communities. We also witness 
the birth of people who, in the following time, always see their own religion is the best, 
and show the very sensitive attitude and aggressive. And then, militancy, the next 
behavior, usually emphasizes on the concept that everything which is different has to be 
pushed away, or if it is necessary has to be destroyed, and it becomes honorable task.” 
(Megawati’s speech, May 17th 2004). 
 
“Now, we know better our faults are more on the method to handle the pluralism. So 
far, we have handled this pluralism by ignoring the nature and meaning of that pluralism 
itself. It should be handled by accommodating and managing pluralism, by 
decentralizing, not centralizing.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2004). 
 
 
Table 26 below describes the critics of Megawati to the Indonesian people who have judged her 
and her cabinet in the crisis resolution and reformation. In general, based on her speeches, the 
critics to the government and her are not positive attitude and just a character assassination, 
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Table 26 
The Negative Reaction of the Indonesian People  




Impatient,  not understanding people about crisis   February 9’ 03 
Improper understanding about reformation. Reformation means: (1)   
“freedom to decide what have to do or not to do, and say or not to 
say”; (2) “anarchism, mass violence, riot” 
February 9’ 03 
February 11’ 04 
Our politicians have no enough knowledge about the complexity of the 
Indonesia and political ethics.   
May 20’ 03 
Give inaccurate, subjective and imbalance information   June 5’03  
Give unrealistic and false information    June 7’03, May 5’04 
Give disproportional and illogical criticism    July 22’03, Jan 12’04,  
Define autonomy as freedom for the local government to decide 
everything by and for themselves 
February 11’04 
    
                             
Based on her statements, it is clear that Megawati saw Indonesian people or public were not 
critical or did not have good critical thinking. They tended to criticize Megawati and her 
cabinet’s performance in illogical, emotional and subjective ways. People also did not have 
proper understanding about some concepts, such as democracy, reformation, autonomy, politic 
ethics, and freedom. People also did not have good social discipline, low commitment to the 
regulations, even to the regulation made by them. The incapability of the people, based on 
Megawati’s point of view, is the main contributing factor to the crisis and crisis resolution. In 
2004, she looked at the weaknesses of people or individual are the cause of crisis than those of 
the government. The mentality, character and personality, rationality and morality are the 
several individual factors which inhibit the crisis resolution. Therefore, the main source of crisis 
came from the Indonesian people themselves. The act of collusion, nepotism and corruption 
are the biggest contributor of the crisis development. It means that the source of crisis and 
prolonged crisis resolution is in the individual/actor/ agent level, not in the system or structural 
level.  Thus, crisis, then, was resolved by improving the individual capability, not the structure 
or system. It is firmed by another statements of Megawati that there are many progresses in the 
level of structure or system.  
 In general, referring to her speeches, Megawati mentioned clearly about crisis as the 
hardest problem of Indonesia to be solved only in the first two years (2001-2002). In this time, 
Megawati admitted that the crisis was not only caused by the bigger problem, international 
problem, but also caused by the weaknesses and the failure of the government and its 
institutions. Inaccuracy and improperness of the rules, regulations and policies, both in the past 
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or current times are the factors of the failure. By another words, Megawati claimed that the 
untidiness of infra and supra structure of the state and nation is the source of crisis. Therefore, 
to solve the crisis and restore the Indonesian conditions, we have to reform all aspects in the 
structure level. However, she did not ignore the incapability of the individual was also the 
inhibiting factor in crisis and crisis resolution. 
 Different from her speeches during the first two years of her presidency, in the last two 
years (2003-2004) Megawati saw that the ongoing crisis and the difficult crisis resolution in 
Indonesia, was caused more by the mentality and professionalism of the Indonesian people. 
The critics about the slowness of the government in crisis resolution were responded by 
Megawati, by placing the people as the most responsible part of the crisis. Impatience, 
subjectivity, inaccuracy, and one sidedness of the people in assessing the government’s 
performance in the crisis resolution are the main cause of the government and all its institutions 
failure in resolving the crisis quickly. Therefore, the best way to solve the crisis, eliminate its 
impact and repair the conditions is by improving the mentality of these people. Until the end of 
her presidency, Megawati still saw that the critics are ridicules as they exacerbate the crisis 
resolution, and also deteriorated the reputation and image of the nation and state in 
international publics. In contrast, in the other parts, in the same time, Megawati emphasized 
more on the progresses and improvements in the level of system or structure made by 
governments and its institutions. 
 It can be concluded that the response by Megawati to the crisis in the first two years 
differs from those in the last two years. The responses of Megawati to the crisis in the early 
time of her presidency can be called as accommodative strategy, however, in the last two years, 
the strategy of crisis response used by Megawati was dissociation or denial or avoiding strategy. 
It means that Megawati used two kinds of strategies of crisis response, within four years; (1) 
accommodative strategy; and (2) dissociation strategy. 
 
3.3.2. Megawati and Crisis: Media Portrayal 
Referring to the theoretical framework mentioned on Chapter II, I would say that the crisis 
response strategy applied by someone or an organization is influenced by some factors; (1) the 
crisis situation itself; (2) the relation between someone or organization and its publics/ 
constituents, such as media persons, and (3) social/political environment in time of crisis. 
Applying this hypothesis, I think that Megawati’s responses to the crisis as explained before are 
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not free from the other factors. So, it is important to know how the situation of the factors 
above. 
 
3.3.2.1. The Transition Time: 2001  
How the social and political situation in Indonesia during the crisis, especially in Megawati’s 
presidency (2001-2004)? The situation in the early of Megawati’s administration was still 
colored by the prior situation; the situation produced by KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur); 
the situation which might be the product of interaction between procedures, policies and 
actions of the Gus Dur and his cabinet. Megawati, the next president after Gus Dur, could not 
ignore this situation, like or dislike had to face and take it as the consequences from the 
previous president. How did the situation in the end of Gus Dur presidency affect the situation 
during Megawati’s presidency?  
Two thousand and one was a transition year for Megawati. She lived with the situation 
inherited from Gus Dur’s administration time. That time was very massy according to the 
media’s point of view, as the following newspaper quotations below: 
      
 “If the students now say that Indonesian reform has failed, it must be asked to the 
President Abdurrahman Wahid […]. The faults of the three presidents are getting hard 
because they precisely are holding the highest power. They hold mandate of people to be 
the leaders. But, surprisingly, in their hands, reform is dying to soon. Amien Rais, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri are enjoying their own games. They 
fight, not in the context of reformation, but power struggle […]. Based on our history, 
we can see that the Indonesian people have bad character and mentality when they are 
offered the power.” (Media Indonesia, January 25th 2001). 
 
“The skilled military have been asked not to do anything during the mass riot, but, the 
police who do not train to handle riot and guerrilla – as happened in Aceh—must fight 
in front line. Ya..amburadul…The military are tempted to be back in practical politics area 
by weak, frustrated and greedy civilians.” (Media Indonesia, March 8th 2001). 
 
“Uncontrolled anarchism is rising because of grudge. We revenge when we are looking at 
military, military bear a grudge to the situation. Because of it, the confusion which 
happens in front of us can’t be handled by the professional military. It is also only 
because they are afraid to violate human rights. It means, in one aspect, an ethical reason, 
but in other aspect, it is the death of morality.” (Media Indonesia, March 8th 2001). 
 
“Indonesia. It is the crucial name which is not cohesive anymore. The name which is not 
attractive and cohesive. […] Land and water, from Sabang to Merauke which belong to us 
is separated in many pieces […]. Dayak people chase away Madura people..in Aceh, 
Javanesse people are raid, we chase away and are chased away from our own country. It 
is very awful. In a very big country and rich there are so many problems. All resources 
have lost... In time of the collapse of Indonesian symbols, we take our hopes only on the 
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leaders. But what happen? Surprisingly, Gus Dur disseminated the threat of 
disintegration…Gus Dur, aware or not, reduced his authority only in the area of East 
Java.” (Media Indonesia, April 18th 2001). 
 
“Now we begin to feel the democracy is being dominated by mass mobilization…we 
have to admit that the politic of mass mobilization still dominate our democracy. The 
truth tends to be measured only by the number of mass supporter, not by the quality of 
argumentation.” (Media Indonesia, January 29th 2001). 
 
“We witness the extreme political process. In a society, democracy is understood as 
anarchism. In the elite level, democracy is running to be dictators, who are becoming to 
be constitution and symbolizing their activities for nation and country.” (Media 
Indonesia, May 31st 2001). 
 
“But in time of transition, when we hold democracy as a way to develop our nation, the 
violence grows. Violence becomes a new identity of this nation. Violence does not 
belong especially to the security apparatus but to all people. Honestly,   demonstration in 
this country and anarchism is identical. It is identical with the traffic disorder, public 
facilities damage and environment damage. Our demonstration is the representation of 
the way of thinking of the society who are dull in expressing their demands. So, it always 
ended by mass riot.” (Media Indonesia, June 20th 2001). 
 
All quotations above are expressed by mass media they give picture of Indonesian social and 
political situation in the end of Gus Dur’s administration. By KOMPAS, 2000 it is called as the 
most insecure year for Indonesia. Until the end of 2000, ‘storm’ never ended. It was indicated 
by the various internal problems, such as conflict, mass riot and violence in our everyday life. 
Kompas, based on its polling, mentions that society tended to be pessimistic about 2001. For 
them, the following year was not promising time. It was the time which was full of the 
uncertainty. Pessimistic attitude was growing in the area of politic and economy.  In the area of 
politic, pessimistic was growing because of the potential vertical and horizontal conflicts and 
structural and physical violence.  Meanwhile, in the area of economy, pessimistic was caused by 
the improper and unsuitable resource management and the social and political stability which 
were not supporting for economic growth. In general, KOMPAS claimed that in 2001, the 
image and reputation of Indonesia in international publics were very awful. 
In 2001, Gus Dur was in the difficult situation in which his power as president was in 
the edge. As explained before, he was suspected as the actor of the corruption in connection to 
the financial support from Sultan Brunei and BULOG budget. Based on this, Gus Dur was 
pressured by people to resign from his position. But on the other hand, Gus Dur said this 
pressure was not right to be directed to him. By mass mobilizing, Gus Dur tried to remain his 
position. The statements and actions of Gus Dur were understood by people as absolutely not 
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conducive for the nation in time of crisis resolution. The bad image of Gus Dur that was 
constructed during his presidency was another additional factor for this demand, even though, 
in the early of his presidency, his image was quite good for publics.    
Below are the citations that describe the image of Gus Dur in the early and end of his 
presidency, based on mass media’s point of view.  
 
“…President Abdurrahman Wahid has shown the big steps of the statesman. The big 
steps are the capability of the president to differentiate between state issues, political 
issues and personal issues. Politics in one side, personal in other side.” (Media Indonesia, 
March 6th 2000). 
 
“…the humanity spirit is doing human reconciliation through the peaceful way. 
Visitation and friendship are two of that ways. The steps that look so simple and small. 
But, it is the big step, because it deconstructs the value system of old authority and 
creates new face of authority.[…] Gus Dur has answered many questions by talking, 
speaking…so far, only Gus Dur used this kind of way, solve the problem by developing 
discourse. He really has big modal to do it because he is free from primordial boundaries, 
partial and parochial small room.” (Media Indonesia, March 22nd 2000). 
 
“…Giving opinion, in the era of democracy, takes an honorable place and is a special 
honor. But, disseminate opinion to the publics and then make publics panic and 
confused, and then decide not to talk, are the bad behaviors which destroy the public 
etiquette […] It is…from the President…uncontrolled talking.” (Media Indonesia, May 
22nd 2000) 
 
“…Gus, in the past you criticized the New Orde because New Orde has been 
developing irrationality to keep the power. Now, you, yourself, intensively developing 
that kind of irrationality. In the time of New Orde, through the military, HM Soeharto 
made the power as a monster, but now, you, Gus, create the same thing by your 
followers.” (Media Indonesia, April 20th 2000). 
 
“Because of inconsiderateness, in the hand of the President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Indonesia becomes a vehicle which runs recklessly […] Beside inconsiderateness, 
Abdurrahman was also always talking too much and his legs can’t be stop walking to 
overseas […] The president who is an idol for any Indonesia people, actually, is not 
serious to eradicate the corruption.” (Media Indonesia, November 12th 2000). 
 
“…People have a long list, that Wahid as the President is more enjoying with his own 
interests and his stubborn, than concerning to the nation and state’s goals. […] A new 
dictator was born.” (Media Indonesia, July 23rd 2001). 
 
Mass media clearly shows us the image of Gus Dur. In the early of his presidency, the image of 
Gus Dur was constructed by media was so positive. Media hoped he would   improve 
Indonesia. But, in the end of his Presidency (2000) Gus Dur’s images was very negative, at 
least, constructed by Media Indonesia, Indonesian big national daily newspaper. The image of 
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his cabinet and his governance and the image of Gus Dur were identical. In the same time, time 
of crisis, 2000, Kompas, another national newspaper criticized the government and the 
government administration of Gus Dur, as below. 
 
“…Because our problems are urgent and too many, people are getting not patient. 
People start to quest, the government is able or not to perform the government’s   
administration. Why do many problems keep unsolved? The perception that the 
government does not command or the government is making more statements than 
decisions, has given the disappointed impact and frustration.” (Kompas, February 16th 
2000). 
 
“…People begin to ask and make fun the government, by saying that the (Indonesian-
add by writer) government is the government who always say  ‘We will’.” (Kompas, 
February 16th 2000). 
 
“Referring to the some cases, the issue about at least the senior state officials, even the 
President, like to directly intervene is developing. The government’ habit which must be 
criticized in the old regime.” (Kompas, November 4th 2000). 
 
“The image of the government, now, is not only questioned in terms of the effectiveness 
and the coordination, but also the transparency, tidiness and free from collusions.” 
(Kompas, November 4th 2000). 
 
“Nation can be changed inconsiderately for pragmatic interests. […] Government is 
performing the administration based on impulses and obsessions or order by plan, 
program with anticipative attitude?  The anxiety and questions are existed every time. 
The several important steps are taken, including replacement of the ministers and 
officials, often these make questions: the steps are impulsive and emotional or are 
considered carefully, including anticipation of the impacts, influences and effects.” 
(Kompas, November 22nd 2000). 
 
“The one function of the government is giving the certainty. It is not given yet by the 
government. Even, the government’s effort itself gives contribution to the uncertainty.” 
(Media Indonesia , November 22nd 2000). 
 
“In managing the problems, government creates the image that they are not professional 
who can show us their competency…the weakness is very fundamental, that is the 
weakness of the credibility and the government’s wisdom.” (Kompas, November 22nd 
2000). 
 
“The one of our awful disappointments is that our honored people and leaders as the 
people who have high humanity are actually showing the character of revenge, people 
who bear a grudge.” (Kompas, February 17th 2001). 
 
“Economy crisis is not eliminated, but precisely is getting worse. […] After one and an 
half years, where is the improvement of national, people and country life? Based on our 
views, based on our empirical experience, by polling, by voluntarily assessments of 
Indonesian and International people, it can be concluded that the condition is not 
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improving, but getting worse […] Government makes us to make impression that they 
are more interesting to themselves, and even, finally, develop the impression that 
government is more concerning to their own interest than Indonesian people interests.” 
(Kompas, April 4th 2001). 
 
“…Gus Dur creates the new method of communication, small talks […] But so far, the 
effectiveness of this small talk is not accomplished yet. What more frequently happen is 
controversial effect and inconsistency.” (Kompas, April 4th 2001). 
 
“Recently, when the conflict and political contestation in the level of political elites are 
growing, some people are asking: how does the effectiveness of the government and its 
administration?” (Kompas, April 4th 2001). 
“Who can say that the security and national interests develop well during the last two 
years? It is not getting better but worse.” (Kompas, May 18th 2001). 
 
“It can’t be justified, if the leaders are mobilizing the mass to keep the power remains. 
That way is not equitable for the spirit of democratic and constitutional process because 
there are so many possibilities and tension.” (Kompas, May 18th 2001). 
 
“Moreover, this bad condition might be influenced by the approach, that is, the approach 
and political spirit of power sharing.” (Kompas, June 28th 2001). 
 
 
Referring to the editorial of Kompas during 2000 and the first half semester of 2001, the 
Indonesian government and its administration the crisis has not been successful yet in crisis 
resolution and reformation. Kompas and Media Indonesia saw that the performance of Gus 
Dur and his cabinet are not good. It was the main reason why people suspected Gus Dur was 
doing corruption, in relation to the cases of Bruneigate and Buloggate. The image that Gus Dur 
divested money finally made him getting impeachment from the Parliament. Table 27 describes 
the image of Gus Dur and his administration during his presidency, the image constructed by 
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Table 27 
  President Gus Dur and his cabinet’s image 
  
The President The Cabinet of Gus Dur 
• Made public were disappointed and frustrated • Said anything that comes to his 
head • Do improperly political practice 
• Made more statements than decisions and policies. • Destroyed public ethic  
• Dysfunctional 
• Inefficient and uncoordinated • Cultivated irrational for getting 
power • Selfish 
• Just said “We will” but not followed by action • Talked inconsiderately, talked 
too much • Mobilized people for getting power 
• Hard headed, stubborn • Doubt about the government’s integrity, purity – not free 
from collusion 
• Impulsive, obsessive and emotional • New dictator 
• Failed to build national security 
• Failed to make the certainty  
• Unprofessional problem solving  
• Made more controversy and 
inconsistency than 
communicated effectively • Bad credibility 
(Source: Kompas, 2001). 
 
Under the same situation Megawati was the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Megawati, 
like or dislike, was inaugurated by the leader of this Republic, was hanged over by the image of 
the prior president and the situation was resulted by him. She had to take over Gus Dur’s 
procedures, policies and actions and all its impacts. In the end of the first six months of her 
presidency, the above situation did not change.  As a result, Megawati had to face the 
accumulation of the past situation and the new situation, with the following problems. 
Quotations below are the representation of the social and political situation, within the early of 
Megawati’s presidency, based on ‘Media Indonesia’. 
 
“So, it is so strange if suddenly in the fourth step, Indonesian Parliament is ignoring the 
policies which have been agreed in the prior three steps of the discussion. The things 
make us laughing to the Parliament, because the mechanism made by them was violated 
by themselves. The things that make us to be distrustful is that there is a hidden 
powerfully interest which has effect on the existing of the compromise in the end of 
process…It is an evidence that the Parliament becomes a source of problem, not a source 
of solution.” (Media Indonesia, October 25th 2001). 
 
“…For four years we have been destroyed the authority and destiny of the people who 
have nationhood and statehood. As a society, we are a group of a wild people. As nation, 
we are a weak entity, and as a state, we have lost power […]. The incompetent 
government will only speed up of this nation and the state enters to the bankruptcy.” 
(Media Indonesia, December 14th 2001). 
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“Politics can mean anything. Politics is untruth. Politic tended to say something not clear. 
It is ironic, related to the spirit of reformation and democratization that the transparency, 
open dialogue is very important. In Indonesia, World Trade Center and Pentagon 
tragedies have made many reactions. There is coming from Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(MUI/ The Committee of Indonesian Islamic Scholars - writer). There is demonstration from any 
various groups in front of the office of American Embassy in Jakarta […]. One of the 
visible political faces is something called as jolting. [...] It is indeed awful. It is a kind of 
political compromising as an impact of the unawareness of safety importance. Our 
politicians have bad commitment. Only in one month of their authority, they have been 
jolted.” (Media Indonesia, September 30th 2001). 
 
“Poso is outburst when the freedom comes, freedom which destroys the symbols of 
appropriateness of law, the freedom which is not followed by the strong government 
administration. This kind of freedom causes the existence of new dictators that bring the 
symbols of justice, religiousness, and primordialism, in the situation when law is 
disobeyed. Political intervention, internally and externally, causes the religion transformed 
to be sect or sectarianism. […] The brutality, for any certain group’ interests, which 
happens in this country is caused by a fundamental fault: there is no supremacy of the 
law.” (Media Indonesia, December 21st 2001). 
 
“Mega (wati – writer) keeps using the old methods, by signing epigraphy and the number of  
symbolic certainties, together with continuously shows the power of feudalism. It is 
proved by her impatience as a good listener. One interruption from a student has 
destroyed the hopes of many people to establish the dialogues with Megawati.’ (Media 
Indonesia, September 9th 2001). 
 
However, Megawati could not ignore the problems from the past. In time of her presidency, 
especially in the early of that time, was the transition era. The time, like or dislike, may contain 
an accumulation of the old and new problems.  People who were represented by press did not 
create a good impression about Megawati. However, in a few editorials, Media Indonesia and 
Kompas wrote positive statements about her. At least, there were still positive wishes of mass 
media about the current President. 
 
 “There is a new awareness growing in the level of the government elites. The awareness 
that we have a debt from other countries is not a safe way. In contrast, it is a dangerous 
way for this country.” (Media Indonesia, August 29th 2001). 
 
“At least, that is Megawati’s hopes. She believes that in the future, the institution, so far 
we know as “playing park” of the attorneys, can be changed into the good way. The 
attorney institution will be able to be the pioneer of law enforcement. […] This president’s 
belief  - in the very skeptic  society – must be a good momentum to reach back all 
authorities and honor of the counsel of attorney general which has been so long 
decreasing. The counsel has to be able to find these missing things: law and justice.” 
(Media Indonesia, September 4th 2001). 
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“The President’s speech was positive in style, method and content. Many times audience 
gave applause. […] The content was good because by her explanation about the main 
elements, it can show us the vision and the basic attitude of the President, which is 
actually good and so much different from the people thought about her. […] The 
President showed she was not the same as people thought. She was the person who was 
not low intelligent and low competent. Even, she showed her wisdom […] That is 
important for a leader to perform her administration recently; wisdom. A good start can 
be continued if the President and her cabinet keeps going to be open for criticism and 
correction.” (Kompas, August 18th 2001). 
   
“President said: “By a very deep concern, by unpretentiousness, and by honesty, I must admit that there 
is no good news.” The situation does not improve yet and in some aspects, still remain or 
even are getting worse. […] We appreciate with her honesty, concern and modesty. These 
are the valuable and important social modal to implement the three of the government’s 
priorities. But, the President, government and all of us have to work continuously; can be 
ended in every time. It is always sustainable. There are policies, concrete program, 
persistent direction and consistent and persistent implementation.” (Kompas, November 
3rd 2001). 
 
At least, Indonesian mass media still have positive assessment about Megawati, even though it 
is followed by hopes for the improvement in the future. Their assessments must be influenced 
by her successful facts, although not too many. In the early of her presidency, mass media saw 
Megawati had the competency to create a positive future of Indonesia. The structure of a good 
cabinet, improvement of the economy situation and political condition are the two good 
progresses made by Megawati, which are written by mass media. Unfortunately, in the 
following months of her presidency, Megawati could not be seen as well as in the early time. 
From time to time, media saw Megawati gave bad impression, at least for mass media. Her 
image, day by day, was getting worse for some people, including Indonesian journalists. 
However, for some other peoples, Megawati was still the president with all her competencies 
and capabilities. 
As explained before, in the early of her presidency the image of Megawati was 
constructed positively by people. However, the prior presidents had also the kind of positive 
image. It is usual phenomenon that a president, in the early of their presidency, is constructed 
in a positive way by people. It is because in the early time, generally people see the presidents 
with all positive hopes. Table 28 shows the reputation of the three Presidents, based on their 
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Table 28 








                         
                     (Source: SKH Kompas, Monday 25th July 2005)40
 
 
The table above displays that the decreasing of their image on publics was experienced by all 
presidents. The credibility of Megawati in the first nine months of her presidency was better 
that those of KH Abdurrahman Wahid. It means that the reputation of Megawati on publics 
was positive for the half of the respondents, especially in the three aspects: economy, social 
prosperity, politic and security, law. The respondents saw that Megawati have made positive 
changes in the three aspects. However, this number of respondents who gave positive image 
for Megawati in the first nine months was decreasing from those in the first three months and 
six months. Of course, it is not only Megawati’s experience. Gus Dur and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY), the next presidents, had the same experience.41  
In addition, the reputation and credibility of the presidents is always following the 
certain political and social situation. For media, the image of Gus Dur and the political and 
social situation was very identical, especially in the end of his administration and in the early of 
Megawati’s administration. Mass media, at that time, wrote that the situations under the two 
presidents were not quite positive. It happened, perhaps because of the two presidents held the 
power in the same situation of time, that is, the time of transition, the time of crisis which was 
full of uncertainty and unexpected changing, the time when the uncertainty and instability have 
been transforming into the reversed situation. Table 29 describes the social and political 
                                                 
40 Table 29 was constructed, refers to the public polling was performed by research and development team of 
KOMPAS on 16-17 July 2005. This data were gathered by telephone to 1650 respondents in the age min.17 
years old, by systematical method, quoted from current phone book. Respondent were living in  32 capital 
cities in Indonesia. The number of respondent was determined by proportionally sampling, The precision of 
estimation is 95%, sampling error is  +/- 2.4%.   
41 At the first state address of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the first ten months of his presidency, he 
said that there were many progresses mad by him and his cabinet. Contrarily, publics said in reverse. By 
research performed by Media Indonesia, in the economy aspect, people assessed that there is no significant 
progress, especially in the field of goods prices and man power, even though in another aspects, law enforcing, 
security and social prosperity, people have the same assessment with those of the president (Media Indonesia, 
22nd 2005).    
 
 
Gus Dur Megawati SBY 
Economy 52% 58% 77.5% 
Social Prosperity 54.2% 63.10% 78.6% 
Politic and Security  52.6% 60.2% 81.9% 
Law 54,7% 55.7% 82.3% 
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situation of Megawati -- compares to those of Gus Dur -- which is written on the News 
Editorials of Kompas and Media Indonesia, two national newspapers.  
 
Table 29 
Indonesian Political Situations 
 (Based on Kompas) 
 
(Source: Kompas and Media Indonesia 2001-2002) 
             
 
Based on the comparison, it can be said that there is no significant improvement of the social 
and political situation made by Gus Dur and Megawati. What occurred in the time of Gud Dur, 
was still ongoing in the time of Megawati. In the two periods of time, we can see that the 
government, assessed by media, failed to reform, to eliminate the impacts of crisis and to 
improve the social and political situation. However, mass media saw that the failure was not 
only because of the incompetence and incapability of the presidents and the cabinets, but also 
because of the weaknesses of the people and another governmental institutions.  
 
 
3.3.2.2. Period of 2002-2004 
 
Is there any improvement for Megawati’s image on public in the ongoing time of her 
presidency? The hottest issue in 2002 was the Bali bombing that happened on October 12th 
2002, one year after WTC bombing in New York happened on September 11th 2001. The 
second event substantially has no relation directly to the Indonesia, but, in fact, the situation as 
an impact of this event was spreading to Indonesia. The efforts of United States (US) to against 
terrorism by attacking Afghanistan, the country thought as the hiding place of Osama bin 
Laden, was interpreted by some parts of Indonesian people as one of US’s efforts against Islam. 





Government failed to reform People were wild, entity was weak, government   
was  powerless  
Government fought for power, not for 
reformation 
Parliament was a source of problem, not center of 
problem solution  
Military was not professional   Politic was full of mistakes 
Military was easy to be intervened by publics Politicians were not committed 
President disseminated threat of disintegration There was no supremacy of law 
Democracy meant politic of  ‘mass fighting’ President was not sensitive to the public voices 
Democracy meant fighting by violence President was feudalistic  
Demonstration means anarchism  
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religion conflict oriented – issues, made the situation in  Indonesia was not conducive for crisis 
resolution and reformation. This situation was exacerbated by Bali bombing one year later. It 
made people focused their attention more on the attitude and action of Megawati in reaction to 
the crucial events. Inter-religion relation is the one of sensitive issues for Indonesia because of 
its pluralism.  So, the two events are understood as a kind of terrorism, were very important 
works for Megawati to be handled in the early of her administration, together with her main 
task, solve the crisis and reform the nation. Terrorism, therefore, can be said not only as the 
one of triggered factors of the crisis, but also, the one of inhibiting factors of crisis resolution 
and reformation. How Megawati and his cabinet handled the terrorism as a part of the 
government’s efforts in crisis resolution was being the one part of people assessment of the 
government’s performance.  
One hundred days of her administration, the performance of Megawati and her cabinet 
became a focus of the people assessment. Based on the performance, publics saw that 
Megawati, in the following years, did not make good progress. Her image, as constructed by 
mass media, was getting worse, and kept declining.  Here are the media assessment of 
Megawati’s capability after 100 days she held the power. 
 
“Not good, is different from the performance in the first month. President is assessed as 
not active leader in performing the administration and the leadership in crisis resolution. 
People said that the President was silent. President made people impressed that she was 
passive.” (Kompas, November 20th 2001). 
 
“One hundred days are too short to make assessment of the government’s performance. 
But, one hundred days is not a short time to create impression or image on publics about 
the performance’s government and her cabinet. Honestly, it is not our expectation. The 
policies are not visible, even for the people. People did not see that there was 
coordination. People said, government’s coordination was implemented only in the form 
of meeting, discussion, and brainstorming. Not yet visible the performance and actively, 
comprehensively, coordinated responses and get things done, are really implemented.” 
(Kompas, November 27th 2001). 
 
The negative assessment from the people to the Megawati and her cabinet’s performance still 
happened in the following time of her presidency. The policies, decisions and actions by 
Megawati were often called as useless rumor, just promises and rhetoric. It was not easy to 
avoid that media often was doubtful about the president’s statements about the policies or 
actions that would be done.  
 
“Not many people trust about the statements of the President in the end year   address 
that Megawati Soekarnoputri will proclaim to eradicate corruption, collusion and 
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nepotism (KKN-ind) […]. The skeptical attitude is based on the fact that the practices of 
KKN are not eliminated, but in contrast, it is getting worse.” (Kompas, January 9th 2002). 
 
“The performance of Megawati and her administration has not been satisfied yet. For the 
economy area, 75.7 per cent of the respondents was not satisfied. For the social 
prosperity, 68.5 per cent said not satisfied, politic and security 54.1 per cent was not 
satisfied also. Most of us also had the same impression. Publics were waiting for and not 
satisfied. The right policies and actions were not implemented yet. There is tendency, is 
the incompetence of current problems, was contrast to the fact that the government was 
busy preparing money politics for the next general election 2004. It is the transition to 
the wrong direction.” (Kompas, January 29th 2002). 
 
“Just for instance, Megawati who has hold the power just for one year, the one of her 
functions as president is economy recovery, especially for eliminating the actions of 
corruption. But what does happen? When she accomplishes the function, there are many 
cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism that are not yet resolved. The public trust 
was declined. The quality of her leadership was decreased. Nurcholis Madjid sees 
Megawati is not communicative, the head of Indonesian Representative People Assembly 
gives her score 5.95.” (Kompas, July 26th 2002). 
 
“It is really the politics. It is usual if there is any factor and other consideration, these are 
political factor and politics. For many times, including us, media have given opinion and 
reminded the government about their weaknesses, weak in their figure, intelligence, and 
the art of leadership. Related to this, for example, the persuasion of the president to get 
used to working hard and living modestly, at least creates any question, is Megawati 
serious with this persuasion, is this persuasion credible? So far, the willingness and its 
spirit are not shown by the government’s behavior itself. In contrast, people see the 
government behaves in the reverse side.” (Kompas, January 14th 2003). 
 
“Even though the improvements are displayed, including the increasing of the number of 
conflicts resolutions in the several areas, but, in general, the national life is unstable yet.” 
(Kompas, January 14th 2003). 
 
“If during five years the people’s disappointment has not reduced, but increased 
[…]…has not been out from the economy, social, security and public order yet […] 
Except for the economy aspect, people concern deeply on the law enforcement, 
prevention and actions against corruption, collusion and nepotism. The complain is 
connecting to public order and security, which is relating to the daily activities of people 
and the protection and safety guarantee for investors…This dissatisfaction is not only in 
the area of government’s administration and the ministers performing but also in the area 
of the leadership.” (Kompas, May 20th 2003). 
 
“The Republic of Indonesia looks like being stagnant in the latest year. Even in the area 
of security, we must admit that our condition gets worse. If it is not, how dare of the 
terrorists exploded bombs in Bali, in JW Marriot and the other places in the same year? 
…The first step of the government which was informed the day after the bombing could 
be seen more as a warning to the potential bombing target, than as a warning for the 
potential actor of the next planned bombing.” (Kompas, August 16th 2003). 
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“Even though we have been living in the era of reformation and democratization, the 
President Megawati and her administration (including police, military and attorney) are 
not able to eradicate all corruptions. Neither nor the General Attorney and the Ministry 
of Justice and Human Rights.” (Kompas, October 4th 2003). 
 
“The change of the President and administration always bring about the opportunity for 
us to reach the expectation better…However, we know that the expectation is still as an 
expectation. We always failed to implement the expectation to be the facts which give us 
prosperity. There are many improvements but that is not enough for this nation to come 
out from crisis.” (Kompas, September 22nd 2003). 
 
The media statements about Megawati and her cabinet as written above show that the image of 
the President and her administration is not quite positive. There are some positive statements, 
particularly about the progresses made by Megawati in crisis resolution and reformation in the 
area economy. The positive statements about economy are mentioned by media particularly in 
the early of her administration. However, the progress in economy is not enough for Indonesia 
to come out from crisis. It needs improvement in all aspect and all dimensions because crisis in 
Indonesia is multidimensional crisis. Unfortunately, media did not write about the progress the 
rest areas. It is different from Megawati’s statements. In her state address, she said that 
Indonesia was successful in eradicating the crisis and restoring the image of the nation. There 
are contradicted assessments between government and media when talking about crisis and 
crisis resolution. Table 30 shows the comparison of Megawati statements about her 
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Table 30 




(Source: Editorial of KOMPAS 2003-2004, and textual speeches of Megawati 2003-2004) 
    
 
The table clearly shows us that there is contradicted assessment to the performance of the 
government in crisis resolution. In one side, Megawati said the government was quite successful 
in crisis resolution, but in another side, media emphasized their reportage on the weaknesses 
and the failures of Megawati and her cabinet in crisis resolution, Indonesian image restoration 
and reformation. 
Based on public relations perspective, the contradiction above is one indicator of the 
disharmonious relationship between the president and media. In the context of public relations, 
the harmonious relationship between institution and media is characterized by, at least, the 
capability of the institution to persuade media, to and not to publish something as the 
institution wants. It means that in the perspective of institution or organization, media will be 
effective if they want to emphasize on the positive side of the things, not on the negative side. 
It does not mean that media must manipulate the fact, ignore to publish something bad or 
wrong about an institution. The harmonious relationship between media and the organization 
must be represented by the willingness of the media to compose a bad thing of the organization 
in a positive way and consider the time of the reportage carefully.  
In other way, the contradiction shows that there is different interest between the two 
parties. President must defense her image and reputation of her cabinet, whereas the media 
President’s statements  Media’s statements 
The national life was getting established  Government and its all related institutions have 
failed to eliminate the corruption, collusion and 
nepotism.  
The condition of monetary and economy, 
particularly in macro economy is going 
better.    
The performance of the President was not  
satisfying people. 
The threat of disintegration and problems 
related to democracy and human right can be 
reduced.  
The President was passive, not responsive. 
The improvement of the politic and security 
stability.  
The Indonesian security worsened.  
We have actually achieved a lot all this time The government administration and development, 
and the leadership were disappointing.     
Since the last three years we have done a lot, 
and the positive results are a lot, too. 
Government has failed to reform, to solve the 
crisis and also to improve the social prosperity.  
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have interest to be professional, do their social role function such as informing, educating and 
social controlling. President thinks it is important to create positive image on publics, 
particularly in the time around the general election will be taken place.  To keep her good image 
on publics Megawati used the avoiding strategy to respond to the public criticism. Based on all 
statements made by her, in the end of her administration, avoiding strategy was implemented 
by Megawati in many kinds of form; (1) avoiding to admit that the government also contributed 
to the existence of the crisis and lengthened the duration of the crisis resolution; (2) shifting the 
blame to the Indonesian people; and (3) saying that the crisis in Indonesia was more difficult to 




According to the strategies applied by the two presidents – HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie – and 
its contextual factors, it can be seen the structure is more dominant than the agency in crisis 
communication strategy choice. Both adaptive and defensive strategies are made on the basis of 
the structural context.  In crisis, HM Soeharto preferred to establish the exixted structure. 
However, BJ Habibie was more innovative and active in the certain cases. He made new 
actions, did not follow the existed structure but tried to create a new structure. Different from 
both presidents, Megawati, in the case of multidimensional crisis, used two strategies. In early 
time, she used accommodative or adaptive strategy.  However, in the end of her presidency, she 
applied defensive strategy. At that time, publics and media frequently criticized her, regarding to 
her efforts to resolve the crisis. They saw that Megawati failed to solve crisis quickly. To 
encounter that   assessment, Megawati tended to be defensive. She shifted the blame to the 
Indonesian people mentality, other institution and media people for the failure. What strategy 
did she choose for other cases, for instance in case of terrorism and corruption? What was the 
context for all the strategy choices?  How did media people and publics see Megawati’s effort in 
dealing with this issue?  The answer is explained in the following chapters. 
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CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 





During her presidency (2001-2004) the two biggest issues handled by Megawati were the 
increasing of the number of bombing and the corruption actions. The two issues worsened the 
crisis and the crisis resolution. These were also the crucial issues for Megawati related to her 
image establishment on internal or external publics. Actually those were not only faced by 
Megawati, but almost all the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia face it too. It means that 
the terrorism and the corruption are the ongoing issues and problems for every president in 
crisis resolution. The problems were also not exclusively belonged to the presidents or their 
administration but they also are belonged to the other related institutions, such the law 
enforcement institutions and other related governmental institutions. For the two cases 
mentioned, Indonesian National Police and Attorney Institution got involved in these issues. 
How Megawati, along with the other related institutions, responded to the issues was very 
sensitive and it influenced her image and reputation building on publics.  
Below I analyzed the communication did by Megawati in responding to these issues. I 
would like to know how Megawati responded to  terrorism and corruption. It is a part of the 
efforts to explore the crisis communication strategy of Megawati, especially the strategy to 
restore and to construct her image on Indonesian and international publics when her reputation 
was questioned by national and international publics through the Indonesian mass media.      
  
4. 2. TERRORISM 
4.2.1. Bomb Terror: Megawati’s Reaction  
 
In the reformation era, there were a number of bomb blasts occurred in several different areas 
in Indonesia. There are more than 80 cases of bombing in the period of 1998 – 2005 (Ekspose, 
July 2005). Not all bomb blasting was a part of terrorist actions or terrorism. As written before, 
relies on the Indonesian National Police’s point of view, there were only a few of them can be 
said clearly as terrorism actions (Indonesian National Police, Annual Report 2004)42. The 
                                                 
42  There are many cases of bombing. Based on police investigation, beside as the action of terrorists, bombing 
might be caused by business, personal, and ethnic conflict (internal, local problems or conflicts), beside by the 
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several big bombings which were categorized as terrorism actions in Indonesia during 
Megawati’s administration were Bali Bombing43 (2002), J.W. Marriot Hotel, Jakarta (2003), 
Australian Embassy Building, Jakarta (2004). The table 31 is a list of bomb blasts occurred in 
2000-2005.  They were predicted as a part of global terrorism action. 
 
Table 31 
The Bomb Terrors in Indonesia 
2000-2005 
 
 No Date  Places Detail 
1 August 1st 2000 Home of Philippines Ambassador, Jakarta 2 people died 
2 September 13th 2000 Building of Jakarta Stock Exchange, Jakarta 10 people died 
3 December 24th 2000 Several areas in Indonesia 16 people died 
4 September 23rd 2001 Atrium Senen Plaza, Jakarta -- 
5 October 12th 2001 The Restaurant of KFC, Makassar -- 
6 November 6th 2001  Australian School, Jakarta -- 
7 January 1st 2002 The Restaurant of Bulungan, Jakarta  1 person died 
8 October 12th 2002 Kuta, Bali 202 people died 
9 December 5th 2002 The Restaurant MCDonald, Makassar 3 people died 
10 April 27th 2003 Cengkareng Airport -- 
11 August 5th 2003 Hotel J.W. Marriot, Jakarta 11 people died 
12 September 9th 2004 Australian Embassy, Jakarta 5 people died 
13 June 8th 2005 Home of Abu Jibril, Pamulang Tangerang -- 
14 October 1st 2005  Kuta, Bali 22 people died 
Source : Kompas, November 10th 2005  
 
 
Terrorism has developed and become the hottest public issue since the World Trade Center 
Bombing in New York, September 11th 2001. Even though the bombing did not occur in 
Indonesia, its impact spread into this country. Since the President of US, George W Bush, 
claimed that the actor behind the bomb blast was Osama Bin Laden, USA decided to attack 
Afghanistan, the country where Osama hides. The attacking to Afghanistan by the US was 
labeled as against terrorism. It was interpreted in the different way by different countries and 
nations. This decision was interpreted by some people in Indonesia as an effort of US against 
Islam.  It is a sensitive issue for Indonesian people since the majority of Indonesian is Moslem 
and Indonesia was also multi cultural country. It is very important and sensitive for Megawati 
                                                                                                                                                      
terrorism acts. For some cases, the police could not find the exactly motives of those bombing and for many 
cases, Indonesian National Police has not identified and arrested yet the actor (s) behind the action.         
43  Bali was bombed again in October 2005. Recorded, 22 people were dead and hundred’s people get injured. 
It happened in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the president of the Republic of Indonesia after 
Megawati.   
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and her cabinet because her response and reaction to the issues would be a triggered factor for 
the raising of broader issues, such as the relation among ethnics, religions, races and groups44.    
How the government reacts to these issues created the image of the president and her 
administration. On the case of WTC bombing and attacking of US to Afghanistan, Megawati 
showed her attitude and response by her statements on the Ascension Day of the Prophet 
Muhammad SAW, October 14th 2001. These are her statements. 
 
“The spreading of the symptoms of violence, brutality and terrorism, as happening now, 
have driven us to think again what is wrong with our life. Are our patient and humanity 
on limit, so the goals must be attained by the violent way or even by terror, and finally 
killed the humanity itself?”    
  
“Human civilization really has a record that war is assumed as the last appropriate answer 
to restore the justice. There is no one or nation wants to receive injustice.   Moral, as 
taught by Nabi Muhammad Shallalahuallahi Wassalam is the direction that the 
oppression and the disgracing to the justice are wrong. This direction drives for the 
raising of social solidarity for the justice recovery. But the moral and civilization give the 
boundary: when and how far a war is appropriate to do, so war as a best method is not 
necessarily applied, even if it will cause of human indignity and disgrace the justice.”  
 
“Everything has to lie down on the rules. No one or no group in this society or even in 
this nation is able to make their own measurement or rules, when they are permitted to 
use violence and even use it for attacking the other parts. Life institutions of modern 
world also have made the legitimated rules and regulations about war. Ignoring the rules, 
finally we just create a picture that violence and the other forms of terror.”  
 
“It is difficult to imagine what will happen if everybody or group or nation is permitted 
to make everybody own rules or measurement to determine what is true or is not, and 
then decide to attack the other parts. It will be awful for this world if everybody is 
permitted to do it, even more if then he or she creates his own formula to make it right 
for everything they have done. In the same way, the solidarity that is made must be 
moving on the right way.  Without vigilance, it finally drives the solidarity to the edge of 
injustice.”  
 
“Moral has to be maintained in order to enlighten the rationality of the people, so they 
do not believe that “blood can be cleaned by blood.” As a civilized nation, we do not 
need to build the assumption that violence has to be responded by violence.”  
 
“Where ever and when ever all kinds of violence, includes terrorism, have to be 
eliminated. No one in the world will accept it. Whoever the actor of violence or terror 
must receive punishment. It is a principle. The actor of violence and terror and any party 
who protects them must be taken to the trial and they have to obey the common and 
general law. The person or the group or even the government, could not be able and 
                                                 
44 In Indonesian term, it is called as SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan antar Golongan). This issue was very 
sensitive for Indonesian public, so, there are several regulations in the several aspects of Indonesian life is 
supposed to avoid this issue.   
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permitted to chase and arrest the actors of violence and then without any clear reason 
they attack the other nation or countries. As I said before, there is a legal rule and 
measurement in the world that have to be obeyed. Without it, the purpose to fight 
against violence can slip to be the violence actions and new terror.” 
 
Based on her speech, we can see that Megawati very definitely supported everybody or every 
country to fight against terrorism and terrorist. She did not deny that terrorism did not bring 
welfare to the people  and the world. However, Megawati said that fighting terrorism or 
terrorist must be controlled by the rules, common rules, rules that were legitimated by all 
countries. She emphasized that a country, by the reason of against terrorism, used its own 
measurement to fight another country was similar to the terrorist itself.  
 Her speeches were clearly directed to the United States. Actually, the decision and 
response of US, caused by WTC bombing, created various reactions from several countries, 
including Indonesia. As a multi cultural country, Indonesia gave the big reaction. It was seen as 
the problem of the “Islam-Christian Relation”. This kind perception has impact on the 
developing of “Anti America issues or movements.” The relation among different religions in 
Indonesia, in a certain time, has been shaken by this event. Indonesia has been threatened by 
national disintegration. It is difficult for Megawati to leave her position. In one side, she must 
give clear position on the case of terrorism, but on other side, she also must respond to the 
issue of “Islam – Christian relation”. Based on this situation, Megawati made her speech to 
ensure the Indonesian publics that she and the Indonesian government has opposed the 
domination of the certain religion over the other religion. She also ensured to the international 
publics that she and the government supported to all efforts in fighting terrorist. Although she 
tried, it seemed so difficult to her to convince Indonesian people about terrorism. In fact, the 
acts of terrorism often manifested as religion symbols.45
 Megawati responses were asserted again when she gave the speech in the National 
Christmas Celebration, December 27, 2001. 
 
“…The national life in the several countries pretends to be moving backward and 
threaten by terror, which is not so clear who the actors are and when it will happen. The 
same situation has been experienced by Indonesia. We really must do something, not 
only for purifying, but also correcting the mistakes and faults, something that we have 
done so far is restructuring our life to be better future.” 
                                                 
45 Terrorism for the terrorist are often viewed as the fighting against Islam. Terrorists view their action as a 
part of holy war, fighting to protect their religions. The effort of US to fight terrorism by attacking Afghanistan 
was interpreted by terrorist was the effort of US attacked Islam. US was also viewed by the terrorists as a 
symbol of Christian.     
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“There have been so many victims and there will be more victims in the future if we do 
not do something to improve this situation.”  
 
“We do not need to be pessimistic to face this situation. We have a rational capability, 
both to identify the problem –how difficult it is – and to give the resolution alternatives. 
What we need is the courage from the various ideology, class, and groups to formulate 
the best decision, how hard it is now.” 
 
Through her speech, she wanted the publics to know about her attitude and responses about 
terrorism. She had tried to ensure all publics that the terrorism issue was an international issue, 
that the terrorism and its impacts might be experienced by all countries in the world, including 
Indonesia. Megawati rejected, through her statements, that the terrorism was not a part of the 
religious or holy action. She created this kind of statement not only for building positive image 
on the international publics about terrorism but also for muffling the Islam fundamentalist 
movements that tended to interpret the attack of US to Afghanistan as the effort of Christian 
to fight Islam. Megawati wanted to meet the two interests or take herself in a safety position. It 
is also indicated by the time and places she selected to convey the messages. It was in the 
religious occasions, Moslem and Christian Holidays.  
In a few international occasions or in the meeting with the overseas leaders, she asked to 
the other countries for establishing and enforcing international cooperation to fight against 
terrorism. Her statements can be seen, as below: 
 
“We love our country, so we expect to create the public security, orderliness, and peace. 
[…] Therefore, relating to the international terrorism threats which are dangerous for the 
establishment of world peace, Indonesia still keeps our commitment to fight against 
terrorism. […] We believe that the cooperation between two countries, along with the 
international communities can eradicate terrorism.” (Megawati, February 13th 2002). 
 
“…To establish peace, security and stability, we have very strong will to face all threats, 
including terrorism, along with ASEAN countries and the other countries.”(Megawati, 
April 25th 2002). 
 
“In this time, His Excellency can trade on the Indonesian support in implementing the 
various initiatives of United Nations, including […] common efforts to fight against 
international terrorism […]” (Megawati, May 17th 2002). 
 
“[…] and with looking at our several challenges, I command to the personnel of 
Indonesian National Police to […] (4) keeps on guard and anticipates to the various form 
and methods of transnational crimes, including terrorism.” (Megawati, July 1st 2002). 
 
“In 2002 the policies, programs and activities with regard to politics and security are 
mainly focused on the following agenda: […] Third, restoring security and public order, 
including combating terrorism, both from the international perspective as a member of 
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UN, as well as from the national perspective with a view to protecting the public safety 
and maintaining national security…” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002) 
 
“[…] aware of its bad impact, we commit to fight terrorism. But, in the fast changing 
world and the international relations were borderless, nothing to do, except building the 
international cooperation.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003). 
 
“Thinking of the huge causes, recently all nations in the world commit, that whatever the 
background, reasons and goals are, we realize that the terrorism can happen in any time,  
any where and done by  any one.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003) 
 
“The old challenge which becomes the new source of public anxiety is terrorism and not 
traditional security threats […]. The plan of regional action to solve the problems was 
made so long time as a part of and result of functional cooperation of ASEAN, but this 
cooperation is not equitable anymore in fighting terrorism, as happened in US and Bali. 
The two tragedies remind the world about the danger of the international terrorism […]. 
Based on Indonesian perspective […] it needs global coalition, that involves every nation, 
every societies, religion and culture to fight terrorism.” (Megawati, August 8th 2003). 
 
“We have to continue our cooperation for establishing the world structure which is more 
fair, prosperous and secure. Not only for handling the threats of regional and 
international instability, but also fighting against terrorism […]” (Megawati, January 24th 
2004).  
 
“…Right now, we feel the importance of the cooperation enthusiasm. It has directed and 
will guide us to face the threats of terrorism […]. The cooperation among nations, both 
regional and international, to fight terrorism becomes very important, as well as to 
eliminate the source of violence and terrorism.” (Megawati, February 4th 2004). 
 
“…I have unequivocally stated our position against terrorism. Yet, more important, on 
that occasion we also expressed that it would be more effective if we, the developed and 
developing countries, all co-operate in assessing, investigating, and eliminating the root 
causes that in truth are the sources of terrorism itself.” (Megawati, June 21st 2004). 
 
From her speeches, Megawati wanted to show to the publics that she and the government did 
not keep quiet but did quickly responsive reaction to the terrorism issues. She also ensured to 
the publics that she and the government were not passive and slow in reacting the issues. She 
rejected the critiques from people and Indonesian mass media that she and the government 
were always doubtful to take the position and actions. She just wanted to be careful in facing a 
very sensitive issue and situation.    
 The issues of terrorism became a deeper concern for Megawati and the Indonesian 
government since Bali bombing, one year later. It was the bombing, after the several bombing 
happened in the several areas of Indonesia. Some of the bombing were directed to the churches 
and mosques as the symbol of religions. And then, it is  placed as the conflict among religion 
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communities. At that time, the government was assessed not capable to identify the actors of 
bombing and not seriously handle it. The credibility of Megawati and the government was not 
good in this area. Bali bombing was the big stimuli for Megawati in building her credibility on 
publics. The responses of Megawati were very sensitive reaction for her image building.   
Bali bombing happened on October 12, 2002. It caused 200 people death and hundreds 
people were injured. The deeper concern to fight against terrorism can be indicated by the 
producing of Antiterrorism Regulation; that was Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang/ 
Perppu Antiterrorisme, which was legalized to be UU Antiterorisme (Antiterrorism Rules). The deep 
concern to the fighting of terrorism was shown formally by Megawati in her speech in the end 
of 2002, two months after the occurrence of the rules. She said as below:  
 
“While we were still trying to establish political stability and security, in 2002 we were 
shocked by bomb blasting in Bali that killed many innocent people and   tourists. Our 
security personnel were successful in identifying the actors, based on hard fact evident and 
accurate acknowledgement. We hope that the network of the terrorists can be identified 
deeper until we could find the main actors and all actors behind it. The Government has 
published two government regulations about terrorism and also submitted several draft of 
Rules for implementing this regulation.” (Megawati, December 31’2002) 
 
“That is our commitment. Through this occasion, I want to reconfirm our decision to the 
all leaders and nations from my neighbor countries, that we are really very serious about 
it.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003). 
   
“Through this event, we convey our message that how very much bitter the impact of 
terrorism, absolutely it did not discourage us to make the next steps to fight the threats of 
the human and their civilization. We are never doubtful to face it.” (Megawati, February 
4th 2004).    
 
In 2003 Megawati was continuing to give the statements, relating to the terrorism issues and 
especially to the Bali Bombing46. It was done by Megawati persistently particularly to respond 
or react to the impact of Bali Bombing to the Indonesian image on international publics and 
her image on internal publics. The main messages were that Indonesia has committed to fight 
against terrorism and asked for establishing cooperation among nation. Megawati also 
                                                 
46 In 2003 there were many bomb blasts in many areas.  Few of those actions have relation to the national and 
international terrorism and some actions were driven by personal motifs or conflicts among religion 
communities. But all bomb blasting can be called as the terror by bomb, because those have made the 
spreading of fear on publics. After Bali Bombing, there were more than fifteen bomb blasts in Menado (Oct 
12’02) , Makassar (Dec 5’02), Ambon (Dec 12’02), Ambon (Jan 14’03), Jakarta (February 3’03), Medan 
(March 31’03), Jakarta (April 24’03), Jakarta (April 27’03), Aceh (June 30’03), Jakarta (July 14’03), Aceh 
(July 25’03), Poso (August 7’03), Jakarta (September 5’03), Poso (September 12’03), Aceh (Dec 31’03). The 
bombing that occurred on JW Marriot Hotel, Jakarta (September 5’03), and Australian Embassy Building 
(2004), Bali Bombing Second (2005) were the bomb blasts which are indicated as a part of terrorism action.        
  
                                                                                        162  
persuaded Indonesian people that terrorism was not a part of holy activities, it did not have any 
connection and relation to the religious movement. 
 
“Even though all the actors of terrorism said that the actions are relating to the Islam, 
however it is clear that Islam or Islam communities have no relation with their terrorism 
actions. Both the government officials and law enforcement personnel and also Islam 
community their selves can distinguish the two things above.” (Megawati, July 1st 2003).    
 
On January 20th 2003, Megawati spoke on the international forum. She spoke about terrorism 
and the government position on this issue. Similar to her responses before, Megawati clearly 
stated that Indonesia needed the other countries’ commitment to cooperate in fighting 
terrorism. She stated also the very bad impact of the terrorism for Indonesia. Megawati asked 
for the understanding of the other countries that Indonesia was a victim of terrorism, not a 
country where must be punished as a place of the terrorists.       
 
“Terrorism is the reality that is occurring now in our life, both in the level of national and 
international. Its impacts are not only the anxiety or panic, but also, more essential, the 
threat of humanity. The one of its characteristics that the terrorism does not distinguish 
the target and the victims who tended to be massive and innocent, make the terrorism is 
going to be a real crime for humanity. […] However, in the same time we really 
understand that the terrorism has indeed destroyed our public orderliness, security and 
social equilibrium. Insecurity which has been experienced by people has driven to the 
raising of distrust among people, or groups in the society. […]  In Indonesia, we really 
experience it. The nationhood, we have built based on the pluralism, has been totally 
destroyed by the terrorism action. During our efforts to reform our nationhood and 
statehood, which required so many  limited resources, terrorism and its impacts have a 
very bad influence, especially to the our development programs.” (Megawati, January 20th 
2003)       
   
In addition to the messages, Megawati also identified the root problems of terrorism. Referring 
to the root, she offered some suggestions of resolution. She said that the root of terrorism was 
the gap of prosperity among nation, that in turn it caused imbalance. The imbalance among 
nations increases the issues of injustice. And, injustice was predicted as the root of terrorism.  
 
“We realize that in the long step our fight to terrorism will be successful only if we are 
able to eradicate the main source of the terrorism, namely the poverty, apathy, suspicion 
and injustice.” (Megawati, February 13th 2002).   
       
“If it is true that the injustice or the social, political or economy discrepancy in our 
national and international institutions were becoming the root of terrorism actions, we 
have to be aware that to solve terrorism will be a very long time. Possibly, we, ourselves, 
will not be sure, when we are able to totally eradicate the terrorism.” (Megawati, January 
20th 2003). 
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“Terrorism also has the root cause in injustice. This is our understanding from the very 
beginning, when the world was shocked by a series of those odious acts. Whatever the 
motives of reasons, we repudiate terrorism as a means or excuse to achieve an objective. 
We believe that no issue can be resolved by resorting to acts of terror. In addition to 
inflicting innocent victim losses, in our view, terror will only beget other acts of terror.” 
(Megawati, June 21st 2004) 
 
Megawati also said that the travel warning or travel ban given by a few governments for 
Indonesia exactly was not consistent to the commitment to fight against terrorism. This 
suggestion or policies causes two things; (1) international publics are afraid or doubtful to visit 
Indonesia and (2) internal publics feel insecure because the travel warning can be interpreted 
that Indonesia was really not secure. The two things above cause the very bad impact for 
Indonesian tourism and positive impact for the terrorists. Terrorists will feel successful with 
their action, spreading fear.  
Supporting to her statement that Indonesia was very committed to fight terrorism, 
Megawati asked and commanded to the Indonesian National Police to investigate the terrorism 
actions, find out the actors and execute them. It was said by her for many times, and in many 
occasions, especially in the international events. She always tried to ensure the other countries 
that Indonesia was indeed serious and concern with this kind of problem. For the internal 
publics, she repeatedly said that the terrorism was not a holy war, and it was also not a part of 
religious activities. By giving this statement, Megawati avoid the bad impact of her action to the 
political and social stability. She also tried to anticipate the existing of social disintegration.  
In the later speeches, Megawati started to emphasize her messages on the hard efforts of 
the government and security apparatus in anticipating, preventing, investigating and executing 
the actors of terrorism, and also on the positive result of it. The success story of the 
government and Indonesian National Police was shown by her statement about who the actors 
of terrorism are. It was an indication that Indonesia was able to identify the actors. 
 
“The Indonesian National Police, along with the security personnel, have worked so hard 
to ward off and eradicate the terrorism in this country, especially on the case of Bali 
Bombing that happened in the end of last year. Even though they have to face many 
difficulties, work so hard, be patient and diligent, their works begin to be successful. 
Honestly, I am proud of their hard working and capability. Beside being able to arrest 
some people who were suspected as the terrorism actors, they were successful finding 
the terrorism networking.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003) 
         
“In the case of terrorism, now we have taken the corrective action quickly, by publishing 
the Antiterrorism Regulation, investigating and executing the suspected terrorism actors 
in the court.  One thing that needs to be concerned is about the specific pattern of the 
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terrorism action in Indonesia. Almost all the actors, planners or executer are Indonesian 
people. The planner has been living in and under the protection of a certain country – or 
even as the citizen of other countries, where as the executers have been living in their 
home country.” (Megawati, July 1st 2003)  
 
“Now, like or dislike, believe it or not, based on the whole process of investigation, we 
realize that our country was not only the target of the action but also the country   where 
the several actors come from,  as planners, executers and supporters. They are not many 
but their fanaticism of the extreme dogma, which not respect to publics’ property and 
their souls, and not distinguish the target […] really causes domestic terrorism action, as 
a part of international terrorism. It is beginning to be the very dangerous threats.” 
(Megawati, July 1st 2003). 
 
“We are never doubtful to face it. We chase after, arrest, investigate and execute the 
terrorism actors. Our law enforcement officials have been working so fast and our court, 
by strong hearts have given fair punishment to them. The part of them is still on going 
trial process, while the security and law enforcement personnel were still remaining to 
chase after the terrorism actors and their followers.” (Megawati, February 4th 2004). 
 
“[…] even though shocked by the horrified reality, we have to thank to and proud of the 
Indonesian National Police personnel and all the intelligent communities. Together with 
the law enforcement and security apparatus, our police have been able to do their duty 
very well. They are able not only to find out the terrorist and the strategic planner, but 
also take them to the court. I hope this achievement will be maintained   and improved, 
as we are helped by the security personnel from our neighbor countries.” (Megawati, July 
3rd 2004). 
 
“The courage and capability, and competency of the Adhyaksa, along with the Indonesian 
National Police personnel and security apparatus in bringing the actors of Bali and 
Jakarta bombing to the court were not a small achievement. In contrast, the concrete 
action to bring the actors and proceed them in the court have made this country and the 
government to be the first in the world which is consistent and strong to fight 
terrorism.” (Megawati, July 22nd 2004).             
 
The statements about the success of Indonesian apparatus in eradicating terrorism were 
purposed to refuse the international assumption that Indonesia was not serious about 
terrorism47. The international publics did not quite believe it because Indonesia did not take 
immediate movement to respond to their suggestions. It is indicated by several things, such as 
(1) avoiding the other government warning about the possibility of the occurrence of the 
                                                 
47 The successful investigation of terrorism by the government, along with the Indonesian National Police and 
The Indonesian Armed Forces was indicated by their success in arresting and executing the terrorism actors, 
for instance, are Amrozy and Imam Samudra. In 2005 they will be executed, by punishment: death sentence. 
However, until the end of Megawati presidency and Dai Bachtiar as Head of Indonesian National Police 
leadership, the two of very important terrorist actors, Dr. Azahari and Nurdin M Top, could not be arrested yet. 
But, in November 9th 2005, Dr Azahari, claimed by the Indonesian National Police, was dead after the armed 
attack between terrorist and the Police in Malang, East Jawa. In this time, the Indonesian President was Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and  as the Head of Indonesian National Police is General (Pol) Sutanto.        
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terrorism actions in some areas in Indonesia; (2) prohibiting or liquidating the group of Jamaah 
Islamiyah (JI) that was predicted that exists in Indonesia and suspected as a apart of terrorism 
network in Asia. In Indonesia itself, the two suggestions above, for some parts of Indonesian 
people, have been interpreted as the international or overseas intervention to the Indonesian 
problem solving.   The suggestions were also accepted by some people as the US efforts to 
discredit and fight Islam. Even more, they thought that all terrorism actions in Indonesia were 
engineered by US and its allied countries. For some Indonesian people, it was interpreted that 
Megawati and the government protected US and it was controlled by US.   
 
“The report which contains – once more refers to the Center of Intelligent Agency in 
USA (CIA), the acknowledgement of the bombing action and even the plan of the 
murder of Megawati, were the two very serious plans and actions. But, let you see what 
the reaction of the Indonesian people? Publics did not shock or worried or nervous or 
alert. Very surprisingly, the society reaction tended to be distrustful to and they warned 
the US not to intervene and disturb this country. It existed also the negative reaction 
toward the Indonesian government from many parts of the society. They were 
questioning about the government who easily handed Al-Farouq over to the USA. It was 
also questioned by them how the government was very slow to give comments and 
reaction about it.” (Kompas, September 30th 2002).   
 
For international publics, especially for US, it could be meant that Indonesian government 
protected the terrorism actors. Contrarily, based on Megawati’s perspective, the slowness of 
Indonesian government was representation of the carefulness and respectfulness to the 
Indonesia as a pluralistic nation, as spoken by her below: 
 
“[…] we are really serious about it. The understanding to our social condition and social 
structure drives us to be careful to make step, in order to avoid the damaging of our 
social values of national life.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003). 
 
The careful attitude, mentioned by Megawati, was also relied down on the later statements 
which are shown as the skeptical views of her about the other countries reactions toward the 
terrorism. 
 
“[…] In Indonesia, we are of the belief that in reality only a small dose of honesty and 
courage is needed to uncover the sources that bring about terrorism. Simultaneously, we 
are also convinced that – without such an attitude—what we have been hearing as the 
policy of “the war against terrorism” would easily lose sight of direction. Should this 
situation be allowed to persist, it would not be improbable that the world would fall into 
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There is different perspective about the performance of the Government and Megawati in 
responding to the terrorism and the issues that was developing as the impacts of it. It can be 
seen as there is different interpretation between Megawati, internal publics and international 
publics about terrorism and how well the government and Megawati handled it.   Table 32 is 
the summary of the description above. 
 
Table 32 
Megawati about Terrorism and Bomb Terror in Indonesia 
(Based on her speeches 2001-2004) 
 
 
No Terrorism Megawati’s statements about terrorism Date of the Statement 
1 Impacts • Raising of public anxiety, panic, and the 
developing of the threat of humanity 
• Destroyed our public orderliness, security and 
social equilibrium 
• Insecure, distrust among people 
• Destroyed the Indonesian Nationhood and the 
Statehood 
• Inhibited the national development programs 
• January 20, 2003 
2 Root • Poverty, Apathy, Suspicion, Injustice  
• Social, political, economy gap/imbalance among 
nations 
• Injustice 
• February 13, 2002 
• January 20, 2003 
• June 21, 2004 
3 Responses • Published Antiterrorism Regulations 
• Asked for establishing cooperation among 
nations to fight terrorism 
• Fight against terrorism 
• Chased after, arrested, investigated and took the 
terrorists to the court, not only by Indonesia but 
also the other countries. 
• Explain to the people that terrorism is not a part 
of holy activities and not identical with Islam. 
• Very serious and concern to the terrorism 
• January 20th 2003 





• July 1st 2003 
 
4 Result • Arrested the suspected actors and successful 
finding the terrorism network 
• Able to identify the actors behind the terrorism 
• Successful to chase after, arrest, investigate and 
bring the terrorists to the court  
• January 20th 2003 
 
• July 1st 2003 
 
• February 4th 2004  
• July 3rd 2004 
• July 22nd 2004 
 
 
Based on table 32, it can be said that Megawati and her cabinet saw that the root of terrorism 
was out from Indonesia, it was from outside. It meant that the external factors or international 
situation contributed much more on the high escalating of the terrorism actions. Terrorism that 
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occurred in Indonesia was only a part of international terrorisms, even though Megawati 
admitted that most of the actors of terrorism came from and lived in Indonesia. Referring to 
the root of terrorism, Megawati looked like want to say that there was no internal problem, 
came from Indonesia, as the source of the events. Therefore, when the bomb blast occurred 
again in Hotel of JW Marriot (2003) and Australian Embassy building (2004), it was identified 
as the action of terrorism, Megawati stated that the terror by bomb could be happened  any 
where,  any time and by  any one.48 Even, in USA where the military and police armed were 
very sophisticated, the terrorists could do the terror successfully. In another statement, 
Megawati also mentioned that how good performance of military and the police, if it was not 
supported by the efforts of all Indonesian people, terrors could not be prevented49. By those 
statements, it was very clear that Megawati shifted the blame to the Indonesian people and the 
external factors. The weaknesses of the Indonesian National Police to anticipate the terror 
actions and the failure of them to establish the stability of national security were not the focus 
of Megawati in responding to the action. Therefore, to fight terrorism Megawati always 
persuaded the international publics to concern and establish the global cooperation, and 
persuaded the national publics to be willing to participate in the security efforts.  
 Megawati stated that the terrorism was caused by global and international problems, 
and it was contributed by the unwillingness of the Indonesian people to participate in 
maintaining and establishing the national security. It can be concluded that Megawati used 
dissociate strategy in constructing her image and her cabinet performance. Dissociate strategy 
used by Megawati consisted of two sub strategies, namely (1) placed the terrorism as a little part 
of the bigger world phenomena, so there were no countries could be free from the terrorism 
actions, including Indonesia, and (2) shifted the blame to the other parts, those are (1) the other 
countries, especially the developed countries that were inconsistent to fight terrorism and unfair 
and unjust in international policy making, and (2) the Indonesian people who did not get 
involved to make the security stability.  
 
 
                                                 
48 The statement that terrorism can occur whenever and wherever was mentioned many times, not only by 
Megawati but also by other important people. This statement was usually mentioned after the occurring of 
bomb blasted.    
49 In the second Bali Bombing (2005), the Head of the Indonesian National Military (TNI/ Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia) said the same thing when he commented about it. He said that the bomb blasts that occurred in Bali 
because of no people participation in maintain the public security. The statement made many critiques. The 
one critique was whether there was public participation or not, it was military/police responsibility to establish 
the national security.      
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4.2.2. Megawati and Terrorism: Media Portrayal  
4.2.2.1. WTC Bombing and Its Impacts 
How did Indonesian mass media look at the terrorism and the government’s responses? 
Terrorism and bomb terror for Indonesian mass media looks like a never ending story, the 
story which is continuing and ongoing. It means that terrorism and terror by bomb in 
Indonesia always becomes an attention of the Indonesian journalists. During Megawati’s 
presidency, mass media had concerned to the terrorism issues since WTC bombing on 
September 11, 2001. Since that event affected to the Indonesian situation, for instance, the 
increasing of the Anti-America movements. These movements themselves influenced the many 
aspects of Indonesian life, especially in the government’s efforts to eradicate the crisis.    
Difficult situation in Indonesia as impact of WTC Bombing and the reaction of US to 
fight Afghanistan by the reason to fight terrorism was shown by mass media for several weeks 
after that time.  
 
“It is not untrue story that the tragedy of September 11th 2001 gave big impacts for many 
parties and countries […] For Indonesian economy situation, that event brought   bad 
indications of the crisis resolution. […] The increasing of Anti-America movements will 
cause the increasing of capital flight. In turn, the increasing of capital flight will make 
difficulties for Indonesian economy growth.” (Kompas, October 1st 2001) 
 
“Following the demonstration actions (Anti America movements-writer) which are highly 
increasing, the Foreign Department of United State permitted to the low line staffs to 
leave Indonesia. In addition, a few of American people are reported start leaving 
Indonesia to be back to their country. […] Another facts are found that in Bali the rate 
of hotel occupancy decreased to 50-60% . […] It was not only related to the declining of 
the amount of investment but also to the social and economical condition. […] The 
initial symptoms (as effects of the terror 11 September 2001-writer) have been experienced by us 
since one week before today. People did demonstration to US  US in Jakarta and other 
cities, threatened to do sweeping to western people and they also expressed their 
attitudes and comments  to US ambassador in Jakarta. It was very crucial for us last 
week. Action-reaction of the terror 11 September 2001, for one week, is getting more 
crucial, controversial. Its impacts have been worried.” (Kompas, Oct 1st 2001).  
 
“Protests to USA as an action-reaction of the 11th September 2001 terror (in Indonesia – 
writer) interacted with the emotional environment and associated with the sensitive 
things. […] it is almost every day we saw how sensitive our people and how high 
tendency to the people to judge by themselves. They tends to be anarchic… ”  (Kompas, 
Oct 8th 2001). 
 
“The attack of US to Afghanistan strengthened its impacts on many countries, 
particularly on the Moslem countries. This impact was also experienced by Indonesia. It 
is mixing with several elements.  The strongest factor is solidarity among the religion 
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communities. But it exists also, the factor of the developed country versus the poor, 
marginalized and powerless countries.” (Kompas, October 11th 2001). 
 
“Now we are not only living in the crisis situation, but also staying in the uncertain 
situation. September 11th attack and the invasion of the military coalition leaded by USA 
to Afghanistan disturbed to the world peace. It causes many innocent people suffer, and 
the other part of them feel uncertain and live in the improbable life. We, in Indonesia, 
are a part of them. We, who are working hard to fight against crisis, are threatened by the 
second storm. […] There is a very strong indicator that is the declining of value and 
volume of export…” (Kompas, October 13th 2001). 
 
“For many countries, including Indonesia, the action-reaction of September 11th and the 
war which is chosen as its response, is driving for reactions: solidarity reaction, emotional 
reaction and the increasing of the number of demonstration. The reactions are also 
logical reactions, rational predictions and commitment to bring Indonesia out from the 
crisis. (Kompas, October 16th 2001). 
 
“Unexpectedly, it looked like stroked by lightening, the actions of the September 11th 
terror to US actually gave impacts on us. Our risk of security was highly declining. 
Foreign and domestic capital were wiping out from Indonesia. The recession was getting 
stronger in US and other industrial countries. We get a hit again. This time, the export 
volume stuck. It was canceled and postpone […] Not only our government or parties, 
this group or that group which will suffer of its impacts but also all of us, if the condition 
is getting more awful and misdirect.” (Kompas, November 13th 2001). 
 
For Indonesia, WTC Bombing and the reaction of the US toward Afghanistan did not only 
affect to the Indonesian economy, as to the other countries, but it also affected on the 
relationship among different religion communities. Almost all of the movements contained the 
nuance of religious relationship which affected on the developing of religion prejudgments, 
distrust and even conflict among different religion communities. The following issues were 
about Islam-Christian, not only America-Afghanistan issues. It developed and influenced the 
political, economy and social condition in Indonesia. Based on mass media, the Indonesian 
situation which had been fighting to come out from crisis was becoming worse. The impact of 
this issue made the efforts of the government to resolve the crisis was getting harder and more 
difficult.  
Beside the above situation, mass media also concerned to the responses of the 
government to the issues. There were several opinions, assessments of the mass media to the 
government performance in the case of WTC Bombing and US attack to Afghanistan, and also 
in case of the International and Indonesian people’ responses to this issues. In general, media 
thought that the responses of the government were late and too slow. Indonesian people made 
movement faster than the Indonesian government. People reacted quicker and acted more 
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responsive. People always made one step ahead than the government. Based on the 
assessments, media also looked at the uncertain situation, particularly in the relationship among 
the different religion communities, developed because of the impact of the unresponsive 
government, including unresponsive president. Mass media also saw that the government’s 
attitude and position in responding the issues of Anti-America was not so clear and resolute.    
In the early of her presidency, Megawati made some state visiting trip to the several 
foreign countries, to fulfill the other state invitations. One of the invitations came from George 
W Bush, the President of USA. It was coincident that her visit to US was one week after WTC 
Bombing and after the US made a plan to fight Afghanistan. This visit caused various opinions 
and one of them was coming from mass media.  
 
“The President’s visit to US only one week after WTC Bombing September 11th was not 
appropriate. Let’s imagine, if during her visit to US, President George W Bush make a 
decision to attack Afghanistan or other countries by the reason of terrorism fighting, the 
position of Megawati will be difficult, isn’t it? What position and comments will 
Megawati make if she receives many questions from mass media, congress’ member, and 
other people of that country?  Without any coincidence of fighting command, the 
president’s visit is not in a right time. […] what we can say? Please be smart to place our 
position, to make and answer the questions.” (Kompas, September 19th 2001). 
 
Opinion about the time chosen by Megawati to visit US was not appropriate. It was an    
indication of the distrust of mass media to the president’s capability to react the issues of WTC 
Bombing and the plan of the US to attack Afghanistan. The distrust might be based on the 
difficult situation in Indonesia which was faced by Megawati, where there were two different 
interests or point of views in relation to the issues. In that time, Megawati did not give the 
definite responses or reaction toward the two interests. It is shown by the following media 
statements : 
 
“In this kind of situation we need a clear government policy. We wait for the 
government’s determination that enables us to walk. The unclear government’s policy 
has made this society acted by their own initiatives. Even, when there were many 
different points of view, attitudes and behaviors among people on this society, still the 
government did not give any definite policy. The government reacted to the issues too 
slowly. Always like this. Since reform era, there was no significant change. We did not see 
the changes in the sense of urgency, and as if we walked as usual, business as usual.” 
(Kompas, Oct 1st, 2001) 
 
“It was the government’s fault that the action-reaction occurred and we received its 
impacts. But, it is necessary to say that the government response was late. Response has 
been already taken by the certain group of society. The government was placed on the 
reacting position, not as an actor or leader who determines the action. […] honestly it 
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was not as our expectation. The policy was not so clear, and was not socialized yet. 
Coordination was also not clear. People said it was just a form of meeting, discussion, 
looking for opinion. There was not yet coordination and active, comprehensive, 
coordinated response, and get things done, was really done.” (Kompas, October 27th 
2001).  
 
The disbelief of the mass media to the President was also caused by the indefinite response and 
position of Indonesia made by the President, along with the government and Indonesian 
publics before visiting to the USA. Media saw that Megawati and the government did not make 
dialogues and communication with all parts of the Indonesian society. They also assessed that 
the President and the government did not want to and doubted to take initiative, coordination, 
and consolidation and to give the direction. Therefore, they asked the government many times 
through their editorial, as written below: 
“We ask again to the government, it is very urgent to intensify the dialogues and 
communication with the various group of the society in order to establish solidarity and 
the same attitudes for facing the complicated and sensitive problems.” (Kompas, Oct 8th 
2001). 
 
“To face the highly increasing of global crisis, Megawati and Hamzah Haz have to 
intensify the consultation to the people representatives. Not only to the people 
representatives in politics but also to the exponent and the leaders of mass organization, 
particularly of the religion organization. […] the government and all national components 
meet to each other and to dialogue and consult, in order to attain the same understanding 
about the main problems of our nation.[…] which is logical is consolidate the mutual 
understanding, the mutual trust and consolidate the togetherness to handle the difficult 
problem.” (Kompas, Oct 11th 2001). 
 
However in other editorial, Kompas wrote that Megawati’s visit to the US was actually assessed 
as giving positive image for Indonesia on international publics. It was shown as below: 
 
“In US, the President of the Republic of Indonesia was counted in the positive way. That 
is the strongest impression of her visit in US and United Nation Organization. […] 
Based on the media reportage, we tend to think that it is quite wise for Megawati to place 
herself before the nation and the president of United State who is being shocked, angry, 
worried and burned out by the enthusiasm to revenge and attack the terrorism.” 
(Kompas, September, 22nd 2001). 
 
The worrying about the incapability of the President in handling a meeting with the President 
of US was wiped out. Media saw Megawati was capable for managing the conversation. The 
statements that hoped by mass media to be conveyed in that meeting were done by her 
successfully. It was about the suggestion of her to all leaders, including to the US’s President, to 
be careful to set the target of the struggle of terrorism fighting. The inaccurate and invalid 
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target and goals made the fighting for the terrorism can be interpreted as fighting for religion 
and a certain group society. The statement was her comment also to George W Bush who 
planned to attack Afghanistan due to the reason to fight terrorism. The statement was also 
directed to the Indonesian society that she supported their opinion and position which against 
US and its unions. However, beside the positive assessment, media still asked to the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia to explain more explicitly the Indonesian position in facing the 
impacts of the terror to the US to the Indonesian people in facing the impacts of the terror to 
the US. It is important to confirm the position because in the same time Indonesian 
government still has to bring this nation out from crisis. Media hoped for the government was 
able to do the two interests together, responding to the terrorism in the right way and 
reforming Indonesia, in the frame of crisis resolution. To reform Indonesia, Megawati has to 
concern to make the stability in politic, social and security.  
 
4.2.2.2. Bali Bombing: the Second Biggest Terrorism Action 
Media said that Bali Bombing is the second biggest terrorism action, after WTC Bombing in 
USA. The bomb blasting occurred in Legian Beach, Bali, Oct 12th 2002 in which 202 people 
died and more than 300 people were injured. Most of the victims were foreign tourists. This 
event was ‘a big punch’ for Indonesian government who has been working hard to resolve the 
crisis and ensuring the international publics that Indonesia was safe for foreigners to visit. It 
was one of the many bomb blasts occurred in Indonesia. It was the biggest one among the 
several bomb blasts which strengthened the image that Indonesia failed in establishing national 
security, and that the Indonesian National Police and government did not seriously investigate 
the actors. Two days after the bomb blast, Kompas wrote its editorial which depicted how hard 
the impact of it for Indonesian’s image on international publics. 
 
“Ironical mock was displayed through the terrorism action. Bali that was identical with 
the harmonious society and peaceful environment and social climate was destroyed by 
the biggest bomb blasts, as Indonesian people have ever known. We can imagine, how 
our face and profile as Indonesian citizen and nation on international stage. We are 
embarrassed, mocked, judged and asked for responsibility. […] Is it true how dull our 
heart so we do not care of the Indonesian image on the world stage. Not only good 
reputation, trust and honor, but also its impacts on the political, economy and security 
trust.” (Kompas, October 14th 2002). 
 
“Not only human victims, but also reputation, and the victims of ongoing social and 
economy crisis. We are Indonesian people, even if we can’t to be smart,  become the 
victims of instability and ongoing conflict which are going to be worse. […] Security was 
  
 173___________________                
a part of the ongoing instability. It was related to the bad economy which couldn’t offer 
appropriate field works, the bad law enforcement, weak discipline, and weaknesses in all 
institutions in transition era. […] The anxiety was growing fast when we saw, witnessed 
and experienced terrorism action in Bali that the developed countries came to Indonesia 
not for helping but as if ‘killing’ us slowly.” (Kompas, October 23rd 2002). 
 
“With the several bombing happened  in Indonesia, this country is imaged as the very 
nice target of the international terrorism. There are so many factors playing behind it. 
According to Western media’s analysis it might be true that  one of them is the chronic 
accumulative effect of misgovernment of the Indonesian government.” (Kompas, 
August 16th 2003).  
 
“Indonesia is often suspected, as written by West Media, as one of the terrorists’ nets. 
Contrarily, Indonesia is rarely mentioned as the victim of the international terrorism.” 
(Kompas, September 19th 2003). 
 
The same critics were also given by media to the performance of the government in dealing 
with the terrorism. Not only the media, but also international publics that criticized Indonesian 
government did not give any immediate response for the act of terrorism. Travel warning and 
travel ban published by other countries, even by our neighbor countries, were indication that 
they did not trust to the seriousness of the Indonesian government about terrorism fighting. It 
was indicated also that they did not trust to the capability of Indonesia to build the stability of 
security. Media understood its response, as they wrote on their editorial below: 
 
“We understand. It is because we, Indonesia, have been told about the existence of 
terrorism networking in Indonesia and the threats of terrorism actions, but we were 
interpreted by the other countries that we did not take the preventive action which was 
effective and believable.” (Kompas, October 23rd 2002). 
 
 
Harian Kompas agreed with this interpretation. It was mentioned through its editorial as below:     
 
“What is our argument to respond the opinion and assessment? We answer, the 
Indonesian government did not take the effective actions, not only for responding and 
preventing the threats of Indonesian security, including the terror, but also for the other 
things, such as the government administration management, law enforcement, and 
economic policy and program implementation. The effectiveness of the government for 
the things was weak.” (Kompas, October 23rd 2002). 
 
“The Republic of Indonesia seemed did not make progress in the last one year. Even, on 
the aspect of security we have to say that the condition is getting worse. If it is not, why 
the terrorists are so much brave to explode the bomb in Bali, at the hotel of JW Marriot 
and in other places?” (Kompas, August 16th 2003). 
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It means that the media saw the government was so late to make actions when the situation 
needs emergent responses. As usual, the government was too slow, and their reaction and 
responses were not so clear, and confusing. But, on the other aspect, media also saw that the 
international perception and reaction about terrorism in Indonesia was not fair. It reconfirmed 
the statement and attitude of Megawati about the reaction of the several countries which 
discredited Indonesia in case of terrorism. 
 
“The pressure for us to investigate and execute the terrorism actions becomes the 
pressure to the Indonesian life, through the pressure to the Indonesian sources of 
economy etc. We said that the opinion and attitude like that are not right, unfair, unjust, 
and do not help us to solve the problem, but in contrast, it lengthen our crisis.” 
(Kompas, October 23rd 2002). 
 
“Indonesia was really disappointed and offended to the US policy which compel the 
Indonesian citizens who are visiting to USA to report/ check in. […] whatever the 
reasons, this policy is interpreted as a form of discrimination, harassment, arrogant and 
exaggerated behavior, and it discredit to Indonesia. […] furthermore, Indonesia is 
difficult to understand and can’t accept the partial policy.” (Kompas, January 20th 2003). 
 
Not only in the aspect of the international reaction, media also supported many of Megawati 
statements about terrorism. It was indicated by the willingness of the media to report the 
statements of Megawati and it was followed by some positive assessments and agreement. 
Almost all the official statements of Megawati were quoted by media in its editorial, especially 
after Bali Bombing 2002. 
 
“Alhamdulilah the President Megawati Soekarnoputri and her staffs were not passive. 
They performed emergent meeting and gave press release.  They condemned the terror 
action, would investigate and arrest the actors. They conveyed condolence to the victims 
and their families and countries. They said welcome and thanks to the medical and 
humanity aids from other countries. It is the right time to the government and its staffs 
to arrest the actors, identify the networking, and execute them in the court. (Kompas, 
October 14th 2002). 
 
“The disappointment toward the US policy can be seen from the persuasion of the 
President Megawati Soekarnoputri to the Indonesian people not to visit USA if it is not 
very urgent and important. As reported by mass media, the President was apprehensive 
about the policy that Indonesian people must report if they visit to USA. Indonesian 
reaction of it can also be seen from the statement of the Foreign Minister that 
questioned the impact of the policy to the collective efforts against terrorism.” (Kompas, 
January 20th 2003). 
 
“President Megawati Soekarnoputri, when she gave her address on the Indonesian 
National Police Anniversary, asked to the other closed countries who gave protection to 
the intellectual actors of terrorism action in Indonesia to investigate, execute and gave 
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them punishment as regulated by their own law. […] It strengthened to the importance 
of regional cooperation to fight against terrorism. “ (Kompas, July 2nd 2003). 
 
“We agree that the terrorism which recently becomes a world phenomenon can’t be 
faced only by an half of our heart. We need a totally firmed action. Therefore, we have to 
face it together. In time of Megawati giving her speech in ASEAN Anniversary, she 
strengthened her commitment that the threats of international terrorism can only be 
broken down by global coalition which needs all nations, societies, religion, and cultures 
cooperation.” (Kompas, August 9th 2003). 
 
“Our leaders need to do the public defense in the global level, to claim that Indonesia is 
in the position of victims of the terrorists attack. […] This step is very important to be 
created in order to ensure the international public that Indonesia was not only looked as 
the place where is intruded by international terrorism movements. […] President 
Megawati has a strategic and prestigious chance in the front of UNO meeting to explain 
the Indonesian struggle to fight terrorism. […] The visit of the President and the vice 
President to the foreign countries was very important and strategic to show our profiles 
as a big nation…” (Kompas, September 24th 2003). 
 
“Explicitly, Megawati pressured to the developed countries to evocate the root of 
terrorism by changing the unfair policy about the conflict of the Middle East. […] By her 
perspective, that policy is not only unfair but also sides with Israel. […] Injustice which is 
supported  the feeling of alienation brings opportunity for the development of the 
climate of violence. This condition is an original cause of the problems, that are 
remaining to grow and develop and one of them brings and drives the act of tragic 
terrorism. [...] It is normal if Megawati reminds us, the root of terrorism has to be wiped 
out before growing to be terrorism.” (Kompas, September 26th 2003). 
 
“The President Megawati reconfirmed, the organizing of KTT ASEAN (Konperensi 
Tingkat Tinggi Association of South East Asian Nations/ Highly Conference of 
ASEAN) in Bali can be indicated as an Indonesian courage to face the threat of 
terrorism. Physically and symbolically, it also shows the strong heart of ASEAN leaders 
to fight the threat of terrorism as crimes of humanity.” (Kompas, October 10th 2003). 
 
In general media said the same opinion as the government did. What the President said about 
terrorism, such as (1) its impact on the Indonesian situation and the image of Indonesia on the 
International publics, (2) root of the international terrorism and how to eliminate it, (3) 
response to the perception and reaction of the international publics to the terrorism, are not so 
far from what the media thought. In general, media always support the President and the 
government in fighting terrorism, including when the President had to react the other 
countries’ responses, including the US’s.  As it was mentioned by the media, the position of 
Indonesia, as taken by the President and the government, was right and accurate. Only, there 
were few things seen by media was not quite correct; (1) the government was too slow in 
decision making and unsure in taking the action; (2) the government’s actions and statements 
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were unclear so they caused multi-interpretation and different perception among the different 
publics. It might because of the President and the government which were still trapped by the 
introvert behavior as the impact of crisis situation. Therefore, media also gave some advices 
and suggestion to the Presidents and the government, which can also be seen as the things that 
the government had not done yet or had done it partially.  The advices are (1) intensifying 
dialog and communication with all parts of the Indonesian society, (2) thinking and doing 
things which can achieve the two interests equally. The first was the national interest, to reform 
Indonesia and bring this nation out from the crisis; and the second was the international 
interests, to fight terrorism along with the other nations in the world. There was a tendency that 
the government focused more on the certain interest but forgot to give attention to the other 
interests.  
How the media saw the terrorism can be seen briefly on the Table 33. This table shows 
us the comparison of the media’s views on the two cases of terrorism action, the one is 
terrorism act that occurred outside of Indonesia and the other is terrorism action that occurred 
in Indonesia. The two cases were a part of the acts of the international terrorism. We can also 
see that the media have different opinion and perspective in viewing and interpreting the 
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Table 33 
Megawati and Terrorism: Media Perspective 
(Based on Kompas Editorial 2001-2004) 
 




The Impact • Bad economic condition 
• Bad indication for crisis resolution 
• Threats of disintegration 
• Bad national security, especially for 
foreign visitors 
• Second crisis 
• Bad image and reputation on 
international world 
• Unstable national security 
• Ongoing horizontal conflict 
The root • Economical gap between the 
developed countries and 
developing/under develop countries 
• Injustice on the international policy 
• Low sense of urgency 
• Misgovernment 
• Unfair policy, injustice 
Responses of the 
government 
• Too slow and always late 
• Unresponsive 
• Unclear statements, doubtful 
reaction, indefinite policy 
• No coordination, poor in 
communication  
• Do not take preventive and effective 
action 
• Give the  right responses, by: 
o    strengthening the international 
cooperation   
o ensuring publics that Indonesia 
was a victim of terrorism 
o showing the profile of the 
countries to the other countries. 
o showing our strong heart to 
fight terrorism  
International 
reaction 
•  Exaggerated, emotional, but it was 
understandable and acceptable.  
• Too arrogant 




Based on table 33 we see that media tended to give positive assessment to the performance of 
the government much more on the second issues of terrorism than on the first issue. At the 
first case, Indonesia was really on the position as the country which was influenced by WTC 
Bombing, particularly by the attack of the US to Afghanistan. It means that Indonesia was an 
outsider of the case and it did not get involve directly in that event. The root of the event came 
from the external factors. In this situation, media saw the government was weak and not 
capable handling the impact of it on the national situation.  
However in the second case, Indonesia was the target and experienced the event and its 
impacts. Media focused more on the positive action of the government in responding to the 
terrorism. Media took themselves in the same place as those of the government. Media feel as a 
part of Indonesian people who are protected and defended by the President and the 
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government. Most of the government action, in relating to the terrorism, was positive 
responses, based on the media perspective.  
Generally, in the case of terrorism, President Megawati and the Indonesian government 
had the similar perception with those of the Indonesian media/ journalists. They together 
condemned the terrorism and the actors. They also concerned to the victims and the bad 
impacts of terrorism to the Indonesian social, political and economy situation and   
Indonesian’s image on international publics. They were serious to investigate, identify, execute 
and punish the actors of terrorism. They together committed to fight against terrorism, so they 
had the same thought about the importance of global coalition, international and regional 
cooperation and consistent response to fight terrorism. The President and media also had the 
same perception about the international reactions which were too arrogant, discriminated, 
unjust, imbalanced, exaggerated and sometimes emotional.  
In the perspective of public relations, the relationship between the president or the 
government and the media as explained before was in harmony. It means that they have similar 
opinion in viewing terrorism. Additionally their statements show that they supported to each 
other about this issue. With this kind of relationship, the crisis resolution should be easier to be 
solved and the image of Megawati can be remained in a good manner.        
 
4.3. CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (CCN), in Indonesia is called as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi 
dan Nepotisme). CCN or KKN is a very popular concept for Indonesian people. It is a kind of 
ever lasting Indonesian problem. It belongs to all presidents.  It is still running until now. CCN 
is also mentioned by many people as the main source of the Indonesian crisis, and the main 
inhibit factor to crisis resolution. Megawati is the one who gave that statement.Eradicating the 
CCN was the program priority of all Indonesian Presidents and their cabinets. But, ironically, 
Indonesia is labeled as the most corrupted country in the world. Even, in the latest years, 
Indonesia was mentioned as the second biggest countries50 in the world in the number of 
corruption actions. In international level, that Indonesia was a corrupt country was not so 
                                                 
50 Based on the Survey of Transparency International, Indonesia has index of corruption 2.2, one level above 
the Myanmar. It means that in 2005, this institution placed Indonesia as the second biggest countries in the 
number of corruption actions in ASEAN (Association of the South East Asian Nations) or the sixth level in the 
world, together with three other countries, namely Azerbaijan, Kamerun, and Ethiopia. (Media Indonesia, 
October 19th 2005). The index was better, one level upper than the index in 2003 (IPC 1.9) and in 2004 (IPC 
2.0). In that time, Indonesia placed on the group of worst level of the corrupt countries in the world. In general, 
since 1995 Indonesia remained in the low index on corruption perception (Kompas, November 8th 2005).   
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surprised. Even for Indonesian people, as if the label really belonged to their countries, for 
ever.  It is even worse that many Indonesian people think and believe that the corruption has 
become a part of the Indonesian culture.  
The effort to eradicate the corruption practices in Indonesia had been started by the 
first Indonesian President, Ir. Soekarno in his administration (1945-1965), it was continued by 
HM Soeharto, BJ Habibie, KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri and the current 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Many regulations and institutions or commission that 
had main tasks to eliminate the corruption actions were published and found by each 
presidents. Table 34 indicates that the corruption is still an ongoing problem for Indonesia. It 
was very difficult for each president and government to stop the practices, even though every 
president of the Republic of Indonesia always said that they committed to eradicate the 
corruption. Crisis was thought as the accumulative impacts of the corruption that has been 
done by the people. It was also the result of the incapability or unseriousness of the president 
and the government to eliminate it in the past. Table 34 also shows that almost all Presidents of 
the Republic of Indonesia took deep concern to combat terrorism, not only manifested by 
establishing teams or commission but also by publishing laws and regulations. It was also 
followed by some actions/efforts to investigate the actors of corruption and bring them to the 
court. However, some people still saw that their efforts were just stopped on the symbolic or 
rhetoric level. Some big investigations of the corruption, which involved very important people, 
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Table 34 
The Indonesian Presidents and Corruption Eradication Team 
 
President Time Commission/Team Law/Regulations 
Ir. Soekarno   1945-1965 No team or commission 
established 
• Rules of Leader of Military 
No PRT/PM/06/1957 
• The rule of Corruption 
Eradication the Central 
Leader of War No 
PRT/Peperpu/013/1958 
• Law No 24/Prp/1960  
 
HM Soeharto   1966-1998 • The team of eradicating 
corruption (Tim 
Pemberantasan Korupsi) – 
1967 
• Fourth Commission (Komisi 
Empat) – 1970 
• The operational team for 
orderliness authority and 
corruption Eradication (Tim 
Operasi Ketertiban 
kewibawaan dan 
Pemberantasan Korupsi) -- 
1977.    
• P. Decree No 228 in 1967 
• P.Decree No 12 in 1970 
• Law No 3 1971 
• P. Instruction No 9 in 1977 
• Law No 11 in 1980  
BJ Habibie 1998-1999 No team or commission 
established 
• Decree No XI /MPR/ 1998   
• Presidential Instruction No 
30/1998 
• Law No 28/1999 




1999-2001 • The investigate commission 
for the wealth of the state 
official  (Komisi Pengawasan 
Kekayaan Pejabat Negara/ 
KPKPN) – 1999 
• The joint team for corruption 
eradication (Tim Gabungan 
Pemberantasan 
Korupsi/TGPK) – 2000 
• Ombudsman Team – 2000   
• Presidential Decree 
(Keppres) No 81/1999 
• P. Decree (Keppres) No 
242/M/2000 
• Government Regulation No 
68/1999 




2001-2004 • The commission for the 
eradication of corruption 
actions (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi/KPK) 
– 2002 
• Law No 20/2002 
• Law No 30/2002 




2005-2009 • The team for the eradication 
of corruption actions (Tim 
Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi/ Tipikor) – 
2005 
• Presidential Instruction No 
5/2004 
• Presd. Decree (Keppres) No 
11/2005 
 
Source: Compilation of Media Indonesia, July 25th 2005 and Kompas November 8th 2005  
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Since every president has her or his own commitments and strategies, it is important to 
analyze how and what commitment of Megawati to handle this never ending problem. Even 
more, all the prior presidents, before Megawati, were assessed by publics, national and 
international, that they were not successful to do this. It is not impossible Megawati was also 
criticized in the same way. It becomes more necessary to explore how Megawati built the trust 
of the people about her commitment to eradicate the corruption, still in the frame of crisis 
resolution and reformation, and how Megawati reacted to the critiques about her capability to 
eliminate corruption. 
 
4.3.1. Strategy of Megawati 
Megawati understood very well about the importance of corruption eradication for Indonesian 
publics.  As people knew, the one of HM Soeharto’s failures to defense his position as the 
President was his failure to ensure international and national publics that he was very serious 
and capable to eliminate the corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN) (Kompas, October 30th 
2001) . Even, his era of the presidency was called as the era of CCN (KKN- ind) in which the 
CNN was growing very fast and uncontrolled. Megawati learned from Soeharto’s experience. 
She did want to fail to handle this problem. Therefore, in the first speech as the President of 
the Republic of Indonesia, in the front of People’s Consultative Assembly on August 16th 2001, 
she stated clearly about her commitment about corruption. She said that CCN was a big 
problem for Indonesia. It was the source of the crisis and the difficult crisis resolution. And, 
CCN was a part of the New Order institution, which saw the CCN as the common behavior.   
 
“The difficulty to eradicate corruption, collusion and nepotism, directly or not, had 
affected on crisis since 1997. Different from in the feudalistic social institutions which 
accepted CCN and it was not a big mistake, in the democratic institutions it will be a very 
difficult problem. […] In this case, please permit me to tell that personally I have made a 
meeting with my closed families and asked them to be really promised not to open the 
possibility to do the CCN. They have really promised, and I hope they will be strong 
toward the temptation which comes from their environment. I believe that we will make 
great effort to prevent and solve CCN if all of us in this building also promise not to do it. 
I have also asked all the cabinet members to report their possession and submit it 
immediately to the investigation commission for the state official wealth (Komisi 
Pemeriksa Kekayaan Pejabat Negara).” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001).  
 
 
The commitment was very important to be delivered in her first annual state speech. Megawati 
wanted to persuade Indonesian people and ensure that Indonesia will change, particularly for 
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the CCN issues. She tried to build people trust that she and her cabinet under her leadership 
will be different and she wanted to make Indonesia to be a good government and good 
governance, free from CCN actions. The commitment was built from the commitment of her 
family not to act the CCN. She asked also the cabinet members not to act the CCN by 
reporting their possession to the authorized commission. Not only it, Megawati also started the 
commitment by determined the CCN eradication as one of the six main programs of her 
cabinet.  
The statement in her speech was really interesting for almost all Indonesian people. It 
invited many comments, but most of them are positive and supported to her commitment. 
People made a good wish from her governance and the government. Megawati, in the first step, 
was capable to build good step for her long presidency. People assessed positively and hoped in 
the optimistic way. The statement was successful to make people looking at the new 
government and the new president by the positive and prospective thinking. Media was not the 
only one that mentioned her commitment to fight against CCN. In every occasion that was 
related to the good governance by good government, the commitment of the President to 
eradicate, even her persuasion to make war to the CCN was always reminded as the 
fundamental reason. Fighting against the CCN was  a must for the government and it became a 
political demand from Indonesian people who wanted to reach success, as she  mentioned on 
her speech below: 
 
“The general condition of our national life for this case, especially in the commitment to 
fight against the CCN has driven a political demand for us to behave clearly and 
persistently in the case of law enforcement.” (Megawati, September 3rd 2001). 
 
In front of the Indonesian general attorneys, she asked them to get attention and concern to 
the issue. Megawati saw that the quality of the law enforcement personnel was very 
determinative for eradicating the CCN by executing and giving fair punishment for the CCN 
actors, whoever they are. There were many CCN cases couldn’t be brought to the court 
because there were so many ‘games behind the stage’ between the actors and the attorneys. It 
was an indicator of the bad quality of our law enforcement personnel and a bad indication for 
the realization of Megawati’s commitment. 
 
“Right now I am pleased to ask you (the general attorneys-writer) to get attention to the issue. 
One of the government’s program  written in Indonesian Development Plan is to perform 
law enforcement consistently, to build safety and security in the social life and to eradicate 
the CCN.” (Megawati, September 3rd 2001). 
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During 2002, Megawati seldom mentioned about corruption in her speeches. But, as explained 
before, mass media tended to repeat her statement about her commitment to fight against the 
CCN which was delivered in August 2001.    
In the annual speech, August 1st 2003, Megawati mentioned again about CCN. She said 
that CCN in Indonesia is the one of the several sources for economy crisis in 1997. It means 
that Megawati tried to tell that CCN keeps going on and growing fast in the later time of her 
presidency.  
 
“The important thing to be learned from the crisis in 1997 is how much dangerous the 
impact of the crisis into the life of nationhood and statehood. In the certain level, the high 
increasing of foreign and national debt and also the fall down of Indonesian banking 
system so far have connection with the CCN practices which have been growing so fast 
and spreading into the whole nation, especially in the time before the economy crisis. It is 
irony that when we tried hard to bring the actor(s) of the CCN in the executives 
institutions and privates to the court, now the CCN is also done collectively by a few 
politician, especially by people who have position as the local legislative institutions.” 
(Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003). 
 
The statements mean that CCN was done not only by the executives but also by the legislatives, 
not only in the center  but also in the local government. It also means that the CCN in 
Indonesia has been spreading in broader area. The corruption that was done by the legislative 
might be caused by the influence of the CCN to the cadre of political parties, that in turn they 
might be the members of the legislative institutions, as she stated on her speech below: 
 
“The indicators of the weaknesses of the cadre education system are that the cadres of 
political parties have been influenced by the CCN that was actually a bad phenomenon 
which had driven us to smooth the reformation movement five years ago. […] by 
heavyhearted I tell you that recently the phenomenon of CCN  -- that in the past was 
suspected as the ‘disease’ for the executives persons – has infected to the legislatives, both 
in the province, regency, and municipality. […] Many people said that those bad 
symptoms were raised because of two things, namely because of the large authority that 
was given to the local parliament, particularly the authority to accept or refuse 
responsibility report from governor, regent and high civil servants; and there is no 
supervising and controlling system for them, both by political parties who send them and 
the people who vote them in the general election. […] In the short words, the great power 
of the members of the parliament was not equally followed by the proper responsibility or 
accountability mechanism. (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 2003). 
 
Megawati gave the statement in the context of local autonomy that was given for local 
governments to manage all aspects of their life by themselves. No controlling and supervising 
mechanism made the legislative ‘play’ their decisions with the strategy of money politics. The 
main message of her speech is her admission that the CCN actions have widespread to all areas 
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and all governmental institutions in Indonesia. One of the sources of the extendability of the 
CCN, based on Megawati, was the lack of supervising and controlling mechanism for the local 
government. The driven factors of the development of the CCN in Indonesia were also 
mentioned by Megawati in another her speech: 
 
“In the past, we witnessed various forms of deviation as a result of centralistic national 
perspective, which in the absence of effective public control, always had a tendency 
towards authoritarian. In the last decades prior to reform era, such authoritarian 
tendency was coupled with different forms of corruption, collusion and nepotism. To 
certain extent, this tendency continues to persist in the new order of post reform we are 
building nowadays. (Megawati’s speech, December 7th  2003)  
 
“The other national problems have still been handled by the law enforcement apparatus, 
particularly in the problem of CCN. We do not lack of regulations and rules to eradicate 
the CCN and the other crimes. We do not also lack of institutions and personnel who 
must deal with the prevention and elimination of corruption. […] However I need to 
explain that the final decision of the serial of the law processes is handled by the court 
and the law institutions that totally far from the government intervention.” (Megawati’s 
speech, August 16th 2004)       
 
Megawati in her speeches above claimed that CCN nowadays was a heritance of the new order 
administrative. It was coupled with the authoritarian and the centralistic national perspective. 
She also placed the unprofessional of the law enforcement institution as another sources of the 
ongoing CCN practices in Indonesia. Not only placed the failure of the CCN eradication on the 
institutions, but Megawati also saw that the role of the individual mentality gave contribution to 
the development of the CCN practices. People, personally, who were not strong to defense 
themselves from the temptation would drive the practices of CCN. It was stated by Megawati 
as below: 
 
“In every time you will face any big temptation, even very big temptation to misuse your 
authority, including do the corruption or other CNN actions. The initiative to misuse 
authority like that can be influenced by yourselves, but it can be by persuasion or even 
pressure of the other parts. Whether you will be tempted or not, it depends on you 
personally, your moral which was cultivated by your parents, and your religiousness and 
also the personal integrity values you get from your ethnic.” (Megawati’s speech, August 
5th 2004). 
 
Referring to the statements I could say that Megawati really needed to identify the source or 
factors which contributed to the development of the CCN and the difficulties to eradicate it 
because there was a tendency that many people looked at Megawati’s performance in the CNN 
eradication was bad. Megawati herself admitted that she and the government felt the difficulty 
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to eliminate corruption and failed to attain her commitment. Not only once or twice, Megawati 
admitted her failure so many times in many occasions, even in her last annual state speech in 
2004. 
 
“[…] I understand that despite of all those efforts, the results have not yet met our 
expectation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
“It is normal to be reflected how the corruption has developed so far and law violation 
keeps going on if there is no punishment.”  (Megawati’s speech, October 5th 2002). 
 
“During five years we have done several efforts to prevent, tackle, execute and recover 
the CCN […] we have committed to improve in eliminating the crimes, even though 
based on our experiences, we can see that it is not an easy task. I know that many of us 
did not satisfy yet in tackling CCN. […] The eradication of CCN actually does not 
connect with the technical law, but also with the aspects of social, economy and culture.” 
egawati, August 1(M  
st 2003)     
“…corruption, collusion and nepotism was the one factor which triggered Indonesia felt 
down on the very serious economy crisis. It is very difficult to eliminate by the 
government nowadays.” (Megawati’s speech, November 13th 2003). 
 
“We worry that the CCN which so far was predicted occurred in the central executive 
institutions, actually have disseminated to the local governments and also to the 
legislative institutions both in the center and local which being a core of autonomy 
program and have big financial budget.” (Megawati’s speech, May 5th 2004)  
 
“The other national problem that still resolved is the law enforcement, especially in 
eradicating corruption. […] But, it is the fact that our performance to eliminate and 
eradicate corruption has been successful yet. […] As what happened in the law processes, 
I believe that no one which has been satisfied with the execution of the law violations.” 
(Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004). 
 
The lack of success in corruption eradication was admitted definitely by Megawati even though 
the government’s development programs were emphasized on the CCN eradication. We should 
not be pessimistic when we realized that the CCN eradication, was not only to be the 
President’s commitment, that was followed by publishing any regulation to support 
government commitment,  but it  was set up as one of priority development programs in every 
year.  
 
“The six main development programs of the cabinet of Gotong Royong are […] (4) 
implementing law enforcement consistently, establishing the security stability in society, 
eradicate and eliminate CCN.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001). 
 
“In 2002 the policies, programs and activities with regard to politics and security are 
focused mainly on the following agenda: First…[…] Second, promotion of law 
enforcement with priority given to synchronizing activities in law enforcement, finalizing 
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major cases and preventing the practice of collusion, corruption and nepotism.” 
(Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
“…six programs of the cabinet Gotong Royong […] 4) Law enforcement, public safety 
and security and eradication of corruption. (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003). 
 
“The six main development programs of the cabinet of Gotong Royong are […] (4) 
performing law enforcement consistently, establishing the security stability in society and 
continuing the effort to eradicate CCN.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004). 
 
“In relating to the law enforcement, the government continues to do its utmost to fulfill 
the assembly’s mandate. To acquire a more solid legal foundation in combating 
corruption, in addition to Law No 20/2001 on the Amendment to Law No 31/1999 on 
Combating the Crime of Corruption, the government has legislated Law No 15/2002 on 
the crime of Money laundering.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002). 
 
According to the description above, I would say that in the early of her presidency, Megawati 
by enthusiasm spoke about her commitment to fight against corruption, collusion and 
nepotism which has been growing fast,  since the time of the HM Soeharto’s administration 
until the time of her administration. In that time, Indonesian people have positive wishes and 
hopes to the President’s commitment.  However Megawati said for many times that it was not 
easy to fulfill her commitment to eradicate the CCN. She admitted that the government was 
not successful. It does not mean that Megawati admitted that the failure of the fulfillment of 
her commitment is because of the failure of her cabinet and the Indonesian government. As 
described above, she identified several factors that cause of the failure of the elimination and 
eradication of CCN in Indonesia. Almost all factors are external factors which were difficult to 
be controlled by her.  
It shows that Megawati tended to use dissociate strategy when she must face and 
handle the critiques about her and the government’s failure in the case of corruption, collusion 
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Table 35 
Megawati and the CCN of Indonesia 
(2001-2004) 
 
 Statements  Explanations 
• To be the one priority of development 
programs of the cabinet. 
•  Establishing the institution/commission that 
dealing with the eradication of CCN  
Commitment Fight against 
CCN 
• Publishing any regulation about CNN 
• The impact of feudalistic/authoritarian 
leadership of the New Order 
• Bad cadres of the political parties   
• No controlling mechanism for local legislative 
• Unprofessional the law enforcement 
personnel/institution 
Root of CCN and difficulty in 
eradicating 
External factors
• Bad mentality of the Indonesian people 
• Not successful  
• Difficult resolution 
Evaluation by herself Failed 
• People were not satisfied 
Sources: Megawati textual speeches (2001-2004) 
 
 
Table 35 above shows that Megawati used the dissociation strategy in responding the CCN 
issues and practices. She admitted the failure of her and her cabinet to resolve the CCN 
problems, but she did not want to take the blame. She took the blame on the external factors, 
not on herself or her cabinet. 
If we compare it to the statements about terrorism, the commitment to fight against the 
practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism was less mentioned by Megawati. During four 
years of the Presidency, Megawati did not talk many times about the corruption in her formal 
speeches, especially in 2002. At this time, Megawati talked more about terrorism.     
 
4.3.2. Megawati, Media and corruption 
4.3.2.1. Indonesian Corruption  
Performance of the government deals with the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism 
always invited high attention and concern from publics, including mass media. And, it was 
connected to the commitments of the Presidents to combat and eliminate the practices of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. The statements of the President about corruption, 
collusion and nepotism tended to be published and supported by media. However in another 
parts, the media criticized the government in their effort to eradicate the corruption.  
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Before the description of media about Megawati in dealing with corruption, firstly I need 
to describe how the media saw corruption occurring in Indonesia. It is necessary to analyze the 
media’s position in the case of corruption, in order to look at its position in the relation 
between the President and the government, and Indonesian journalists. As viewed by Megawati, 
media see corruption as a serious problem for Indonesia, especially for the government in the 
context of crisis resolution. Through its editorial, media have tried to make a picture of this 
country’s corruption, collusion and nepotism. 
 
“We should be ashamed that Indonesia is placed on the lowest level in the list of 
corrupted countries in the world. But, it was more tragic, corruption has inhibited to 
make progress, corruption is a source of injustice and arbitrarily practices.” (Kompas, 
July 26th 2001). 
 
“Along with the efforts to promote peace and national unity, in early of the new 
government administration we must also proclaim to eradicate the practices of CCN. 
Without it, the new government will lose the good momentum to eradicate the 
corruption. And the result is the corruption will keep going, we will not make any 
progress. It is not efficient and we will not have any credibility.” (Kompas, July 26th 
2001). 
 
“The prevention of CCN by the government is not just becoming public consumption. 
Indeed it is irony. During the era of reformation, we worked so very hard. Everything 
had tried to be reformed. How in that era, corruption was not subsided but it widespread 
to anywhere?” (Kompas, August 8th 2001). 
 
“The CCN symptoms, including money politic, were spreading to everywhere in 
Indonesia. […] about the raising of the few local Kings who decentralized CCN. The 
looseness of central control had driven the local officials to be more lose to practice 
CCN.” (Kompas, October 25th 2001) 
 
“We know that CCN is like a disease for this nation. The New Order had collapsed. It 
was because of the huge uncontrolled practices of CCN. Since long time ago, we 
criticized CCN practices because it was a parasite which destroyed Indonesian life. […] 
However, the number of CCN practices was not reduced but increased. […]  
Corruptions that are occurred in this country, is not only done by executives officials. In 
the transition era, the officials of legislatives were ‘wilder’ to practice CCN. […] It is also 
done by the officials in judicative. (Kompas, October 30th 2001)  
 
“Business industry has to take the responsibility of this current situation. Their behavior 
to start their business by doing mark-up and their contribution to the growth of the 
practices CCN causes the business kingdom they built was like “sandy kingdom. […] We 
together know that the practices of CCN did not subside but contrarily, it developed. 
Even, it is more frankly because done in the situation which is open and transparent.” 
(Kompas, May 14th 2002). 
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“The practices of CCN itself were continuing in the larger scale and it used by methods 
which are ignoring the risks. (Kompas, August 4th 2003). 
“It is so sadden, we see the condition right now. The practices of CCN are displayed 
openly and frankly. […] We often hear how the members of legislative institution to be 
arrogant to each other, to show off their possessions. […] whereas we know their 
condition before they became the members of the legislative institutions.” (Kompas, 
November 11th 2003).  
      
“We have to say that there is no progress in the judicative institution.  The reason is  
there are cases which not yet finished and executed, but also more people in this 
institution get involve in the practice of corruption. It happened not only in the first 
general courts but also in the highest general courts.” (Kompas, January 1st 2003). 
 
“[…] And which is most apprehensive is the CCN is not wiped out and reduced, in 
contrast, it is enhancing to everywhere. The political actions and law to this social 
diseases and crime do not give good result. They are not effective.” (Kompas, December 
5th 2003). 
 
“The practices of CCN have already internalized in our nation and that has actually 
strapped us into the crisis.” (Kompas, March 1st 2004) 
 
 
Those editorials showed that the media looked at the practices of the corruption, collusion and 
nepotism have internalized so deeply and thoroughly into the people and spread into the whole 
Indonesian areas, not only in the executive, legislative and judicative institution, but also in the 
central, or local areas. Media also saw that corruption, collusion and nepotism were the source 
or the root of the broader of Indonesian problems, such as the crisis and the difficult crisis 
resolution and difficult reformation. In addition, the CCN practices in Indonesia varies in 
methods, and more transparent. Media also quoted the Indonesian rank in CCN based on the 
Survey of International Transparency to enforce or highlight the label that Indonesia was 
indeed a very bad country in the world in the aspect of CCN. The picture of Indonesia, 
especially in relation to the CCN, described by mass media was not so different from the 
picture described by the President. It means that the President admitted about the bad 
condition of Indonesia in case of corruption. 
The impact of ongoing CCN practices was mentioned also by journalists. Crisis was one 
of the effects of practices of CCN. CCN was mentioned as a cause of crisis developed to be 
serial, highly escalated and hard. It also caused the crisis to be people’s responsibility. The 
innocent people had bigger responsibility than it was for the persons who made mistakes, law 
violation and social crimes (Kompas, November 3rd 2001). Corruption is the inhibit factor for 
progress making, a source of injustice and also as arbitrarily practices (Kompas, July 26th 2001) 
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and CCN is not only making Indonesian economy ‘fall down’ but also enhancing the cruel 
injustice, disappearing investors, and placing the national honor and trust on the lowest level of 
another nations (Kompas, August 18th 2001), CCN is the one of the main sources of injustice 
and social gap (Kompas, August 4th 2003),  CCN causes people to be responsible for highly 
economical cost, but high level of business community might use “peaceful negotiation” by 
bribing.(Kompas, October 4th 2003), CCN is a serious social disease and crime, which destroy 
our past, present and future life (Kompas, February 16th 2004). 
Based on media, it can be said that how the government deals with corruption can be 
looked as how the government deals with crisis. The part of crisis is corruption. It means that 
the strategy to eradicate the crisis is similar to the strategy to make crisis out from Indonesia. 
Thus, it is important to take the government’s effort to eradicate corruption in the area of crisis 
resolution strategy. Media, as what they usually have done, watched and criticized the president 
and Indonesian government’s efforts in doing this. So many colorful comments were made by 
the media.        
 
4.3.2.2. Megawati and the Corruption: Media Portrayal  
Positive assessment and hope firstly published by media to the President commitment to 
eradicate CCN only few days after Megawati delivered it in her first state annual speech, August 
16th 2001. Media and publics focused their comments more on the statement of the President 
who asked to her family not to do CCN. Kompas wrote in the editorial as below: 
 
“That priority was described by the President. Strengthen the unity and oneness of this 
nation and state, preventing disintegration. […] We appreciated with the attitude of the 
President who was aware of the signals, hopes and people demands. Please get up the 
government and clean governance, which are free from CCN. Not started by the others 
but by their environment.” (Kompas, August 10, 2001). 
 
“The statement of the president that she prohibited her family not to do CCN invited 
public’s applause, appreciation and support. […] This commitment was so hard. Don’t 
discourage if almost all do not easy to believe it. It was not only because the same 
statements were also delivered by the prior presidents in the past, but also the issues of 
CCN were being internalized, rooted and it was a part of feudalism structure which gave 
a big chance for the practice of CCN, gave power as privilege […] There was a big 
opportunity, smart temptation […] Rationalization was easy to be made. The Indonesian 
business communities have been trapped into the corrupted business practices. […] It is 
a big task. We appreciate with good willing and commitment of the President, which, like 
or dislike, is followed by the commitment of the vice president, ministers and the other 
government officials. […] The president has made a good step…” (Kompas, August 18th 
2001). 
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“However, once again, the improvement is not enough by giving statements. It has to be 
followed by a real action which can be seen and felt by any one that we really want to 
develop this country. The other thing we need is communication building. The 
government has to be more active to communicate with the strategic components, in this 
case is with the business communities.” (Kompas, October 24th  2001). 
 
“The government of Megawati Soekarnoputri […] will correct and improve the policy 
and bad practice in the past.51 And now, we can see the positive changes are going on. 
The Indonesian government wants to make correction and make policy better than those 
in the past.” (Kompas, October 25th 2001). 
 
“According to the President, CCN was robbery. The actors of CCN were thieves, 
whatever their position and degree. Therefore the CCN actors have to be proceeded by 
law to take their responsibility toward what they have been done. The President asked to 
the leaders and the members of the youth organization for cutting off the series of the 
robberies. The practices of CCN, which have been done for so long time ago, even 
become our culture were identified as the one of economy crisis factors. […] the 
statement was accepted well by several parties. At least, it was just the first time a 
president used the term openly and defined a corruptor so clearly.” (Kompas, October 
30th 2001). 
 
“President Megawati Soekarnoputri repeated her statement that they must decide 
priority. Those were economy recovery, political life normalization by using the 
reformation paradigm and restore the security and safety. Eradication of the corruption 
was the one of the priorities of the government. The priorities determination by the 
government was absolutely right decision. […] especially for the priority to eradicate 
CCN. […] We also appreciated for the President’s honesty, concern and modesty. Those 
were valuable social capital and needed to implement the government’s priorities.” 
(Kompas, November 3rd 2001).   
 
“It is correct for the President Megawati Soekarnoputri to ask to the business 
communities to change their behavior quickly. The business communities’ attitude which 
just oriented to get benefit as much as they can has driven us to be trapped into the 
crisis. […] Their behavior […] have made the practices of CCN growing.” (Kompas, 
May 14th 2002). 
 
“President Megawati Soekarnoputri in her report emphasized on the problem and 
challenged the CCN eradication. She said that it was not easy to eliminate those social 
disease and crime. […] Megawati’s statement was correct. Eradicating and preventing 
CCN were really not easy, not an easy task. It was right also the statement of People 
Representative Assembly that eradicating CCN was not easy. It needed sacrifice, 
diligence and consistency. Sacrificing began from the government leaders, in the private 
and public sector, and in the state, public or private institutions.” (Kompas, August 4th 
2003). 
 
                                                 
51 The practices mentioned above are about corruption and collusion that usually were decentralized to the 
local areas, not only in the center. It is usually connected to the implementation of local autonomy.    
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In the other part of Kompas editorials, negative assessments were also made. It is usually 
delivered in the form of criticism and advises which always linked together.       
 
“Corruption as a cause of the crisis became responsibility, more for the people. […] it 
was the reason why executing and preventing the practices of CCN was never enough 
and not satisfied the truth and justice.  It made the concept of eradication of gap, 
violation and social crime was not so really urgent for the political elites and government. 
(Kompas, November 3rd 2001).  
 
“Live modestly, that was the words that we often heard recently. Started by President  
Megawati Soekarnoputri […] which persuaded the higher governmental officials to begin 
living modestly and efficiently. […] And then what was the result? Live modestly never 
comes true. […] The question was why it happened? It was because the expectation of 
living modestly was just lip service.” (Kompas, December 28th 2001). 
 
“Not many people believed when in her closing year speech, Megawati declared to 
eradicate CCN. During 2001 it was recorded the President at least said the similar 
statement four times […] The skeptical attitude was based on the fact that the practices 
of CCN was not decreased but increased.” (Kompas, January 1st 2002). 
 
“We understood the reason of the Megawati’s dissatisfaction to the performance of 
Supreme Court in the case of the eradication of CCN. It was many times the cases of 
CCN were brought to the court but finally the actors were released. […] It can’t be freed 
from the influence of unserious government to eradicate CCN. The government itself 
often did not  strong enough to promote the law, strengthened the internal discipline, to 
show that they really want to eliminate CCN. […] And then did the President take action 
to the case52? Actually not! Even though she had not directly said, the President felt 
better not to change or ask the Head of General Attorney to be non-active, only by the 
reason that the new person could not guaranteed that everything would to be better.”  
(Kompas, November 29th 2002). 
 
“The President has authority to control the performance of General Attorney because it 
is the task of the executives. Surprisingly, the President did not concern to get involved 
in the case of the Head of General Attorney’ accusation about the concealing his riches.” 
(Kompas, January 13th 2003). 
 
“The persuasion of the President to work hard and live modestly, at least raising the 
question, is the persuasion serious, is the persuasion credible. So far, willingness and 
enthusiasm of the government were not so clear. Surprisingly, we saw and felt the 
opposite situation. (Kompas, January 14th 2003). 
 
“We do not need to deny that there are still any weaknesses. The government which does 
not have leadership, CCN behavior increases and the attitude of few people who are 
interested more in their right than their duty increases too.” (Kompas, February 28th 
2003). 
 
                                                 
52 It is about the case of the Head of Indonesian General Attorney who suspected have concealed his richness.  
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“Beside the economical condition, people focus their criticism on the law enforcement, 
prevention and CCN investigation. […] People disappointment and critiques were 
directed not only to the government administration and the developments which were 
done by Ministers, but also to their leadership. (Kompas, May 5th 2003) 
 
“Law and regulation made them (business communities – writer) under the government. For 
working fluently, even for living properly, business communities must be “nice” to the 
government and not only fulfill the duty to pay the tax. It made them to be pressured to 
bribe and blackmailed.” (Kompas, October 4th 2003). 
 
“Megawati admitted honestly that the recruitment system for the candidates of 
legislatives members in the general election 1999 was not objective. It contained the 
practice of nepotism. […] Her statement was very honest.” (Kompas, November 20th 
2003). 
 
“Actually the new government or the reformation government, which changes the 
President three times, has not made any improvement for people yet. […] more 
disappointed when the government, political elites and also various governmental 
institutions have not been successful yet to perform good governance and 
administration, which is free from corruption. The situation and condition seem very 
massy.” (Kompas, December 5th 2003) 
 
“The goals to eradicate CCN always be declared. Politically we have listed CCN 
eradication on the decree. However, CCN was not reduced. Even, increasing not only in 
number, but also it was more transparent, especially after we were not able to behave 
distinctly, to give hard punishment to them who did CCN.” (Kompas, February 16th 
2004). 
 
“Information about the practices of CCN was the more transparent and open. It was 
because of the democracy and the existence of mass media. It seemed they kept 
shouting, looking for attention. Imagine what will happen if they are ignored by the 
government officials and authorized institutions. It will cause disappointment, 
frustration, discouragement and hopelessness.” (Kompas, July 2nd 2004). 
 
“In her annual speech August 16th 2004, President Megawati admitted that the efforts to 
eradicate CCN were still so far from the expectation. President said that actually the 
government has done optimally to eradicate CCN but the law processes were out from 
her authority. We intentionally emphasized on the corruption eradication because 
recently we saw the heavy risk we got as the impact of the government incapability to 
take firmed action to the practices of CCN.” (Kompas, August 20th 2004). 
 
 
The media stated that the efforts of the government to eliminate and eradicate CCN were not 
absolutely successful. It is indicated by many statements of the media that the practices of CCN 
in Indonesia, during reformation era, especially in the era of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s 
administration are highly increasing in number and volume. It is also mentioned by media that 
the failure in corruption eradication was because of the weaknesses of the government. Media 
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concluded the main weaknesses of the government are: (1) the political elites and government 
had no strong and consistent commitment to eradicate the corruption; and (2) the government 
was not serious to eradicate CCN. However, media highlighted the acknowledgement of the 
president about her failure to eliminate corruption and that her failure was contributed by the 
unprofessional of the law enforcement personnel, such as the officials of general attorney and 
Supreme Court. Media agreed that corruption eradication was not an easy task. It was because 
of the weaknesses of the governmental institutions, as explained before, beside, CCN had 
already internalized into the Indonesian people to be culture. 
In general, I can say that the media looked at the performance of the President and 
government to eradicate CCN was not quite good. Media tended to assess that Megawati and 
the Indonesian government failed to eradicate CCN. Their commitment had not been followed 
by the equal and real action. There was no consistency between the statement and action. 
If comparing the statements of the president with the media, they have similar opinion 
about CCN eradication done by the government. The President admitted her failure, and media 
also looked at the performance of the President and her cabinet in the similar way. But, there 
are a few differences between the Indonesian media and the President when they looked at the 




Megawati and Media:    
The Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (CCN) 
 
 
Dimension Megawati  Mass Media 
 Assessment in CCN 
eradication  
Not successful  Failed  
Commitment • Very committed  
• To be the one of six government’s 
priorities program 
• Not serious 
• Not consistent 
• Just lip services 
Source of the failure External factors, not part of the 
government’s weaknesses 
Internal and external (the 
government itself and the 
other institutions) 
 Frequency of talking about  Not many times Many times, often 
 
 
The low assessment, based on media’s point of view, about government and president’s 
performance in handling CNN become an indicator that there is no conducive and supportive 
relationship between media and the president. It shows that there is no good cooperation 
between them to solve the crisis.  
  
 195___________________                
4.4. CONCLUSION 
In the case of terrorism, Megawati tended to be accommodative in early of time. But, when the 
time came up and there were many critics and negative assessment from publics and media, she 
tended to be defensive. She shifted the blame to the Indonesian people who did not participate 
in the national security tasks, and to the other countries which did not commit to encounter the 
terrorism actions. In the case of corruption collusion and nepotism issues, Megawati also 
applied the defensive strategy to respond to the public’s criticism. She admitted her failure in 
corruption actions eradication but she rejected to admit that the failure is caused by ineffective 
efforts of the government. Megawati tended to shift the blame to the other parts by giving 
statements as follow (1) people mentality was corrupt, (2) corruption became the culture of the 
“New Orde” and it inherited to be the Indonesian culture, (3) other institutions such as 
Indonesian general attorney, Indonesian national police, and also local legislative institution 
were not serious to fight corruption. Those three things were thought as the sources of the 
failure, as Megawati mentioned.  More intensive publics and media spoke about her failure in 
the case of terrorism and corruption, more defensive Megawati was.  
 Why did it happen? What factors could drive Megawati to select the defensive strategy 
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CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AND   
THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS : A CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1. THE STRATEGY IS DEFENSIVE  
Referring to the finding, it can be concluded that almost all the presidents of the Republic of 
Indonesia tended to use a defensive strategy to defense or restore or reconstruct their image. In 
the different cases and situations, they always apply self defensive strategy.    
Table 38 shows the strategy used by the presidents. HM Soeharto, in the first time 
stated that the crisis was a biggest national problem. He used defending strategy, which is 
divided into four specific defense strategies, namely: (1) denial, (2) counterattack, (3) 
differentiation/ scapegoating, (4) opinion-knowledge dissociation. Even though he used four 
different specific strategies, all are categorized as a dissociate strategy. It is used for achieving 
main intention, is the strategy to deny the mistake, or make distance from a wrongdoing. As 
explained before, HM Soeharto faced the situation in which his image was in danger because of 
people’s perception that he failed to reform the nation, he was not capable to eradicate people 
from poverty, and also was not able to minimize the corruption, collusion and nepotism 
actions. The final excess of those was the people’s demand for resignation of HM Soeharto. In 
this situation, HM Soeharto claimed that people’s assessments were not absolutely true. The 
statements were not reasonable, and only constructed by a few small group of people. Even 
more, he fenced the people who gave the statements by using words: “I am ready to against 
them. They must face with me.” He used not only denial strategy, but also counterattack, 
differentiation and opinion-knowledge dissociation strategy. It can be understood why those 
strategies were used by Soeharto, especially in a case where he was in the edge of his existence 
after held the power for 32 years.       
Different from Soeharto, BJ Habibie, in the case of crisis, admitted the failure of the 
crisis recovery was contributed by incapability of the government and governmental 
institutions. He also made apology for it and said sorry for this to the Indonesian people. He 
also promised on his statements to improve the Indonesian political, economy and social 
situation. It can be said that he used adapting strategy by admitting his failure to reform 
Indonesia and eradicate crisis. And he made clear actions for improving it. It is very 
understandable he used this strategy. Habibie was in time of image building. He needs to 
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improve his reputation after the last government administration which had very bad image on 
publics in dealing with the crisis and reformation. On the other hand, he also used self defense 
strategy by giving the statements that the weaknesses of the governments could be separated by 
the weaknesses of the New Order administration. It means that Habibie took the blame not 
only on his current administration but also on the other administration. Habibie did not want 
to take all responsibility for the failure in crisis and crisis resolution.         
Similar to Habibie’s strategies, Megawati also combined two big strategies in dealing 
with the crisis or critical cases. She used not only defending strategy but also adapting strategy. 
She tended to use adapting strategy in facing crisis in her early administration. She admitted that 
the crisis happened because of many factors, internal and external factors. The bigger one was 
the weaknesses of the Indonesian governmental institutions both in the past and present. These 
factors gave contribution to the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution. It is more than the 
factors from international situation or publics. This acknowledgment can be meant that she 
herself as a part of the government and people, took the responsibilities, although only a few, 
for the crisis. In that time her statements can be categorized as adapting strategy, more 
specifically it was an evasion strategy, admitted that a part of the crisis was contributed by her 
weaknesses of the government. In contrast, in the end of her administration, when she faced 
the people assessment to the failure of her cabinet to overcome the crisis as people expectation, 
she used defending strategy by blaming other people as a source of the failure of crisis handling. 
She emphasized on the people mentality which is more unsupportive for crisis resolution.  In 
addition to that prolonged crisis, Megawati also made distance from the wrong doing by giving 
statements that crisis in Indonesia was more difficult to be solved than it was in other countries. 
She said the difficulties of the government to solve the crisis were contributed by two things; 
(1) Indonesian people mentality; and (2) the situation of the crisis itself. It means that the crisis 
occurrence and prolonged crisis resolution were results of the problems on those factors. In the 
other part, she always reported the progresses and the positive result of her efforts in 
recovering the Indonesia’s situation after the crisis. She said that the prolonged crisis was not 
caused by the mistakes of the government. It indicates that Megawati used defending strategy, 
by shifting the blame on the other part or people. She shifted the blame to the publics and the 
crisis itself. It was called as differentiation strategy, more specifically called as counterattack 
strategy or scapegoat strategy.  
Particularly in the case of terrorism, especially in the early step of the development of 
the US’s attack to Afghanistan issue, Megawati was carefully listening to the Indonesian people 
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who criticized that Indonesian government did not take quick responses. Facing that kind of 
criticism, Megawati took hard efforts to accommodate the people wants and demands and 
tended to make similar steps what the people did.  She used accommodating strategy. On the 
other hand, when the terrorism actions were experienced by Indonesian itself (in case of Bali 
Bombing) people gave not conducive response for the government. They criticized that the 
government (c.q. Indonesian national police) had failed to maintain and establish Indonesian 
security from terrorist attacks. In the early of this time, Megawati used defending strategy by 
giving statement that terrorism could happen every where and every time. It was difficult to be 
predicted when and where terrorist would take actions, even more, the security technology 
system for terrorism in Indonesia still stayed behind. For instance, USA that has very 
sophisticated and modern military technology could not be free from terrorism acts. But in the 
same time, she also used accommodative strategy, she asked Indonesian people to fight for 
terrorism through her statements and actions. The target of audiences was more for 
international publics than national publics. The statements showed the willingness of her to 
hear Indonesian public’s voices, to be empathic for them, and together with them to do actions 
to solve the problem. It was an indication of accommodative strategy in responding to the 
crucial issues. She claimed frequently that Indonesia and the Indonesian government has been 
successful to handle the terrorism acts, not only by producing anti terror regulation, but also by 
identifying, investigating, bringing them into the court and executing them. She claimed also 
that Indonesia was more successful and consistent than US or other countries which are 
concern on the terrorism combating.   
In another case, namely corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN – KKN-Ind), 
Megawati assessed that Indonesia failed in CCN eradication even though it could not be said 
that the government’s efforts were meaningless. She always said that the government along 
with her had worked very hard for it. Since people saw that the government failed to eradicate 
CCN, Megawati shifted the blame to the other parts. She said that too many Indonesian people 
saw CCN as something not illegal and they accepted it as a part of Indonesian values and 
norms. It was the biggest of the sources of the crisis and difficult crisis resolution. She also 
blamed the law enforcement institutions, such as the Indonesian General Attorney as other 
sources of the failure. Shifting the blame to other parties is the one strategy of dissociation or 
self defense. It also means that Megawati did not definitely mention that she, as a part of the 
government, made the mistakes and did the wrongdoing about the increasing of the number of 
the CCN acts and the failure of its eradication.  Megawati also used opinion knowledge 
  




dissociation strategy since she said that CCN was the problem of all the presidents. The failure 
to eliminate CCN did not belong only to  Megawati. Megawati took the failure on the broader 
context and problem. She made apology for it but she asked for the people to think it as only a 
part of the broader context.  
All strategies used by the presidents are shown briefly on table 37 below.
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Table 37 







Tactics HM Soeharto BJ Habibie 
Case 1/Crisis Case 2/Terrorism Case 3/CCN 
Denial  √     
Counterattack √      
Differentiation Scapegoating  Shift the blame to 
the other party  
  Scapegoating /
shifting the blame   
Apology      Said sorry for the 
failure.  











Adapting Apology    Evasion  Take a few of 
responsibilities 
 
      Reducing 
offensiveness 
of the act 
 
  Corrective 
action 
   Give the statements 
about the progress 
of crisis recovery. 
Give the statements 
about the 
government’s effort 
in handling the 
terrorism acts and 
issues. 
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5.2. THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
5.2.1.   The Structured Public Relations        
 In the context of crisis, how effective of crisis management strategy of the organization can be 
product of how the organization thinks and position public relations – as a part of organization 
and representation of the publics. To resolve the crisis, it needs to build and maintain good and 
supportive relationship between the government and the publics. The relationship between the 
government and the publics can be indicated by the role and functions, the relationship model, 
mechanism and procedures of the Public Relations practices.       
  As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the Indonesian Government Public Relations 
(GPR) was constructed by the former leaders in an ideal way. It means that the government 
positioned PR function as a communication facilitator to establish an equal relationship 
between the government and its publics. As stated by the founding fathers of Indonesian GPR, 
Government Public Relations must be open for communication sharing with publics, for 
information exchange. The relationship between the government and the publics must be 
equal, means there is always high participation of the publics in the process of policy making. 
Empirically, Indonesian GPR was positioned by the government in a reverse way. GPR was 
more closed system. GPR staffs were asked to hold technical role and function and to operate 
one way communication model. They were just a tool to convey the government statements 
and voices. Procedures and mechanism for presidential communication was so formal, directed 
and controlled by the power holder.  
 This kind of Public Relations structure and communication system has been applied 
since HM Soeharto administration until Megawati’s presidency. It means that in the era of 
Megawati’s administration, the structure of the Public Relations and the presidential 
communication rules and procedures tended to be closed, mechanistic and centralistic. There 
was not an equal relationship between the Presidents and Publics Relations. This kind of 
relationship is not conducive for crisis resolution. It was worsened by the negative image of the 
presidents. Bad image, as mentioned earlier, can be an indicator of bad relationship between the 
governments and publics. All conditions can be thought as one of many contexts for crisis 
communication strategy chosen by the President.                      
 
5.2.2. The Distrustful Relationship between President and Media  
The quality of the relationship between the president and the press can be seen by observing 
the way of the press to construct the news about the president and the way of the president to 
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respond to the news or reportage about the president. How did Kompas and Media Indonesia, 
the national newspapers, look at the President’s response strategy. In fact, these news papers’ 
reportage for each case was different. There were three cases to be analyzed.  The assessment 
discrepancy that exists between news reportage and president about the government/ 
president’s performance in dealing with the crisis can be indication of the relationship between 
media and government/ president. Table 38 below describes it. 
 
Table 38 
President and the Press   
  
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
President looks at the their own 
performance 
Successful  Successful Not successful 
Media/Kompas look at the president’s 
performance  
Failed Successful Failed 
 
 
In case one, the president and media have different assessment of the government’s 
performance in dealing with the crisis. They have contradictary statements. In case of crisis 
handling and crisis recovery, media assessed that the government was not successful to recover 
the Indonesian situation after crisis. On the other hand, the government felt good with their 
performance. In case two and case three, there were similar assessments. Government admitted 
that they failed in handling the case and media said the similar statements. In the other thing, 
only in the case of terrorism media saw that the government was successful. The success is 
indicated by the degree of satisfaction of people about the government’s action in facing and 
managing the issues of crisis. Satisfaction means that the government’s efforts meet the 
people’s expectation. In contrast, in two other cases, Kompas said in a ‘negative’ manner about 
government’s performance. What does it mean? 
It is difficult to say there was no good relationship between Kompas and the President 
even though in the two cases. This media focused its reportage more on the weaknesses and 
the failure of the government. “Negative views” from media was getting increased in the end of 
the time of Megawati administration.  In contrast, in the similar time, Megawati also looked at 
the press as “her enemy”. She said that critiques from media were not longer objective, but 
tended to “kill” the government reputation.  On other side, negative views from media can be 
looked as manifestation of the media responsibility for Kompas to control and criticize the 
government. Media thought that Megawati did not have willingness to be criticized.  In this 
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case, this kind of relationship in which there was no similar, even more, opposite thought on 
viewing the same object, and tended to look down on each other was not supportive and 
conducive. It was strengthened by Megawati’s responses in which tended to defend herself 
against media which gave a bad judgment for her. In this kind of situation when she thought 
that her reputation and existence would have been destroyed by media, defending strategy was 
used by Megawati. Crisis was worsened by the communication problem, and vice verse. 
Government failed to build and maintain the relationship with the media. Government failed to 
build mutual trust and understanding between them. And it was absolutely as a representation 
of bad relationship, especially in the end of Megawati’s presidency. This kind of relationship 
might lead someone or an organization to respond to the crisis by self defending strategy. It is 
different from the situation, in which an organization or a person has good relationship with 
media. In this situation, media supposed to assist the organization or the person to solve the 
problem and focused their news report more on the positive or progress manner in crisis 
resolution.  
Good relationship between government and media, as indicated by the above criteria, 
was experienced by BJ Habibie and Gus Dur in the early of his presidency. BJ Habibie, the one 
who decided to revoke the publish permit for press, built an equal relationship between him 
and the media. Freedom of the press took place in his era. People called it as “honeymoon era” 
for both the media and the government. As explained before, at that time BJ Habibie used 
adapting strategy in dealing with the crisis. As we know, Habibie held the highest power of the 
Republic of Indonesia only less than one year. He was still in time of image building as the new 
president. It means that the factors could be the background of adapting strategy selection. The 
factors are (1) there was good supporting from media; (2) it happened in early time of his 
presidency; and (3) the crisis that it was contributed also by the government weaknesses and 
failure. The last statement indicated that there was perception of self-involvement to the crisis. 
Theoretically, if the organization thought that they also contributed to the existed crisis, it 
tended to use adapting strategy than defending strategy. It was done by Habibie.  
On the other hand, HM Soeharto, the President during New Orde administration used 
self defense strategy. He used all tactics which are grouped in defending strategy.  Why did he 
use this kind of strategy? Was there no good supporting from media for him in dealing with the 
crisis? In 1998, Soeharto was in the edge of his power. People demanded him to resign because 
of his failure to reform the country and nation. Not only Indonesia in crisis, but also he was in 
crisis. As explained on prior chapters, HM Soeharto did not want to admit that crisis existed 
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due to his or government’s failure. He did not admit his failure. There was no mistake of him 
and the government. It means that there was no self involvement in the existed crisis.  Based on 
the theory, the situation in which an organization or a person feels that they do not get 
involved on the existed crisis, it or he tended to use the defending strategy.  
 
5.2.3. Crisis Situation: the International Involvement 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the selection of strategy depends on the situation of 
crisis. This situation is characterized by; (1) crisis attribution both external and personal control, 
(2) organizational performance, and, (3) severity of crisis damage. The situation of crisis may 
vary, depends on the variety of the elements of the crisis.  According to Coombs (1998), the 
strategy selected by the Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia could be affected by the crisis 
situation. As described earlier, crisis in Indonesia in time of HM Suharto was admitted as 
something that could be denied. The crisis happened because of the external problem and 
Indonesia just received the impact of it. It means that the crisis, based on HM Suharto, the 
second President of the Republic of Indonesia, was because of the external sources. The 
control of the Indonesian government for the crisis was limited. In the case of organizational 
performance, HM Suharto thought his administration and government’s performance was 
good. He had positive self assessments about his performance. There was not any problem 
with the government even when the crisis came. It means that Suharto viewed that he had a 
good and positive organizational performance. In the other elements, Suharto also looked at 
the crisis as something not hard and did not bring big damage to Indonesia. He believed that 
Indonesia’s economy situation was quite strong to face the crisis.  
BJ Habibie, the third President of the Republic of Indonesia, looked at the crisis 
differently. He said that the crisis in Indonesia happened because of the weaknesses of 
Indonesian governments and the people’s mentality which made them not capable to face and 
manage crisis faster and in the right way. It means that Habibie tended to look at the crisis was 
because of the internal sources or internal problems in the government and governmental 
institutions. Habibie in crisis time also saw that Indonesian government did not have positive 
performance. In many parts, Habibie saw his past administration (New Orde Administration) 
failed to perform their functions. At last, he looked at the crisis was a serious problem that 
brought very negative impact for Indonesian life. Crisis was something very hard and 
dangerous so it must be handled carefully and quickly. Habibie  faced the different situation. 
The usage of this strategy can be connected to the different perception of the situation of crisis.  
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He thought that the government must be responsible for crisis resolution. These factors could 
be related to the strategy of accommodation he applied. 
In the same case, Megawati admitted that Indonesia was really in crisis. Although   she 
claimed that crisis was caused by the internal and external problems, in early of her 
administration she admitted that the crisis was caused more by the weaknesses and incapability 
of the governmental institutions to handle the crisis. She emphasized to the personal factor as 
locus of crisis. Therefore, improving the personal weaknesses is the best solution for crisis 
recovery. It means she admitted that the government’s performance was not quite good. 
Megawati also realized the damage of the crisis was so big. And in that time, she used 
accommodative strategy.  However in the end of her presidency she changed her strategy. She 
thought that the prolonged crisis was not because of her personal/ organizational fallacy. She 
took the blame on the external control. She also said that the organization’s performance in 
dealing with the crisis was very positive, and there was not any problem with it. The severity of 
the crisis damage was not so big any longer. She also thought that Indonesia was in a good 
condition. It is clear in crisis, she applied defensive strategy.  
 The explanation about the situation of crisis interpreted by each president can be 
related to the strategy of crisis response.  The different perception about situation of each crisis 
leads to the different strategy. By using Coombs’ formula, it can be understandable the three of 
the presidents used different crisis response strategy. Table 39 can be used to explain briefly 
about the situation of the crisis and crisis response strategy used by Suharto, Habibie and 
Megawati.      
 
Table 39 
 Elements of Crisis Situation 
 
Megawati  







Crisis attribution  External  Personal Personal External 
Organizational 
performance   




Severity of crisis damage Low  High High Low 
Strategy of crisis 
response 
Defensive Accommodative Accommodative Defensive
                      
 
Of course, these above crisis situations are perceptual. It is created and interpreted by 
individual, in this case is the presidents. It is the subjective assessment. So, the strategy is 
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selected on the basis of his/her perception. If compared to the Coombs statement, it looks 
quite similar that the accommodative strategy is used in the situation as follow: (1) when the 
crisis source can be controlled by an organization, (2) the organization has negative 
performance in dealing with the crisis in the past, and (3) the severity of crisis damage is high. 
In contrast, in the situation where crisis locus is outside of the organization, performance of the 
organization is positive and the degree of damage caused by the crisis is low, the strategy of 
defense is applied.  
Even though Coombs statement seems right to look at the situation of crisis as the 
factor influence to select the strategy, there are other factors that might interact with the 
strategy. As described above, the strategy of the crisis response was selected not only on the 
basis of the crisis situation, but also the other factors, such as the perception of the crisis 
responsibility and the degree of threat of image damage.  If the crisis responsibility of crisis is 
weak, the defensive strategy is more useful. In contrast, if the crisis responsibility of crisis is 
strong the strategy should be accommodative. They also mentioned the threat of image 
damage. The bigger organizational responsibility, the bigger the threat to image damage is. The 
high threat of image damage leads an organization or a person to choose accommodative 
strategy in crisis response. Let see how the presidents percept the organizational responsibility 
for the crisis. HM Soeharto clearly said that crisis happened because of the external factors. 
Those statements can be thought as the rejection of him and his cabinet to take crisis 
responsibility. Crisis responsibility of Soeharto was weak. The threat of image damage was also 
low. In fact, HM Soeharto used defensive strategy.  In contras, BJ Habibie looked at that the 
crisis has the result of the weaknesses of the government. It means that Habibie took the 
responsibility for the crisis and thought that the image damage because of crisis was high. He 
used accommodative strategy. On the other hand, in the early time, Megawati admitted that 
crisis was because of the internal problems but in the end of her administration, she said in 
different way. She said that the source of the crisis was not in the government but in the public 
mentality. It means that in early of her administration, Megawati took the responsibility, but in 
the end time she did not. In early time she thought that the image damage because of crisis was 
high but in the end time of crisis, the threat of image damage decreased. The strategy of crisis 
response was changed, from accommodative to defensive strategy.   
In the other research Coombs and Holliday (2001:321-340) mentioned the threat of 
image damage will be greater for the organization with the unfavorable relationship history than 
for the organization with favorable relationship history. In this research, Coombs and Holliday 
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said that relationship history is one part of performance history. An organization with positive 
relationship with its publics will be easier to maintain its organizational image in crisis. In 
context of this research, relationship history can be breakdown into two, those are the 
relationship between the government or president and journalists, and the general publics. As 
mentioned, in time of Megawati administration, and generally in other presidents’ 
administration, there was a point of time of favorable relationship between them. It is called  “a 
honeymoon era”. Generally it happened in early time of their administration. Megawati and 
Gus Dur have similar relationship history with the media or journalists. In early time, they have 
a favorable relationship, but in the end of time, the relationship worsened. Media told contrast 
story about crisis recovery. On the other hand, Habibie had favorable relationship with media. 
The freedom of the press developed in time of his administration. Open communication and 
interaction established in that time. Media also told in favorable way about Habibie’s 
performance. On the basis of media portrayal, it can be seen the relationship between the 
president and its general publics. When people positively saw the President’s performance, it 
can be meant that they had favorable relationship. In crisis, HM Soeharto and its publics stayed 
in unfavorable relationship and Habibie was seen by its publics in a good way. Megawati 
experienced two different situations of the relationship. These things can be understood as the 
factors that lead to the strategy of crisis response. Positive relationship probably reduced the 
degree of threat of image damage. An organization or a person with favorable relationship will 
be more secure in crisis than those with unfavorable relationship. In this condition, the strategy 
of defensive will be more useful. Refusing that she was doing wrong can be accepted easier by 
publics for the organization with favorable relationship. However, it is not to be done. 
Soeharto, with unfavorable relationship, tended to use defensive strategy. As a result of the 
crisis was going worse. Gus Dur and Megawati, in the end of their administration, used 
defensive strategy even though they did not have favorable relationship with their publics. 
Megawati in the end of her administration rejected the publics’ statement of her unsuccessful 
efforts to recover the crisis. Even more, she shifted the blame to the people. Theoretically it is 
absolutely not effective for her and the crisis resolution. And, in fact, it was. Both of them 
failed to maintain positive image on publics.  
 Let us see the cases of terrorism and corruption that had to be responded by Megawati. 
As aforementioned description, in case of terrorism, Megawati applied accommodative and 
defensive strategy in the same time. In the first time of bombing in WTC, USA (2001), when 
people criticized  that she did not have crisis sense in context of terrorism, she denied by saying 
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that the slowness of her response was symbols of carefulness of actions. The selected strategy 
can be understood by the situational factors such as the crisis was thought as external causes, 
and the severity of crisis damage for Indonesia was low. Because of the external causes, she 
thought that she should not to take the responsibility too high. It means that she and the 
government’s responsibility for this event were low. It also means that the threat of image 
damage for the President and her cabinet was low. However in time of Bali bombing (2002) 
and other terrors by bomb happened in the following time, Megawati changed her strategy. She 
used defensive strategy. These are the factors can be the basis of the strategy. The situation in 
that time was very crucial. The severity of crisis damage was very hard. The threat of image 
damage on international and national public was very high. Even more, the image of this nation 
was in danger. Unfortunately, Megawati said that crisis was unavoidable. Terrorism acts could 
happen every time and everywhere. She thought that the source of the crisis was from external, 
although she admitted that the military and police institutions’ performance were not quite 
good also. In contrast, when the terror by bomb was still ongoing and increasing in frequency 
and intensity, and when it was followed by negative responses from the other countries and 
international world, when media saw the failure of the government in anticipating bombing, 
Megawati changed her strategy. She thought that her image was in danger if she and the 
government could do nothing. She tended to be more responsive for listening to public’s 
voices, actively created statements about government action and position in relation to the 
international world, adaptive to the dynamic public discourse. It was an indicator of corrective 
action strategy and mortification. The two tactics are categorized in the accommodative 
strategy. The factors mentioned by Coombs were not enough to be used. There were any other 
factors such as media and international public pressures which also give contribution to the 
person or organization in strategy selection. On the case of terrorism, the media and publics’ 
negative assessment are seen clearly as the important factors which have connection with the 
defensive strategy.  
It can be learned from the case of Megawati that in creating strategy to respond to the 
terrorism issue and bombing acts. Megawati used two different strategies in the different 
situation and time. According to the Ihlen’s research, the strategy can be changed if the initial 
response or strategy could not be accepted and it is criticized by media and publics. The change 
of the strategy done by Megawati in terrorism issues can be understood as well as the 
aforementioned phenomenon.  In the case of terrorism, I formulate that the factors, such as 
media ‘negative’ tension, high degree of threat to image/reputation damage and high degree of 
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potential damage of crisis lead to the change of strategy. Based on several researches about 
corporate strategy in responding crisis, commonly the person or organization used defense 
strategy rather than adapting or accommodating strategy in the initial phase of crisis 















  High threat of      Negative pressure of the press 
  image damage       High potential  and international and local people 
          crisis damage 
 
 
In 2004, fourth year of her presidency, Megawati seemed to be highly confident in responding 
to the terrorism issues. She had directly confronted to the other developed countries, asked for 
their real action toward the terrorism. Even, she challenged those countries to be consequent in 
dealing with the international terrorism, by giving statement that Indonesia was the most 
consequent for that matter. That action took positive attention of the media and people. The 
result of it, they supported Megawati in taking clear action and statement. In that situation, 
there was a supported relationship among Megawati, people and media.   
How about the case of corruption eradication by Megawati? As explained before, media 
assessed that she and her cabinet failed in eradicating corruption. Government did it by an half 
of heart, not serious and not followed by a real action. However, Megawati had the same self 
assessment. She thought that she and her cabinet failed in corruption eradicating. Although, 
both of them have the same assessment, actually, they had different strategy in giving the 
statement. Megawati admitted that failure but she did not admit that the failure was contributed 
by their ineffective efforts. She blamed the other parties as the source of this failure, such as the 
Indonesian people mentality, feudalistic behavior, improper policy and practices that had been 
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scapegoating and opinion-knowledge strategy. In other way Kompas saw that government gave 
big contribution in that failure, beside the other contributions. It means that there was a 
difference between government and Kompas in looking at the failure.  
Even though, Kompas and Megawati had the same opinion about the government 
performance in handling the corruption issues, it did not mean that there was a mutual 
understanding or supporting relationship between them, as well as in the case of terrorism. 
Kompas frequently connected the failures or weaknesses of the government to their failure of 
corruption eradication. Corruption thought by media, and also by Megawati herself, as the main 
root of crisis and any problem in Indonesia, remained as the root problem and unsolved matter 
for the government. Kompas mentioned this things so many times, even though, in contrast, 
Megawati did not mention it as many as Kompas did. Even, Kompas did not fully trust 
Megawati about her statement to eradicate corruption and all of causes in the early of her 
presidency.  Kompas viewed that statement was only purposed to construct her good image, 
get attention and sympathy of the Indonesian people. Distrust of Kompas to the Megawati’s 
commitment for eliminating corruption can be understood as the criteria of the absence of 
supporting relationship from media to the government.  The rejection of Megawati that she was 
doing ineffectively as media said is also the criteria of the distrustful relationship between them. 
On this situation of the relationship, the crisis was still going on and tended to be ever lasting 
problem.      
Let us see how the crisis situation influences an action. Corruption was an ongoing and 
unsolved problem for Indonesian government and people. Almost all president of the Republic 
of Indonesia faced this kind of problem. For certain people or groups, corruption was thought 
as a part of Indonesian culture and as a normal behavior for Indonesian society.  For them, it is 
the main reason of the failure of almost all governments to eradicate corruption acts.  However, 
Megawati did not think this   problem as the crucial or critical problem that could threaten her 
image. In the early period of her presidency, she looked at this issue as one of all important 
programs of her cabinet, and even though Indonesia was given international label as the worst 
country in corruption acts in the world.  
Compare to the terrorism issues, the commitment of Megawati in the case of 
corruption was relatively weaker.  Even though media and local people gave hard pressure to 
her to take real and quick action, it was not given by international publics. Terrorism got 
attention much more than corruption. There were international publics involved in terrorism.  
The reason was the terrorism and its impacts could be experienced by all nations. This is an 
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international issue and problem, also international threats. Different from terrorism, corruption 
in Indonesia is a local and internal problem. Thus, in this case, international publics’ pressures 
were absence. Corruption was less important and it was not urgent for her and not to be 
priority. She also thought that her image would not be destroyed by her failure to eradicate 
corruption. She felt save even though media criticized her in the negative way because the 
relationship performance history in this case was also negative. Megawati also rejected to take 
responsibility for this failure. Those were some reasons and factors which became the 
background of her strategy.           
 It means that there are other factors contributing to the selection of crisis response 
strategy. Table 40 shows all contributed factors might contribute to the selection and 
effectiveness of crisis response strategies, both in terrorism and corruption issues.  
 
Table 40 










1. Crisis attribution External  Personal External 
2. Organizational performance Negative Positive Positive 
3. The severity of crisis damage Low High Low 
The threat to 
 Image/ reputation damage 
 Low  High Low 
Organization or person’s responsibility  Low   High Low 
Media and local public pressure High  High High 
International public pressure Low  High Low 
Relationship history/performance Negative Positive Negative 
Strategy Defensive Accommodative Defensive 
 
  
If it is analyzed by statement of Coombs, (1) crisis situation, such as crisis attribution, 
organizational performance, and the degree of severity of crisis image; (2) the threat of image 
damage; (3) organizational or person’s crisis responsibility; and (4) the relationship history or 
performance are the determinant factors for an organization or a person in selecting the 
strategy. It is because the strategy of defense or accommodation/ adaptation can be applied in 
various situations of crisis.  However, there is another factors can be related to the strategy 
selection. Table 40 shows that there are three additional factors, these are (1) media and local 
public pressure, and (2) international public pressure/ international public involvement, and (3) 
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the relationship with media and publics. In three cases, only in terrorism issues, international 
publics are involved. And, in the end stage of terrorism, the relationship between government 
and press and publics was positive. It means that accommodation strategy is selected on the 
situation when international publics’ pressures exist and the relationship with publics is positive 
and supportive.  
 On this context, I can draw a conclusion that the action of the organization or 
organizational members can be based on their thinking or perception about the crisis situation. 
Strategy of crisis response or image restoration is selected and applied on the basis of their 
interpretation of what they see or hear about the crisis. It means that crisis situation becomes to 
be very perceptual than factual. However it becomes to be very real data for the organizational 
or personal decision making processes. An action is created relies on what can people think, not 
on the real fact. It is an important reason to explain the factor that may lead the failure or 
ineffectiveness of the certain strategy of crisis response.    
  In conclusion I want to put all factors mentioned above as the external factors, outside of 
the organization or within the environment. It means that there is interaction between an 
organization and its environment. The action taken by an organization is determined by the 
organization itself and its environment, vice verse. In crisis, any strategy is selected on the basis 
of the organizational structure and the environment’s pressure and the strategy selected by the 
organization affects the crisis situation, the organizational structure and the social political 
structure in the larger system.      
                
5.2.4. The Government: Rules and Resources 
In an organizational context, structuration theory can be adopted to analyze how action and 
structure interacts to accomplish their decision making goals.  According to the Poole in his 
theory ‘adaptive structuration theory’, rules are understood as “propositions that indicate how 
something ought to be done or what is good or bad.” These rules contain members’ collective 
practical wisdom on how best to reach to the group goals. The resources that individual bring 
to the task are “materials, possessions or attributes that can be used to influence or control the 
actions of the group or its members.” (Griffin 2003:249).  Personal relationship is thought as 
one of resources for the decision making process. So does the expertise, capability, knowledge, 
communication skill and the other attributes of the members of the organization. Rules and 
resources interact one to another to shape action, and vice verse. The other key concept of 
structuration theory is interaction. Poole said in his theory that interaction between structure 
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and action means “the decision (as the organizational action –writer) not only is affected by the 
structure of the group, but at the same time it also has an effect upon those same rules and 
resources.” Rules and resources are not medium but also the outcome of interaction.  
According to the structuration theory, it can be predicted that the strategy of the 
president and the government in responding crisis is affected by organizational rules and the 
materials, knowledge, skill, and capability of the President, as the member of the government, 
and in contrast, those rules and resources are affected by the strategy of the president in 
responding to the crisis. There is interaction and interplay between an action and a structure. It 
is called as duality of structure. Rules can be understood as norms, regulation, law, common 
practices which is ought to be done or determine what is good or bad for the government. In 
context of strategy of crisis responses, rules can be manifested as the commonly public 
relations practices and regulations. Resources mean President’s characters which might have 
connection with the crisis response actions. It can be the skill of communication, capability to 
build relationship with her important publics such as media and the publics both national and 
international. These resources interact with rules and it shapes and is shaped by the strategy of 
crisis responses. 
  
5.2.4.1. Tight Rules and the Mindlessness   
Structurally, the unit that is responsible for handling Public Relations functions did not exist in 
the State Secretariat53. These departments functionally hold the organizationally administrative 
tasks for the president and her cabinet. A few of these tasks is preparing data which is needed 
by the President for composing the text of the speech, performing the other of the state 
information services and also documentation and information services. It means that these 
tasks are one of many Public Relations functions. Operationally, it is  implemented 
operationally, such as:  (1) managing the president or cabinet’s media relations activities, such a 
press conference, writing press release; (2) documenting and keeping archives about President’s 
communication and activities (3) distributing information about President’s agenda and 
activities to the important publics. These activities can be called as presidential communication 
management tasks.   
It was explained in the first chapter about presidential communication management that 
there are differences between one president and the others.  In general, there is no the pattern 
                                                 
53 State secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into five departments: (1) State secretariat, (2) 
cabinet secretariat, (3) President Secretariat, (4) Vice President Secretariat, and (5) President Military 
Secretariat. 
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or written rules which regulate the presidential communication management. It means that 
almost all presidents relied their communication to the publics on the individually practices. It 
caused the rules of presidential communication management was never to be recognized by all 
presidents. There was no settled communication system that became a guide for the president, 
and also for all presidents. Each president’s communication practices relied more on their own 
traits, characteristics, capability, knowledge, needs and interests, and also the situation that had 
to be faced. It means that the communication pattern of the president relied more on the 
resources. It could be that there is interaction between rules and resources. It will be medium 
and also output for the strategy which is done by the presidents to construct their image during 
the time of crisis. 
 Even though there were no common rules of presidential communication, in general 
the tendency of communication pattern can be looked from the communication practices of 
the Presidents. Beside HM Soeharto who had quite settled communication system, the next 
presidents, including KH Abdurrahman Wahid, generally applied a certain pattern of 
presidential communication. As described in the earlier chapter, HM Soeharto’s communication 
system could be categorized as closed, formal, linier, and centralized. It followed his political 
leadership which was more authoritative than democratic. It was thought that it had connection 
to his military background and the Javanese culture which has brought him the values of 
feudalism. On the other hand, BJ Habibie’s communication style was more open, not too 
formal, decentralized and concerned more on dialogue than one way communication. It was 
thought that it was the result of had a relation to his western education background, so that it 
influenced much more on his attitude toward freedom of the press and political leadership. As 
described on the first chapter, I have linked these factors to the strategy which was selected by 
them in the time of crisis.  I wrote in earlier chapter that it might be the factors which 
interacted with the strategy in crisis responses.  
How about Megawati? I have described that she applied two kind of opposite crisis 
strategies, defending and accommodating strategy for three cases she had to face. Is there any 
connection between the strategy selected by her and the communication system or pattern, and 
also her personal characteristics, as well as the two aforementioned presidents?  
 In the following paragraphs, it will be described the communication rules and practices 
of Megawati and her political leadership style, and the personal characters of her which have 
connection with her selected strategy in constructing her image during crisis. As described 
before, there was no settled presidential communication system in her institution. The early 
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time of her presidency, it seemed she welcomed the press. Not so much different from Gus 
Dur, the President before her, the relation between the press and her was so closed and 
friendly. Megawati was in early time in image building after she had been elected to be the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia for the period of 2001-2004. The friendliness of 
Megawati-Press can be understood as the efforts of her to build her image as a reformist and 
democratic person the two prior presidents, Habibie and Gus Dur. These two things were very 
important to get public’s sympathy and support. It was truly effective in the first nine months 
of her administration. As described in chapter one and four, the image of Megawati on publics 
was better than those of the earlier presidents. The honeymoon era for Megawati and the 
Indonesian press was too short. When media assessed her performance in the first year of her 
administration in a negative manner, she began to react to the statements of media negatively. 
She judged that media were less balanced in reportage. Media focused more on the weaknesses 
or failures, but not on the progress or positive improvement of her performance.  
In the part of personal communication capability, Megawati had been known as a 
person who was not quite talkative in publics’ space. She was absolutely contradictive with Gus 
Dur. People called her as “Mrs Silent”, and in contrast, Gus Dur was called as person who was 
“talking too much”.  Some people said that Megawati’ silence is the communication style which 
she chose, which were emphasized on the principle of carefulness, high self control, and good 
communication management. However for the other people, it was the weaknesses of 
Megawati, especially if she was compared to the other presidents54. It was more seen as the 
weakness of her personal characters than her communication strategy in the president election. 
Some people saw that the character was not conducive for her reputation and image building. 
In fact, some people saw that it made her seems not credible. Her communication performance 
during her period of presidency made her lost of public sympathy because people associated 
the communication skill with the intellectual capacity.  Refusing public debate as a part of 
political campaign by Megawati and also rejecting “door stop interview” were thought by some 
people as the strategy of her and her political party to hide her intellectual incapability, more 
over when she had to argue with the other president candidates. Refusing public debate in 
presidential campaign was based on her reasons, they were: (1) it was not appropriate for 
Indonesian culture, and (2) it was not written on the general election regulation. These reasons 
reaped criticism. Even though she did not have official spokespersons, for some important 
                                                 
54  That Megawati was not too much talking was being to be the one of biggest criticism and very constraint 
for her in the competition in the general election 2004. However, for some people, this kind image her political 
and intellectual capability was not appropriate for participating in political field.  
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public issues, Megawati used her Ministers or her state secretary, including her husband, to 
convey the statement to the publics. It was employed also for her written textual speeches. 
Related ministers or expert staffs were responsible for preparing her speeches, both in informal 
or formal meeting.  It means that one of the public relations functions was held by these 
people. The presidential secretariat which was set up as the public relations department for the 
President did not get involve directly in composing the President speeches.55 More than this, a 
few people saw that some of Megawati’s policies, decisions and statements were not genuinely 
her own thought and wisdom but they were just product of her inner circle staffs’ voices56.  
Megawati, for some people, was assessed as the puppet and her inner circle staffs were the 
mastermind, powered people behind the scenes. In general, she was much more silent than 
giving statements.          
Some people also thought that her experience as a political party leader did not support 
her to be a president. Practical politic experience as a leader of political party could not be an 
indicator that she was capable to be the President. Some people saw she only capable to be a 
leader for her own party but not for the country. The assessment was coming because she 
almost never gave verbal statement to respond to the Indonesian public issues which needed 
her comment, response and reaction. People did not understand and know her intellectual 
capability. People also felt difficult to know her thought, vision and mission about certain issue, 
partially national issues. People though that as the president, she should be responsive, active 
and competent to deal with the national problem, not only with the internal political party 
problem. It can be accepted when in the following time, she was also assessed as the president 
who had low level in intellectual, especially when she was compared to other president 
candidates.  
                                                 
55 It was also associated with the education background and her experience in the field of political practices. 
Megawati did not finish her study in university.  She held high school graduation certificate for getting 
involved in presidential election. She was also imaged as a housewife than carrier woman, as well as she 
herself constructed her own image.  She liked mentioning herself by the word “your mother”. It means that she 
looked at her image as a woman who is a mother, both constructed by herself and some people, was positive 
for gaining many more voters.   
56 Not too different from Gus Dur, some people saw many decisions and policies of Megawati were very 
influenced by the closed people around her. They were called “whisperer”, people who always give the 
opinion, information and even suggestion for every events and issues to the presidents. This people always 
tried hard to persuade her for giving reaction about the issues as they expected. In case of Gus Dur, people 
thought that because of his handicap, he delegated information seeking to his expert staffs or people who 
“seated” around him. And, unfortunately, they sometimes tended to be manipulative, giving bias information 
which are contaminated by their own interests and goals. Gus Dur would have been limited by his physical 
handicap and Megawati by education background and gender.     
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Some people looked at Megawati as the “Soekarno57’s daughter” not as Megawati itself. 
Megawati was just the shadow of his father. Additionally, it was used by her and her political 
party in their campaign. Being a Soekarno’s daughter was the “anchor” of their presidential 
campaign. It was really constructed and deliberated political communication of her. By her own 
intention, she always enforced and established that kind of image. It was believed as a benefit 
for her and the political party to win the election.  Believe it or not, it was one of many reasons 
why people voted her.     
That Megawati is a woman was also a part of the people perception of her incredibility. 
By Islam perspective, woman is inhibited to be a leader, so a certain group rejected her to be 
the president58. There are several groups which hold those values. Not only Islam perspective, 
some people who still hold paternalism see a woman should not be chosen as a public leader. 
Few ethnics in Indonesia that were paternalistic posit a woman as the second level human, 
lower than a man. In these ethnics, the presidential campaign of Megawati, by using the 
message anchor “woman empowerment” was not effective, even more it was rejected. 
Other controversial perception about her personal attributes which kept going on 
during her presidency and during the time close to the general election 2004. She, on one hand, 
was not disturbed by these controversies, but on other hand, she finally defensed herself to 
encounter these controversies. Sumarno (2002) wrote eight of Megawati’s personal attributes 
which were very controversial and debatable, these are: (1) too silent, introvert and passive; (2) 
enigmatic, mysterious, difficult to be understood; (3) conservative, could not accept easily new 
political values which were very dynamic; (4) affirming to be the cult for her loyal follower; (5) 
low level in intellectual capacity; (6) capable only for the leader of her group; (7) unstable 
attitude in selecting the members of her political party; (8) less initiative and ideas. The 
controversy means that all characters above were debated and had double opposite meaning in 
the different publics. Her followers created meaning in the more positive side than out of her 
                                                 
57 Soekarno was the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. For many people, Soekarno was the 
charismatic President. Therefore Megawati as his daughter was seen as the same as him.  The character of 
Indonesian voters was irrational and traditional so they tended not to concern on the rational and intellectual 
capability of the candidates of the Presidents when they voted.     
58 About the issue, it was a very hot debate in time of president’s campaign era. Debate met various 
perspectives who looked at that issue in the different or even contradictive view. Group who brings the values 
of gender equality looked the issue positively. It was a good time for an Indonesian woman to be a public 
leader. For other group, a woman as Megawati profiled, was associated to the person who has strength more 
on the domestic role than public role. So, she was not appropriate to be the President. Indonesia that was in 
very hard crisis needs a leader who was very strong, capable and competent. And, for this group, Megawati 
was rejected as a President.  
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followers. These eight points were the resources which can influence the decision making and 
her action. In fact, Megawati had failed to be a winner in the second step of presidential 
election 2004.   
  Table 41 describes the personal characteristics of Megawati which were very constraint 
for the presidential election. Almost all attributes triggered controversy and debate.   
 
Table 41 




Although it was highly controversial, she was still silent, not talking too much about the 
national political public issues. She did not give much attention for this controversy. She was 
still as the person who was always silent, passive and not responsive. She was really an introvert 
person as mentioned by her little daughter and many other people.  However for her loyal 
followers, it was an indication of her power, and it is the reason she was thought very 
competent and deserved to be the President. 
Referring to the structuration theory that is adopted by Poole for the context of 
organization, these resources and rules (or structure) will interact with the action.  It means that 
an action can be shaped by the structure and the structure can be shaped by the action. In a 
                                                 
59 Srikandi is the warrior woman, a character in the story of Indonesian leather puppet show (“wayang”). She 
is very strong, likes to help people from suffering, popular and influenced. Ratu Adil is an Indonesian concept 
for symbolizing the struggle movement of the people in order to promote justice. It is adapting the original 
concept of social movement called “messiah movement”. Concept of “Mother of Nation” also symbol of the 
people who has a great willingness to protect and save the powerless people, children of nation. The three 
concepts were      
Positive/ Pro   Negative/Contra  
• High skill of communication management/ 
communication strategy 
• Low skill of political communication 
• It was time for woman to be the public leader  
• Warrior woman, “Srikandi”,  “Ratu Adil”, “Mother of 
Nation”59. 
• A woman could not be a public leader 
• A woman can be meant: weak, passive, not 
responsive, emotional, silent, not expressive, 
introvert 
• The daughter of Soekarno 
• Capable to create loyal and fanatic followers 
• To be a cult for her followers 
•  “Just the shadow” of her father  
•   Using the name of Soekarno was only the 
strategy to increase and improve Megawati’s 
image in the political field.  
• All people have right to be the President   
• Political knowledge and intellectual capacity did not 
have to be received as a formal education.  Informal 
and daily life experience is a very fruitful education.   
• Low level in practical politic experience and 
education 
• Low level in intellectual capacity 
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case of crisis, the strategy selected by Megawati was the action as a product of the decision 
making process. This action, according to Poole’s conception, was produced when Megawati 
used her present rules and resources in her interaction with publics, and when the action was 
replicated and done repeatedly, Megawati did reproduction of the rules and resources.  It can be 
said that the strategy of crisis response by Megawati was produced by the usage of common 
presidential communication management practices and her personal resources in interaction 
with her colleagues and publics.  
Based on the description about the presidential communication management of the 
Megawati’s administration, we can look that some PR functions and roles are a part of 
Presidential Secretariat Unit’s tasks and responsibilities.  It is supported by the statements of the 
Head of Bureau of Press and Media, the Presidential Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia and 
President Decree about task and function of Cabinet Secretary which that the roles and 
function of this bureau was emphasized only on the technical things of information 
dissemination. Their staffs do not participate in determining the content of institutional or 
organizational statement or information will be conveyed to the publics. They are not official or 
presidential spokespersons who create and disseminate message by their own words. As 
mentioned before, in the era of Megawati’s administration, there were not formal presidential 
spokespersons60 even though people criticized her that she could not be a qualified 
spokesperson and public relations for herself. As also has mentioned in earlier chapters, 
Megawati, by her personal communication style, tended to create one single communicator, one 
way traffic communication model and block feedback message from its publics. It can be 
related to the role and functions of her staffs in her institution in which focus more on 
technical tasks than on managerial tasks. The opposite and contradictive assessments between 
her and publics about her personal and institutional performance can be an indicator of the 
existence of unequal relationship between her and its public, including the media persons.               
Table 42 identifies more clearly and briefly the rule and resources which are broken 
down into some technical things: (1) role and functions of PR; (2) PR/communication model 






                                                 
60 Comparing to Gus Dur’s era, he inaugurated several president’s spokesperson, even though he was used to 
give some statements by himself.      
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Table 42 







Technical Roles/Communication Technician: 
• Preparing and handling press conference 
• Composing and distributing press release 
• Printing and publishing organizational 
information 




• Graduated from High School 
• Housewife 
• Woman 
• The daughter of Ir Soekarno, the first of 





• Weak/ not stable 
• Conservative 
• Passive/ not responsive 
 
Press agentry/Public information model: 
• Providing information about president activities 
• Preparing news stories that reporters will use 
• Convincing reporter to publicize the presidential 
information 
• Getting good name or reputation of the president 
into the media 
• Keeping bad publicity out of the media 
• Getting maximum publicity  
 
Working experience: 
• The leader of political party 
• The members of the Parliament 
• Vice President 
• President 
 
Organizational communication model: 
• One way communication 





• One way communication 
• Reserved person 
 
 
When crisis came, the action or strategy chosen by Megawati can be linked with those 
attributes. It means that the rules and resources were used for the action she did, in dealing with 
the publics and crisis itself. What personally action by Megawati could not be free from the 
rules and resources. In the same time, what Megawati’s action shaped or made stable the rules 
and resources. 
For instance, the introvert attitude or behavior leads her to be reserved person. She 
chose to be silent to respond to the certain public issues. This attitude also led her not to speak 
spontaneously or communicate face to face or dialogue with publics easily and she preferred to 
speak in formal and structured events, read the text which had been prepared by her expert 
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staffs and limited the time to others who asked her statements. It was always used by her even 
though many people asked her to speak up and be responsive toward the publics’ curious. It 
means that so many people wanted her to change and improve her communication 
competence, she remained her communication style. She always reproduced and strengthened 
the structure. She preferred to make something not change or stable to do something made 
differently. She was conservative, not comfortable with something new or different from usual. 
She made the model of the organizational communication match to her style, one way and 
centralized.  However in the same time, her conservativeness was more firmed when 
organizational communication practices kept running as well61.   
Megawati who was a leader of one of the big political parties brought influences in her 
leadership style as the President. People saw that Megawati was a “Queen” for her loyal and 
traditional followers. As a queen, her power will be stronger if she lives as an ascetic, to shut up 
in a long time. The more she spends time for meditation, the more power she gets. The more 
she shuts up and draws herself from social interaction, the more powerful she is. Based on this 
analogy, Megawati who was cult for her followers did the same way, even when she was a 
President. She thought that there was no something to be changed. She spoke up only in the 
internal event of her political party even though some people criticized her that she was now  a 
President, a leader for all Indonesian people, not only for her followers in her party. Her 
leadership style as the leader of political party was still used when she was a president.  The 
same action was done to respond to the different event and situation. It means that there was a 
reproduction process, strengthen the existed structure. Structure will be more stable. The more 
stable the structure, the more powerful it leads people action. Megawati could not freely change 
the structure because she did not change the action. She could not change the action easily 
because she was leaded by the existed stable structure. 
In the context of public relations function, an organizational communication system 
will be formed as a close system than an open system. PR staffs or practitioners tend to be 
functionary than functional. Functionary means people who just do what they asked to do. 
They work and do the activities on the basis of command. For the person like Megawati, who is 
conservative, passive, reserved and introvert, a close system will be more comfortable. She and 
then posits her PR staffs emphasized more on the task dealing with the communication 
                                                 
61 Roles and functions of the president secretary were not changed so significantly in the era of Megawati. 
Comparing to those of Gus Dur administration, there was not something so different in the organizational 
structure of the state secretary, but only in spokespersons. As mentioned before, Gus Dur has official and 
formal spokespersons.     
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technical thing. In this position, Megawati felt safe and secure. She felt dominant and powerful, 
and so there was no channel and opportunity to transmit critics to her. The unit which is closed 
system fit for the characters of Megawati. The comfort feeling made her did not want to change 
something. There was no opposite tension which pressured her, so she kept her attitude and 
behavior and felt nothing wrong with it.  PR in a closed system means that they do not need 
too many interactions with the environment because they think that they can survive by 
themselves. They can fix, revitalize and survive by using themselves as a basis of their own rules 
and resources. PR in a close system sees resources could not take from its environment and it is 
not depended on that. The relationship with the publics tends to be asymmetrical and using one 
way communication model. PR staffs as representative and functionary of the organization was 
dominant in information sharing. Including in the relation to the journalist, PR staffs are the 
source of information, so there is information exchange equally. The journalists work for PR 
function. An organization deliberately hires journalists to handle press function. In many cases, 
it is usual PR staffs who handle journalist functions: constructing, producing and distributing 
institutional information. Everything is done by them and for them.   
Megawati did the same way. She thought that everything would be right and running 
well by her own efforts.  She did not necessary to take environment’s resources to make her 
and her cabinet survived. She just relied on the expert staffs, the ministers in her cabinet for 
responding to the public and crucial issues and than everything well done. For the external 
communication, she hired few journalists to compose and distribute information about her and 
her cabinet. For the internal communication, the president secretariat handled the PR functions 
in information sharing and distribution.  
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the government institution 
preferred a closed system to an open system. It was followed by the other character that the 
relationship between the organization and its publics, including media people, tended to be 
unequal or not symmetrical. An organization handled the power in information constructing, 
producing and distribution and its publics have less opportunity and channel to transmit their 
voices. As a result of this condition, the organizational action might not be the product of the 
interaction between an organization and its public. In a case of crisis, the president’s action to 
respond to it was not the product of the equal interaction with the publics. President as an 
individual was more dominant and determinant for what should be done. She formed the rule 
and the resources more stable and firmed. She used both when she interacted with the publics 
in making action. The close bureaucracy system and her personal character that tends to be 
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introvert and mindless leads her to create one way communication and unequal relationship 
with the publics, including with media and journalists.  
As described before, the relationship between Megawati and the press was not in 
harmony.  It was not only because the media could not get much more important public 
information from her but also there was no trust between them. This kind of relationship was 
not different from the relationship that was constructed with the publics. The assessment of 
publics toward the Megawati’s performance almost in all years of her administration and in 
almost all fields, especially in dealing with the crisis, indicated that there was no positive 
support from publics to her. In general, Megawati respond to it by using defensive strategy with 
few different tactics. According to the explanation, it can be said that there might be links 
among the rules and resources, the relations between president and the media and publics and 








According to the structuration theory, an action can be shaped by the structure and in the same 
time the action shapes the structure. There is a process of production which makes change and 
reproduction which makes stability. It means that there is duality or interplay between an action 
















one way  
Action/Response 
Self defensive- 
blaming the others 
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resources guided or led her, in the same time, the strategy of her created new rules and 
resources or strengthen the existed structure. Actually she could not blame the press or publics 
when, by her perception, the press assessed her performance did not as she wished. On the 
basis of adapting structuration theory by Poole, people, the organization’s members, frequently 
complaint for the uncomfortable rules of the organization as if it is formed without their 
participation. Poole said that every rules and resources of the organization, good or bad, are 
formed by its members. They are frequently not conscious of their contribution for that 
uncomfortable rules and resources. It means that an action can be taken consciously or 
unconsciously and both shape the structure.  
Megawati who many times complained to the press, other institutions or the other 
parties in some cases for uncomfortable situation and tended to blame those parties for the 
wrong doing, as Poole said, she might be unaware that her action contributed also to the 
situation. When she blamed the general attorney in case of her failure to eliminate corruption, 
actually she herself formed the professionalism of the Indonesian attorneys. In other case, 
when she shifted the blame to the international world in the case of terrorism, she actually 
contributed to the international responses. When she shifted the blame to to other parties, such 
as Indonesian people mentality, in case of crisis, actually she was the person who was 
responsible for the mentality building. The wrongdoing in the structure, consciously or not, was 
contributed by individual action. So, there is interplay between the structure and the agency, 
there is production and reproduction of the structure.         
            
5.2.4.2. Unsupportive Political Situation 
Explanation about crisis situation in the earlier paragraph shows that it is so difficult to draw a 
conclusion on the basis of the empirical data about the strategy applied by Megawati in 
responding the crisis. Three different cases were responded by the similar strategy, those were 
dissociation/defensive strategy, even though in the end of crisis stage of terrorism case, 
Megawati changed her strategy to be accommodative strategy. For these cases, it can be 
concluded that whatever crisis situation, Megawati applied dissociation strategy or self defense 
strategy. Crisis situation was not determinant factor for crisis strategy selection.  
When the crisis situation can be called as a system’s environment, and when it is 
analyzed by using an open system theory, it can be said that the organizational action is 
determined by the situation of the environment. In many public relations cases, an  action to 
respond to the crisis can not be separated from the environment situation. It means that there 
  
                                                                                        226  
are double interactions between an organization as an open system and crisis situation as the 
situation which tight on the environment. According to the empirical data above, this 
explanation about the open system cannot be applied to explain what Megawati’s strategies. It 
seems more quite relevant to be said that the selected strategy was more influenced by the 
organizational rules and the individual resources of the organization.  
It is quite different from the case of terrorism in which in the end stage of the case, 
Megawati used accommodative strategy. The action was taken by Megawati not because the 
crisis situation which pressured her. Need to note that the terrorism issue was a little bit 
different from the two other cases. The terrorism happened in Indonesia became the  
international issues because it involved the other countries, even, the international world, where 
as the two other cases, such corruption and crisis, were the national problems. The pressure of 
the international world, including the international mass media can be the other important 
factor, besides the structural factor. When the international world is also “playing the games”, 
more and less it pressures the international social or political situation. There will be more high 
tension for the national situation, especially for the Indonesian government. It means also that 
in case of terrorism, Megawati did not face directly to the national publics or Indonesian 
people, but the other nations and people. For Megawati, it was more influent for image 
building. So, she wanted to be more democratic looking on her publics by using 
accommodative or adaptive strategy. In the terrorism case, the Indonesia’s social and political 
situation was created more by the international situation than national situation. However, in 
other cases, political situation was more influenced by the Indonesian problem itself. On those 
cases, political situation was not conducive for Megawati to resolve the crisis. The people’s 
pessimism and distrust toward the capability of Megawati to resolve any crisis made political 
situation worse and in turn it made the crisis also worse. There was no positive contribution 
from the political situation. It means that the crisis situation interacts also with the political 
situation. In case of Megawati’s administration, it was so clear that the political situation was 
coloring the crisis and the strategy of the crisis response. Compared to the political situations of 
the three cases, the terrorism gave more bad impact on the political situation that in turn gave 
higher tension for Megawati to build good image on international publics’ view.   
Model 11 describes all factors which are reciprocally interacting, which can explain the 
reasoning factors for selecting of the crisis response strategy. Strategy applied by the president, 
as a repeated action, in turn creates a structure. Self defensive strategy applied by Megawati 
becomes an organizational and social structure when it is applied repeatedly.  This strategy will 
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be a norm, value, even rule of this society in responding to the forthcoming crisis.  In turn the 
structure constrains and helps the next presidents, leaders or people in society to select the 
crisis communication strategy. It means, the next presidents will use the same strategy that is 
the defensive strategy. The defensive strategy finally becomes one of social structures.           
 
Model 11 
Contextual Factors in Crisis Communication Strategy Choice 
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It is too simple to explore the background factors in the process of selection of the crisis 
response strategy lay down only on the system theory although it is acceptable to conclude that 
action is constrained by structure. Research shows that many actions made by the President to 
respond to the crisis are determined by the previous structure. In the three crisis cases, the 
actor just to be a part of the system and follows the old structure. It means that the structure 
helps and enables an organization or a person to feel more comfortable and secure in decision 
making and creating action, even in crisis situation. Behaving or doing action on the present 
CRISIS 
    ORGANIZATION 
 
Structure         Rules 
                        Resources 
ACTION/STRATEGY 
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“track” is seen as the easy way to avoid unnecessary risks. It means that there is a reinforcement 
or establishment or reproduction of the rules and resources. Learning from Megawati in dealing 
with the crisis, she chose defensive strategy on the basis of the “old” structure that had been 
made by the previous Indonesian presidents. The defensive strategy that applied by the past 
leaders to be the structure for the current and next leaders. The structure is more dominant that 
the agency. In these cases, the agent is not capable to make some new actions and to create new 
structure. Moreover, she just shifted the blames to the old structure and thought the “old” 
structure as a kind of heritance which is not avoidable and changeable. It means that the 
structure reproduction is more applicable, even though in the crisis situation.  
 However, by applying the structuration theory, it is important to note that the structure 
is created by the repetitive individual actions. It means that the actor is not just a part of the 
system, but they are agents who are able to produce a structure in a system. Agent has ability to 
use the rules and resources to make new action, and in turn to produce the new structure. 
Megawati might forget that with her modality as power, dominance and legitimacy, she could 
do some actions to replace or to change the old one. In crisis, in which the situation is more 
unpredictable, uncertain and urgent, and so many factors are getting more involved, doing 
change or ‘walking not on the existed track’ is very important. The decision maker should not 
do just by laying down on the rule because the rule itself sometimes to be questioned and 
reconstructed. Therefore crisis sometimes followed by a communication crisis in which people 
hold their own perception and interpretation in decision making processes. A fact is something 
blurred. Data are getting more multi interpretative. In crisis, the information which is very 
dynamic, changeable, unpredictable, uncertain, equivocal, ambiguous, and sometimes 
controversial. The statements given by an organization or a person in the point of time of crisis 
sometimes is incoherent and inconsistent with the existed structure. Quick response is very 
important to take. “Take action quickly, don’t waste time too much and too long” is a key 
statement in crisis. If an organization is in crisis, many ‘new’ actions must be taken. Since the 
best strategy to respond to the crisis is contextual, an organization or a person sometimes uses 
‘try and error strategy’. By being creative and rational, people are able to be adaptive and 
accommodative with the unpredictable situation.  If the strategy is done consistently and as a 
routine it can be a new structure that helps people to recover the crisis effectively in the future.  
It is a process of structuration.    
  Furthermore, not only an organizational structure can interplay with the action but also 
the larger structures or the structures in environment. In organizational context, structure 
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focuses on the organizational rules and resources, as said by Poole and the organization’s 
members are active and capable to create and recreate the structure of the organization. But, 
how do about rules and resources in the community and other organizational publics? They 
have their own structure which might be different from the organization’s structure. It is 
difficult to understand that an agency and a structure of the organization can’t be affected by 
the other structures. I want to say that the member of the organization has a free will. They are 
capable to adapt and adjust both the rules and resources of their organization and the other 
external structures. Both of them are interconnected by communication.   
On context of the research I have found that all the presidents of the Republic of 
Indonesia tend to apply defensive strategy in any situations of crisis. Apologizing was done in 
the context of defense her or his reputation. Usually they put apology in the larger context 
where the mistakes do not only belong to them as the actor but also the other actors in the 
other systems or supra system.  However, high pressures from the external or international 
publics seem so highly influence the president to apply accommodative strategy. It can be 
connected with the image damage on international publics that might happen in the future. As 
we know, Indonesia is thought as the nation which is very dependent on the developed 
countries, such as USA. In many areas, USA still hold high power to affect Indonesian’s 
political economy policies, even though this country has tried to claim that there is no overseas 
intervention. It means that the structure in the larger systems or organizational environment 
also constrain for the action. Theoretically, on the basis of the system theory and structuration 
theory, it is hard for the system to be separated from the external environment. There is always 
‘take and give’ between the system and environment, and also ‘interplaying’ between the 
structure and the agency. Structure here covers the external structure and agency, - two 
elements which are not a part of the organization’s structure and agents. It is important to note 
that the greater tension from external publics, the greater tension to an organization applies the 
accommodative strategy. 
Beside the pressure for the environment, the pressure from media has a high impact on 
the decision of the organization to respond to the crisis. As described earlier, in crisis, 
communication will be a fundamental element to bind an organization and its environment, and 
also the structure and the agency. High quality of communication is determinant for an 
organization to overcome the crisis. Media as one of its elements can’t be separated from 
communication. Mass media have a very important role to create good or bad news for crisis 
resolution. Media also determines what public’s thinking and action toward the organization 
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and vice verse in crisis. Good relationship between an organization and media will more useful 
for crisis recovering. Good relationship leads the media to give positive tension or pressure by 
creating crisis reportage in balance and objective way, focusing the interest of organization and 
public in equal position. Good relationship is indicated by a willingness of an organization to be 
open for information sharing and exchange, keeping honesty to publics and trusting media in 
crisis communication. 
In conclusion, there are several conditions when the accommodative strategy is applied, 
namely: (1) an organization has a good relationship with the media, (2) there is a high pressure 
from international publics, and (3) there is a high threat of image damage. And, by using the 
accommodative strategy, good relationship between an organization and media will be 
established and the ‘interventional pressure from international public’ will reduce. And it leads 
the decreasing of threat of image damage of the crisis. And, in turn, it can drive the 
organization or people to use the accommodative strategy in responding to the crisis. It 
happens continuously and keeps sustainable. These repetitive actions will produce the structure. 
Accomodative strategy will be a new structure that leads people’s behavior.     
There is always interaction and interplay between an action and a structure, between a 
structure and an agency, a system and an environment. By using the system theory, the selected 
strategy to respond to crisis can’t be separated from the environment, such as other publics, 
situations of the crisis, and the relationship between organization and the environment. By 
using structuration theory, the strategy always produces and reproduced by the interaction and 
communication among people in an organization by utilizing rules and resources, and between 
the action itself and the organizational structure.  
Finally, the strategy of crisis response is always connected with the several factors.  
However these factors can not be the determinativeness. It is the main difference of this study, 
especially if it is compared to the study of the crisis communication in the area of profitable or 
commercial institution. In the context of politic or political institution, it is more difficult to 
predict or to set the factors leads to the strategy of crisis response than those in the other 
context or other areas. In political area, ‘something’ behind the individual’s action is more 
playful than those, for instances, in the economic area. There are so many hidden agenda, both 
in the level of organization and individual. It is not rare there is no definite boundary between 
organizational and the personal interest.  By using structuration theory, it is easier to analyze the 
hidden meaning of the personal action and the rules and resources, the structure and agency in 
order to set the factors which play in crisis communication strategy.   So, it is more difficult to 
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make conclusion, what factors will lead to the organization to take what crisis communication 
strategy, what factors as causes and as result. They both are interacting.    
 
5.4. RECOMMENDATION  
5.4.1. Practical Implication  
Based on the result of this research, I want to say that it is useful for the president or the 
government to be “public relations practitioner” for themselves especially in crisis. It means 
that they need to improve their organizational and personal reputation first and next they need 
to increase their communication competence, both strategically and technically, personally and 
publicly. An ability to assess a crisis situation correctly is the important part of the 
communication competence. It needs ability and willingness to analyze the content of media, 
statistical data and public voices or public opinion. Building good relationship with the publics, 
especially with international publics and media persons, is the most important thing to be done. 
In order to create good relationship, the presidents must be mindful, talkative, and positive 
personality. It is necessary to make them to be positively responsive to the crisis. The strategy 
of accommodative communication in crisis is better to apply. This strategy will lead those 
people or organization to attain good reputation and good image. Learning by everything is 
good to make improvement of our next action and to maintain something which is correct. 
Adopting what the past government done is not always bad. If it is an effective strategy and it is 
still effective for the current situation, why we don’t do it? In crisis, there are some structures 
must be remained, made more stable. We just do reproduction of the structure. On the other 
hand, why do we have to follow the existed track or rules if we are able to find and do new 
strategies or new rules which are more effective? By creating new strategy, new action, 
government is able to produce new structure. For this purpose, we need people who are 
powerful, dominate, legitimate and having communication competence. The kind of people is 
capable to use rules and resources to create or produce new structures through their action and 
interaction. We need people who are active listening public’s voices and courageous to act 
something new for fulfilling public’s interest.    
Additionally, learning the other structures, outside of the organizational structure is also 
important. However, an organization can’t be free from the influences the external situation, 
therefore we need to make productive balancing between remaining the internal state and 
adapting the change of environment. It is including the presidents, in a certain situation, they 
need to remain their character and personal attributes and in a different situation they need to 
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change their own personal attribute to adapt, adopt and take the influences from outside. It is 
the most important in the crisis situation that they need to combine the two ways. By this way, 
the president may find the best strategy to respond to the crisis by applying the accommodative 
strategy. And in turn, she or he is able to transform   an action to be a social practice or social 
structure.   
 
5.4.2. Academic Implication 
This research found a new insight of Public Relations field. In general, researchers used more 
objective theories than subjective or interpretive theories. The structural functionalism tended 
to be applied to analyze the organization and its behavior. In context of crisis responses 
strategy, success or failure of the crisis recovery is seen more as a product of the organization. 
Leader or the member of organization is seen as a part of the structure not as a single entity or 
personal. In this research, I give a new addition of PR knowledge, that the failure or success of 
the crisis recovery is also a product of the individuals with all their personal attributes and 
characters and how they have free willingness to use the rules and resources to create strategy 
and action. The system or rules and resources of the organization may be conducive and 
support for applying certain strategy to respond to the crisis, but in the end, it does not 
guarantee for the effectiveness of the crisis recovery. It may because of the personal attributes 
and characters that do not support that strategy. In turn, crisis is not going to the end.  
However, it can happen conversely.  In the basis of this finding, we need to look at the 
personal attributes and characters to analyze the effectiveness of crisis strategy. It may be right 
to say that there is no need strategy or, even, an organizational manual guide for responding to 
the crisis. It can be a creation of the individual and personal creativity. It could be spontaneous 
and unique. The member of the organization can be a smart and rational individual so she or he 
can think and respond to the crisis in the right way. Especially in a crisis, where an organization 
can be in a critical position, even in the chaotic situation, everything can change unpredictably. 
It needs a member of organization who is mindful, open for entering to something new and 
easily adapts the dynamic of the environment, including the dynamic of the relationship with 
the publics and media.               
In the aspect of the research methodology, it is useful to use quantitative content 
analysis of textual speech to ensure that there is causal relationship between the factors and 
which factors may be more determinable for the effectiveness of the crisis response strategy. By 
doing it, we can identify which strategy will be the most effective to maintain and create good 
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image in the crisis situation. Observation research or full participation research where the 
researcher can observe directly to the action of the research subject in responding to the crisis 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE LIST OF WRITTEN SPEECHES OF 
• HM SOEHARTO (1997/1998) 
• BJ HABIBIE (1999) 
• MEGAWATI (2001-2004) 
 
 
No Date Place Occasion 
HM Soeharto 
1 August 16th, 1997  Jakarta Board of Indonesian Parliament’s 
Annual Meeting 
2 March 1st 1998 Jakarta Board of People Representative’ s  
Meeting 
3 May 1st 1998 Jakarta Board of Indonesian Parliament’s 
meeting 
BJ Habibie 
1 August 16th 1999 Jakarta Board of Indonesian Parliament’s 
Annual Meeting 
2 October 17th 1999 Jakarta Board of People Representative’ s  
Meeting 
Megawati Soekarnoputri 
1 August 16th 2001 Jakarta Board of People Representative’ s  
Meeting 
2 August 30th 2001 Jakarta Seminar “National Development 
Strategy” 
3 September 3rd 2001 Jakarta Indonesian Leader Attorney’s Meeting 
4 October 5th 2001 Jakarta Ceremony of Indonesian National 
Army’ Anniversary 
5 October 14th 2001 Jakarta Celebration of Isra Mi’raj of The 
Prophet Muhammad Day 
6 October 29th 2001 Jakarta Coordination Meeting of National 
Development 
7 November 16th 2001 Jakarta Dialogue Meeting between Local and 
Central Government 
8 November 30th 2001 Jakarta Briefing of the Course for National 
Defense Institution 
9 December 2nd 2001 Jakarta Celebration of Nuzulul Qor’an Day 
10 December 5th 2001 Jakarta Primaniyarta Award  
11 December 13th 2001 Jakarta Ceremony of Praspa Indonesian 
National Army and Police 
12 December 22nd 2001 Jakarta Celebration of Mother Day 
13 December 27th 2001 Jakarta Opening Ceremony of Conference of 
“Persatuan Perintis Kemerdekaan” 
14 December 27th 2001 Jakarta  National Christmas Celebration 
15 December 29th 2001 Jakarta Celebration of Juang Kartika Day 
16 February 8th 2002 Banjarmasin Celebration of National Press Day 
17 February 11th 2002 Jakarta Coordination Meeting of State 
Apparatuses Empowerment  
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18 February 13th 2002 Jakarta State Banquet with the President of 
Kroasia  
19 February 14th 2002 Jakarta Closing Meeting of the Leader of 
National Army 
20 February 17th 2002 Jakarta Celebration of Chinese New Year 
21 April 16th 2002 Jakarta Short Course of Institution of National 
Defense 
22 April 17th 2002 Jakarta Opening Ceremony of Workshop of 
Small and Middle Business   
23 April 19th 2002 Jakarta Reception of Anniversary of “Gerakan 
Pemuda Anshor”  
24 April 19th 2002 Palembang Opening of Working Meeting of 
“Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia” 
25 April 22nd 2002 Jakarta Opening Ceremony of International 
Conference of “Jaminan Akses 
Informasi Publik” 
26 April 25th 2002 Jakarta  State Banquet for Prime Minister of  
Republic of Laos   
27 May 2nd 2002 Jakarta Celebration of National Education Day 
28 May 6th 2002 Jakarta State Banquet for PM New Zealand  
29 May 10th 2002 Jakarta Seminar “Pengembangan Peran Serta 
Masyarakat dalam Peningkatan 
Investasi” 
30 May 17th 2002 Jakarta State Banquet for UNO General 
Secretary   
31 May 20th 2002 Denpasar Ceremony of the Day of National 
Resurgence 
32 May 24th 2002 Jakarta Celebration of Maulid Nabi 
33 June 24th 2002 Yogyakarta The Opening Ceremony of the Sixth 
Asian Conference in Religion and 
Peace 
34 Juli 1st 2002 Jakarta The Celebration of Bhayangkara Day 
35 July 2nd 2002 Jakakarta Asean Multilateral Intelligence 
Exchange 
36 August 16th 2002 Jakarta Annual State Report for Board of 
Parliament  
37 October 3rd 2002 Jakarta Isra Mi’raj Day 
38 October 5th 2002 Jakarta Anniversary of Indonesian National 
Army  
39 October 18th 2002 Jakarta National Meeting of PEPABRI 
40 November 21st 2002 Jakarta Nuzulul Qor’an 
41 November 25th 2002 Jakarta Regular Course for Institution of 
National Defense 
42 December 13th 2002 Jakarta Nusantara Day  
43 December 16th 2002 Jakarta Congress of KNPI 
44 December 31st 2002 Jakarta State Address for year’s end 
45 January 30th 2003 Jakarta  Cooperation among nation in terrorism 
combating conference  
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46 February 9th 2003 Denpasar  Anniversary of Indonesian National 
Press 
47 February 27th 2003 Jakarta -- 
48 May 2nd 2003 Subang National Education Day 
49 May 20th 2003 Jakarta Annual Meeting of Political Party 
50  June 9th 2003 Jakarta -- 
51 July 1st 2003 Tangerang Anniversary of Indonesian National 
Police 
52 August 1st 2003 Jakarta Annual Speeches address The 
Indonesian Legislative 
53  August 8th 2003 Jakarta Anniversary of ASEAN 
54 August 8th 2003 Bandung Inauguration of STPDN Graduation 
55 July 14th 2003 Denpasar Seminar “The Development of 
National Law” 
56 October 2nd 2003 Palangkaraya Congress of Association of Indonesian 
Journalists 
57 September 5th 2003 Jakarta Working Meeting of the Leaders of 
Local Government 
58 November 12th 2003 Jakarta Literacy Day 
59 November 13th 2003 Jakarta Briefing of Institution of National 
Defense 
60 December 7th 2003 Denpasar  United in Diversity Forum 
61 December 23rd 2003 Jakarta Working Meeting of the Governor 
62 January 12th 2004 Jakarta The Month of Safety and Health 
Working 
63 January 24th 2004 Jakarta  The State Banquet for PM of 
Bangladesh 
64 February 4th 2004 Denpasar  Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting 
65 February 10th 2004 Jakarta National Press Day 
66 February 11th 2004 Jakarta  Refreshing of National Character 
Building 
67 March 3rd 2004 Makassar 
 
Coordination Meeting of the 
empowerment of the State Apparatuses
68 March 3rd 2004 Ambon Working Meeting of the Association of 
Local Government 
69 March 8th 2004 Pakanbaru Working Meeting of coordination 
Board of Landscape 
70 May 1st 2004 Jakarta Maulid Nabi 
71 May 5th 2004  Jakarta National Education Day 
72 May 13th 2004 Jakarta Commemoration of May 13 1998 
73 May 17th 2004 Jakarta Working Meeting of Religion 
Department Officers 
74 May 18th 2004  Jakarta Government statement 
75 May 24th 2004 Jakarta  Celebration of National Resurgence 
day 
76 May 27th 2004 Jakarta National Working Meeting of KNPI 
77 May 31st 2004 Jakarta National Working Meeting of Local 
Government 
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78 June 5th 2004 Tondano The Week of Farmer Meeting 
79 June 7th 2004 Jakarta The Dialogue for Micro Business Units 
80 June 7th 2004 Jakarta Earth Day  
81 June 17th 2004 Jakarta Technical Meeting for General 
Indonesia Attorney 
82 June 17th 2004 Jakarta Jakarta Fair 
83 June 21st 2004 Denpasar Annual Session of AALCo 
84 June 30th 2004 Jakarta Annual Meeting of ASEAN Ministers 
85 July 3rd 2004 Semarang Bhayangkara Day 
86 July 22nd 2004 Jakarta Adhyaksa Day 
87 Juli 31st 2004 Surabaya  The Meeting of Apeksi 
88 August 5th 2004 Jatinangor Inauguration of STPMD graduation 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE LIST OF KOMPAS’ EDITORIAL 





No   TITLE  Date of published
Year 2000 
1 Ya benar, Memerintah itu ternyata harus membuat  
keputusan  
Wed, 16-02-00 
2 Perlu diingatkan lagi memerintah itu melihat ke depan, 
antisipasi 
 Wed, 22-11-00 
Year 2001 
1 Elite politik berutang kepada rakyat Thurs, 26-07-01 
2 Berlakunya otonomi membuka sejarah baru Wed, 03-01-01 
3 Sebarapa jauh dendam bagian dari motivasi… Sat, 17-02-01 
4 Jika tukang pos sampai unjuk rasa Wed, 04-04-01 
5 Kini semua menyetujui jalan institusional Fri, 18-05-01 
6 Akan memenuhi kewajiban sebaik-baiknya.. Thurs, 28-06-01 
7 Elite Politik berutang kepada rakyat  Thurs, 27-07-01 




9 Bom meledak dimana-mana Fri, 03-08-01 




11 Kabinet baru terutama tim ekonominya dinilai cukup 
menjanjikan 
 
 Fri, 10-08-01 
12 Mengapa pidato kenegaraan Presiden Megawati dinilai bagus  
Sat , 18-08-01 
13 Perbaikan penegakan hukum kita kendalanya pada manusia  
 Fri, 24-08-01 




15 RAPBN belum cukup kuat… Sat , 08-09-01 
16 Perbaikan Hidup rakyat jadi ukuran sukses.. Thurs , 25-10-01 
17 Koruptor itu mencuri harta Negara… Tues, 30-10-01 
18 Belum banyak kabar baik yang bisa dilaporkan.. Sat , 03-11-01 
19 Mengapa 100 hari Pemerintahan Megawati dibahas… Tues , 20-11-01 
20 Kepada Mantan Presiden Soeharto… Sat, 22-12-01 
21 Sejak 1974 hidup sederhana jadi jargon… Fri , 28-12-01 
Year 2002 
1 Lawatan Presiden tentu diikuti dengan berbagai harapan Sat , 31-08-02 
2 Apakah kita mulai memasuki era penegakan hukum… Wed , 09-01-02 
3 Ingat, persoalan yang harus kita selesaikan bukan banjur 
semata 
 
Wed , 06-02-02 
4 Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan… Thurs, 28-02-02 
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5 Perbaiki perilaku tidak terkecuali pengusaha BUMN Tues, 14-05-02 
6 Apa yang dilakukan untuk mengantisipasi krisis … Fri , 26-07-02 
7 Seberapa jauh pengadilan semakin dapat kita andalkan Fri , 06-09-02 
8 Pemberantasan KKN bukan hanya tanggung jawab MA Fri , 29-11-02  
   
Year 2003 
1 Perbaikan lembaga yudikatif tidak cukup hanya dengan 
mengeluh 
Mon , 13-01-03 
2 Agar dibuka peluang dan Kemauan untuk duduk bersama… Tues , 14-01-03 
3  Bagiamana menilai reformasi yang genap berusia 5 tahun Tues , 20-05-03 
4 Korupsi salah satu isu sentral Capres 2004 Mon , 04-08-03 
























6 Kadin memerangi suap, mungkinkah?  Sat, 04-10-03  
7 Tentang berita laksamana tolak tanda tangani pakta anti 
suap  
 
Thurs , 30-10-03   
8 Partai Politik jangan salah lagi memilih caleg Thurs , 20-11-03 
9 Apa makna tampilnya Mbak Tutut sebagai Capres?     Fri, 05-12-03 
10 Pertemuan Megawati-Hasjim Muzadi menarik Perhatian Mon , 16-02-03 
Year 2004 
1 Pembubaran BPPN dan Indikator Akhir Masa Krisis Mon , 01-03-04 
2 Debat Presiden di panggung terbuka Fri , 02-07-04 
3 Karaha Bodas dan Pemberantasan KKN Fri , 20-08-04 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE LIST OF KOMPAS’ EDITORIAL 





No  Title Date of published
Tahun 2001 
1 Tepatkah kunjungan Presiden Megawati ke AS..? Mon , 17-09-01 
2 Di Amerika Presiden Megawati diperhitungkan  Sat , 22-09-01 
3 Tidak apa-apa bermain api, asal kita sanggup membayar Mon, 01-10-01 
4 Kedatangan Presiden Megawati ditunggu oleh sejumlah 
pekerjaan mendesak 
Mon , 01-10-01 
 
















9 Kereta tabrakan, banjir mengancam, perampokan sadis… Sat, 27-10-01 
10 Pembubuhan Teys harus diungkap…  Tues ,13-11-01 
11 Mengapa kita tak berani mencanangkan tahun 2002 … Sat, 29-12-01  
Tahun 2002 
12 Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan di tengah kita 
membangun ekonomi 
 
Thurs , 28-02-02 
13 Isu terorisme jangan memecah belah  Mon, 23-09-02 
14 Dalam kasus bom bali yang dipertaruhkan Indonesia Mon, 14-10-02 
15 Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan… Thurs , 28-02-02 
16 Di Meksiko Presiden harus siap membela Indonesia Wed , 23-10-02  
17 RI dan Singapora tegaskan kerjasama melawan terorisme Wed , 18-12-02 
Tahun 2003 
18 Tentu saja Indonesia tersinggung atas ketentuan AS  Mon, 20-01-03 
19 Hubungan Indonesia-Australia dan lainnya  Mon, 17-02-03 
20 Perlu didukung ide jadikan ASEAN Zona Bebas terror  Wed, 02-07-03 
21 Tanda-tanda menunjukkan Indonesia tahan guncangan Mon, 11-08-03 
22 Hukuman mati Amrozi bukanlah akhir cerita  Sat, 09-08-03 
23 Kita diibaratkan tambang emas di medan ranjau Sat, 16-08-03 
24 Presiden dan Wapres bergantian melawat ke luar negeri Wed, 24-09-03 
25 Presiden desak para pemimpin dunia cabut akar terorisme Fri, 26-09-03 
26 Kunjungan Bush ke Bali dalam perspektif hubungan RI-AS  Wed, 22-10-03 
27 Tragedi Bom Bali Diperingati sebagai tragedy kemanusiaan Sat, 11-10-03 
Tahun 2004 
28 Ledakan bom di KPU dan pemilihan ulang di Al-Zaytun Tues , 27-07-04 
29 Momentum ini jangan sampai gagal lagi Wed, 22-09-04 
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APPENDIX 4 









No Title Date 
1998-2000 
 1 Pengakuan yang Menyakitkan September 22nd  98 
2 Akbar-Mega Sudahlah, Guru Bangsa April 11th 99 
3 Diamnya Mega July 15th 99 
4 Pers yang Jujur November 20th 2000 
2001 
1 Reformasi Kedua January 25th  
2 Politik Tanpa Etika February 6th  
3 Matinya Nurani Pemimpin February 15th  
4 Godaan  Buat Tentara March 8th  
5 Indonesia Tanpa Simbol April 18th  
6 Monster Kekuasaan April 20th  
7 Politik (adu) Massa January 29th  
8 Demokrasi atau Anarkhisme May 31st
9 Belajar Mencari Jalan Damai June 20th  
10 Diktator Baru Negeri ini July 23rd  
11 Selamat Datang Presiden Baru July 24th  
12 Mega dan Juru Bicara August 1st  
13 Membaca nurani melalui Rupiah August 2nd
14 Kesadaran Baru tentang Utang August 29th  
15 Mencari Mutiara yang Hilang September 4th  
16 Kesabaran untuk Aceh  September 9th  
17 Nasionalisme melalui Rupiah September 28th  
18 Politik Goyang September 30th  
19 Pujian dan Serangan terhadap Megawati October 18th  
20 Menertawakan DPR October 25th
21 Seratus Hari dalam Kesunyian November 1st  
22 Negara Harus Kuat December 14th  
23 Contoh dari Malino December 21st
  
